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Chapter I
Introduction
One of the main characteristics of the economic system
of the United states during the last decade has been the
spending of money by the Federal Government • As a result of
such spending, the Federal Budget has become unbalanced and
taxes of all kinds have Increased, Critics of the New Deal
have considered this spending as unnecessary, and have blamed
the policies of the Roosevelt administrations for the failure
of private business to recover permanently from the Great
Depression which began in the fall of 1929, Friends of the
New Deal, on the other hand, have considered the spending
as necessary to offset the lack of business spending.
Economists of the Hew Deal have spoken in terms of "pump-
priming", thus indicating a method in the apparent madness
of excessive spending.
To students of New Deal economics this method in
apparent madness consists of a theory, the essence of which
is that expenditures on public v/orks, as well as other public
expenditures, can stimulate the economic system of a country
so that private business will recover from the depths of
economic depression and continue on its own momentum, after
which public expenditures of great magnitude can be stopped.
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Introduction
One of the main characteristics of the economic system
of the United states during the last decade has been the
spending of money by the Federal G-overnment, As a result of
such spending, the Federal Budget has become unbalanced and
taxes of all kinds have increased. Critics of the New Deal
have considered this spending as unnecessary, and have blamed
the policies of the Roosevelt i^dministrat ions for the failure
of private business to recover permanently from the Great
Depression which began in the fall of 1929, Friends of the
New Deal, on the other hand, have considered the spending
as necessary to offset the lack of business spending.
Economists of the New Deal have spoken in terms of "pump-
priming", thus indicating a method in the apparent madness
of excessive spending.
To students of New Deal economics this method in
apparent madness consists of a theory, the essence of which
is that expenditures on public works, as well as other public
expenditures, can stimulate the economic system of a country
so that private business v;ill recover from the depths of
economic depression and continue on its own momentum, after
which public expenditures of great magnitude can be stopped.
c
This theory is not a product of economic thouj^ht in
the United States. Countries such as France, (iermany, Sweden,
and England used it before the United States, although never
on such a wide scale as this country. It is often said that
the theory reached the New Deal through the English economist,
John Maynard Keynes, Undoubtedly, Keynes influenced the New
Deal economists; economic thinkers of other countries have
always placed a mark on economic thought in this country. It
remains, hov;ever, that each country has had its ov.ti experi-
ence with economic doctrines, and this is true of the United
States and the theory of public works as a recovery measure.
Purpose of This Thesis
It was the purpose of this thesis (1) to study the
development in the United States of the theory of public works
as a recovery measure; (2) to set forth the main important
aspects of the theory as advocated by economists and en-
lightened students of the subject; (3) to describe the New
Deal*s public works programs 1933-1937; and (4) to endeavor
to learn from a study of the views of several noted economists
whether or not government spending brought the recovery of
business that ended with the recession of the fall of 1937,
Validation of the Thesis
Although the business cycle has been studied in great
detail for many years, it revolves in seemingly greater

3intensity and we have not found a renedy to prevent it. It
is not with a spirit of defeatism that one can say that we
are still at the mercy of the evil cycle and its attendant
misery, altnough we are now better prepared than v/e were once
to combat the economic foe. Until a remedy for the cyclical
turns of business is found economists cannot rest in peace.
Remedies have been proposed. Among them is tnat involved in
the theory of public works as a recovery measure, a theory
which has many firm adherents, No government has ever Jut
this theory in all its details into practice, although the
New Deal has come close to it. It is of extreme importance to
understand the American background of the theory, the details
of the theory, and to know if possible what it accomplished
when partly put into practice by the Kew Deal, If v/e can
reach such an understanding we shall be in a better position
to appraise "pump-priming" and thus one major proposed remedy
for the business cycle.
Scope of the Thesis
The first half of the thesis traces the development
of the theory of public works as a recovery measure in the
United States, Chapters II and III are concerned with the
role of cities and states in the development. Chapters IV
and V are related to the role of the Federal Government through
the Hoover Administration. Chapter VI presents the ideas of
several important theorists and writers on the subject.

The second half of the thesis presents the theory as
advocated by economists and enlightened students of the sub-
ject, and describes the New Deal public works programs in
relation to it. Chapter VII presents the theory. Chapter
VIII describes the New Deal^s public works programs. Chapter
IX attempts an evaluation of the theory as put into practice
by the New Deal,

Chapter II
Cities and Public Vrforks
To trace the development of the theory of public works
as a recovery measure in the United States it seems proper
to begin with a survey of what cities have done to meet the
problem of unemployment. Such a problem is considered today
to be of national importance and serious enough to v/arrant
the interference of all units of government - federal, state,
and local, in order to allay the suffering and misery that
accompany it. This conception, however, has not alv/ays pre-
vailed. In the second half of the nineteenth century, when
industrial depressions began to be of regular occurrence,
unemployment was considered a local problem to be met only by
the immediate unit of government - the city or town. Among
the measures adopted by the cities to avert the starvation,
undernourishment, and unrest caused by the discharging of
workers when a depression arrived, was the employing of the
jobless on public work. The public authorities foimd work to
do and paid the unemployed to do It. The motive actuating
these authorities was relief of distress. There was no
thought of reviving business by public v/ork. The feeling
prevailed that business would revive Itself and all that
could be done In the meantime was to prevent distress. The
survey in this chapter indicates the nature of the public
work initiated by our cities.

The Depression of 1855
It is a minor depression in the year 1855 that students
of the subject of cities and public works as a remedy for
unemployment turn to for important material. The City of New
York is undoubtedly the most important of the cities to use
public work in the depression to relieve unemployment. The
Commissioners of Immigration of the city had to face the
1
problem of 3400 unemployed immii^rants. Alms had been given
to unemployed v;orkers, in accordance "with one of the pre-
vailing methods of relieving distress, but the Commissioners
grew tired of alms application and decided to put all able-
2bodied males to work on enlarging the Erie Canal,
Such a method of relieving unemployment is worthy of
comment because the work provided was really constructive.
It removed the stigma of receiving alms and wages for doing
work that was of questionable worth. Men employed on such
a project as enlarging the Erie Canal must have felt that
i
their efforts were of some avail.
The Depression of 1857- 1858
Two years after the City of New York's commendable
experiment, a severe depression fell upon the country, and
i
Raphael Margolin, Public Works as a Remedy For Un-
employment in the United States, unpublished Master's Thesis,
Columbig UnT?eriTty, New York City, 1928, p. 11.
Bryce Stewart, Unempl oyment Benefits in the United
States , New York, Industrial Relations CounseTors, Incor-
porated, 1930, p. 53.

7a reported momber of 5000 banks failed with liabilities of
some ;;?300,000,000.'^ In the year 1857, several cities pro-
vided work for the many unemployed.
In New York City it was estimated that 70,000 were
imemployed. To meet the dire need tnat prevailed, kayor
Fernando wood sent a messa,^e to the common council, saying:
"I recommend that the comptroller be authorized to
advertise for estimates for furnishings corporation
with 50,000 barrels of flour and a corresponding quan-
tity of corn-meal and potatoes, to be paid for by the
issue of a public construction stock redeemable in fifty
years, and paying 7 per cent interest; these provisions
to be disposed of to laborers to be employed upon public
works, at their cost price to the corporation, all these
works to be commenced forthwith under the proper depart-
ments. Twenty-five per cent should be paid in cash.
Every man who will labor should be employed at a fair
compensation, and the supplies thus provided be dis-
tributed in return."'*
This suggestion does not appear to have been acted
upon but it indicated that there was some one who had a
rational conception of the type of public work tnat snould
be provided for the unemployed, Ihe use of the expression
"public works is noteworthy, and that of "fair compensation"
evidence that some one believed that wages for unemployed
workers whould be more than those of a subsistence level.
Elmer C. Bratt, Bus iness Cycles and Forecasting , re-
vised edition, Chicago, Bus Iness ir'ublications
,
inc., 1940, p. 41*;,
4
Report of the 1.Massachusetts Board to Investigate the
Subject of the Unemployed
,
1895, Ft. IV, pp. 7-8, cited by
John R. Commons and John ^, Andrews, frinc iples of Labor
Legislation , fourth revised edition, iNi'ew York, narper and
Brothers, Publishers, 1936, p. 28,
c
8Although this plan was not adopted, work was provided for the
unemployed. It consisted mostly of street cleaning and stone
quarrying. In addition. Central Jr'ark being under construction
at that time, the city comptroller made arrangements to advance
to the park commissioners :;$10,000 to employ 1000 workers at
$1.00 a day until the city took <?25,000 of bonds.
In Philadelphia, on November 12, 1857, 10,000 workers
arrived at Independence Square to exert pressure uuon their
representatives in the State House. ^ Their efforts were of
little avail, iwayor Vaux was a believer in spending money
in times of emergency, but the City Council was not. The
latter demanded economy. As a result of txiis spirit of econo-
my, even in the face of the advocation of public v/orks for
employment by the influential Twenty-fourth uavd rtelief Asso-
ciation, suggestions for v/ork on parks and highways were
defeated. Both chambers of the city government, however,
authorized four large culverts and more reservoirs "to such
an extent and amount as money can be provided to pay for , . .
without impairing the public credit •"'^ Public work was thus
p?ovided by the city, but it can be seen that there was a
reluctance to do so, a reluctance which was encountered at
5
Leah Hannah Feder, Unemployment Relief In Periods of
Depression, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1936, p. 32.
Journal of Select Council (Philadelphia), November 19,
1857, to May 7, 1858. Appendix 22, p. 32, Feder, Uneraplo^ent
Relief In Periods of Depression, p. 32.

that time in many cities and required many years to dispel
entirely. In this incident in Philadelphia it is interesting
to observe the reference to the irapairincS of public credit.
Public authorities have always feared the impairing of public
credit by expenditures on public works, and this fear has been
a factor in retarding the growth of the theory of public works
as a recovery measure.
Chicago released work for the unemployed in this de-
pression. Men were put to work mostly on the streets. Only
two days work per man in a week at 75 cents a day was afforded,
and even at that it was suggested that wages be reduced 50 per
7
cent so that one third more men could be employed. This
illustrates how an effort was made, as in other cities, to
provide only part time v;ork at low wages. Moreover, the work
on the streets was of questionable quality. The spirit of
workers that prevails in the construction of a useful build-
ing or some other worthy public project does not exist in
work of questionable value.
It is the City of Newton, Massachusetts that came near-
est to applying the idea of constructing real public works,
and not mere public work to keep men employed. The new road
that was built, and on which were employed 60 men and 25 teams,
represented work that was of real value to the community. If
such an example had been followed by other cities, the idea
p. 32.
Peder, Unemployment Relief In Periods of Depression
r
of public works as a remedy for unemployment would have found
more adherents and not encountered criticism through the
questionable value of most of the work.
These examples may suffice to indicate that public work
for the unemployed was afforded as early in our history as
pre-Civil War days. Most of the work would not meet the stan-
dards set by modern public works advocates, but there was
evidence that improvement was not beyond expectation.
The Depression of 1875- 1879
The years 1873-1879 witnessed one of the severest and
longest depressions of the nineteenth centui-'y, and unemployed
workers were found in great numbers. Again the cities en-
deavored to meet the problem by providing work.
In the City of Indianapolis, during the first year of
the depression, an incident occurred, which presents evidence
that some of the ideas of modern public works theorists were
at least existent in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. As reported by the Indianap olis Journal on December 22,
1873, the Indianapolis Trades Assembly, which was represen-
tative of 3000 skilled trade union members, requested the
Common Council to provide public works.
"...for the numbers of workingmen now suffering des-
titution and almost starvation, by causing to be pro-
secuted certain public works which are a necessity to
the city, and which can be done cheaper now than the
same labour can be performed in the spring, such as
building sewers, bridges, repairing streets, and so
forth, thereby doing a charity to many impoverished
r
families and at the same time rendering a benefit to the
taxpayer"
8
The arguments involved in the plea, especially those in re-
ference to work being done cheaper at that time, the benefit-
ting of the taxpayer, and the constructing of necessary works,
are reminiscent of the arguments of modern public works
theorists
.
Boston was among the first of the cities to provide
work in this depression. In December 1875 the Committee on
Paving was ordered by the Boston Board of Aldermen to employ
men on grading the streets, breaking stones, and removing
rock from ledges. The wages were ^1.00 a day, and to obtain
employment a worker had to have dependents and make appli-
9
cation to the Overseers of the Poor. It is apparent that
this work was of the "relief" type. Indeed the Boston Daily
Journal of January 3, 1876 commented that the men did not earn
10
the money they received. In reference to this type of work
being performed, Edward Everett Hale remarked;
"In the nature of things, there is no reason why street-
mending should be a work of charity. Still, as the city
of Boston is, by its Street Department, a large employer
of unskilled labor; as a great deal of work, in the
breaking of stones and perhaps in other lines of street
work, might be done in winter which would naturally be
done in summer, - it does not seem unreasonable to ask
that early arrangements may be made for taking on as many
° Indianapolis Journal , Decemoer 22, 1873, Cited by
Feder, Unemployment Relief In Periods of Depress ion
, p. 67.
9
Feder, Unemployment Relief In Periods of Depression
,
p. 67.
*-*^Ibid., p. 68 .

11laborers as possible in the winter months."
Such a statement in in contrast to the prevailing attitude
that public work for the unemployed is in reality charity.
Instrumental in the providing of work in Boston was the
Industrial Aid Society for the Prevention of Pauperism, which,
though a private organization, greatly influenced the stimu-
lating of public work for the unemployed. A wood yard was set
12
up in 1876. Moving gravel was a customary task. Even work
for women was provided, consisting of sewing and knitting in
a work room. No wages were paid the women - the garments
they made were the compensation. In the winter time the
Society made arrangemtnts with the railroads to clear ice and
snow from the tracks at wages of 10 cents an hour during the
13day and 15 cents an hour at night.
In New York State during this depression, the City of
Kingston gave work which was similar to that performed in
other cities. Men were employed breaking stones for
n
Boston Industrial Aid Society for the Prevention of
Pauperism, Forty-first Annual Report, October, 1876, p. 19,
cited by Feder, Unemployment Relief In Periods of Depression
,
p. 68.
12
Stewart, Unemployment Benefits In the United States
,
p. 54.
13
Feder, Unemployment Relief In Periods of Depression
,
p. 69.

public roads.
Other cities meeting the problem of unemployment in
a similar manner were Baltimore, Chicago, New Haven, and
Washington, D.C. The latter city during the winter of 1877-
1878 employed men on grading streets and filling up an aban-
doned canal at 50 cents a day,-^^
It may be seen from the foregoing examples that the
work provided oy the cities during such a severe depression
as that of the years 1873-1879 was primarily "relief" work.
The greatest importance we can ascribe to such work is in the
fact that it served to illustrate the inadequacies of "made"
work.
The Depression of 1895-1695
The depression during the year 1893-1895, set off by
a panic caused by the failure of the Reading Railway on Febru-
ary 20, 1893, was not of long duration, but cities provided
public work more extensively tiian they aia in previous de-
pressions. The une iployi.ient that prevailed was very severe
and was brougnt to the attention of the nation as a whole
partly by Goxey and his array, who stormed the national cap-
14
Abraham Epstein, Insecurity A Challenge to America
,
New York, Harrison Smith and Robert Haas^ 19537 pTS8"3^
15
Stewart, Unemployment Benefits In the United States,
p. 54,
cI
3.
6
Itol in 1894. During this depression there was a striking
improvement in tne concept of public work as a remedy for
unemployment, for the cities seemed to have a broader view
17
of the question. In general, however the work was of the
"relief" type.
New York City was among the many cities to provide work.
Here the East Side Relief Work Committee and the West Side
Relief Committee, private organizations, accomplished a lot in
this direction, although the work was of questionable impor-
tance. Refuse was cleared from tenement buildings and build-
ings were wnite v/ashed. Home work in sewing, knitting, and
mat and quilt making was provided for about 122 women a week
for a period of 16 weeks at wages of <?3.00 a week.-^® The
city itself authorized the Park Commissioners to spend
. 1 Q$1,000,000. on public works for the unemployed. The pre-
dominant attitude of those providing public work for the
unemployed was expressed in an article in the Charities Re-
16
p. 97.
p. 54.
p. 123.
Feder, Unemployment Relief In Periods of Depression,
17
Stewart, Unemployment Benefits In the United States,
18
Feder, Unemployment Relief In Periods of Depression
,
19
Margolin, Public Works As a Remedy For Unemployment
in the United States, p. 12.
i
view of May 1894, written by Josephine Shaw Lowell and en-
titled, "Five Months* Work for the Unemployed in New York
City", According to this article:
"The demoralizing physical and moral results of long
continued idleness have been prevented ... The same amount
of direct relief would have left the recipients weaker
in body and poorer in their only real capital, the power
to work, than they are now, and also with habits of idle-
ness, which in many cases, it would have been difficult
for them to overcome v/hen the opportunity for real work
returned. " 20
In Boston work relief was provided by the Citizen's
Relief Committee in the form of workrooms for women and rag
rug weaving for men vvho were not able to perform strenuous
labor. Vi/ork of a different nature consisted of street clean-
ing, construction, and sewerage labor.
In several cities the public authorities and private
agencies cooperated to furnish work. Buffalo, aided by the
Citizens Relief Committee, spent money on municipal improve-
ments. Cincinnati appropriated in October, 1893 $30,000 to
the Park Commissioners for the employment of 1200 men selected
21
on the basis of need. The Citizen's Committee contributed
funds to aid such improvements and also to finance women^
s
workrooms. Later 3100 men were put to work on the parks but
20Josephine Shaw Lowell, " Five Months ' vtfork for the
Unemployed in New York City V In the Charities Review , vol, 3,
May, 1894, p. 334, cited by Feder, Unemployment^Relief In Per-
iods of Depression
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there were three shifts of workers and a man could work only
one week in three. In Baltimore the Central Relief Committee
of the City installed four stone- breaking yards for a period
of ten weeks, and real v/ork at piece rates. 'Workers v/ith four
or more dependents secured $1.00 a day, those with fewer than
22four dependents secured 50 cents. Only two or three days'
work a week was provided, and only about 120 persons were em-
ployed daily. Of the $10,000 that was spent, $6,400 was paid
for wages and ^3,000 for stone. In Philadelphia the Society
for Organizing Charity raised funds for the clearing of 400
alleys and passageways, outside of regular city street clean-
ing work. Vtfages were $1,00 a day for the regular workers;
24$1.75 to t le foremen.
Other important cities furnishing work were Pittsburg,
Yilaterbury, Cleveland, and Denver. In Pittsburg a Citizen's
Relief Committee was organized v;ith the mayor of the city as
chairman. It raised $125,000, to which Carnegie gave the same
amount.^ All the money was spent on public works in the parks
22
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p . 182 •
^"^Ibid.
24
Ibid., p. 173.
25
Margolin, Public Vdorks As a Remedy For Unemployment
in the United States, p. 12.
r
where 1300 workers were employed. A Waterbury, Connecticut,
town meeting appropriated $10,000 for highway construction.
As a result, 400 resident families were aided, and six months
afterwards, another $10,000 was appropriated for water works .^^
Cleveland and Denver, Colorado initiated work that had fair
27
success but on the whole was disappointing.
To illustrate the prevailing attitude as to what wages
should be paid on pablic work, one can refer to the following
statement by a certain Philip Vn. Ayres:
"The work given must be adequate in amount to prevent
families from suffering either hunger or cold; but at the
same time it must be really hard work in order to prevent
dabbling, and it must be decidedly underpaid in order not
to attract those who already have work at half-time, or
who have otherv/ise disagreeable work. The whole must be
so unattractive as to guarantee that, when other v/ork can
be had, the laborer will seek it,"^^
Most of the time the rate of wages was iJ^ll.OO a day but
often it was only one-half of this so as to protect the nor-
mal wage. In some instances the normal wage might be paid but
the total earnings would be curtailed, as in St. Paul, where
a maximum of only $6.00 could be earned and then the worker
would be laid off until every one on the list had earned the
26
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same. In Boston a force of 5,761 working on the sewers,
streets, and indoor work, averaged total earnings of i:?9.00.
On Bedford Street in a work room each woman was paid 80 cents
a day for about eleven days . Another work room for women paid
30higher wages, as each woman received ;j^l4.93 in seventeen days.
In general the earnings of the workers were so inade-
quate that they undoubtedly would have been criticized by
modern public works theorists with t.ieir ideas of normal wages
and total earnings.
Although most of the public work that was afforded the
unemployed in this depression was of the "relief" type, there
was some that could be classified as regular public work.
Several municipalities let contracts to contractors who hired
workers at regular wages. The city of Rochester was a leader
in this field of activity, as it appropriated $36,800 for
31parks and street cleaning. A regular force was employed
four and one-third days a week, while emergency workers were
32
employed two or three days a week. Most of the cities,
however, were not successful in such public works. Legal en-
tanglements and public opinion prevented the immediate releas-
29
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ing of work. Lack of previous planning resulted in poor ad-
ministration marked by political patronage. In .*aterbury,
inclement weather and the inexperience of the workers resulted
in the city's obtaining only $4,000 worth of work for :;^10,000
spent on highway improvements. Better success was met in
Indianapolis v/here work on the streets and sewers was carried
"^4
on at savings of 20 per cent through depression prices.
In this depression the states, as heretofore, refiised
to undertake work. Their attitude was illustrated by Ohio. In
this state the States Trade Assembly requested relief from the
legislature through work on unreclaimed land and the construc-
tion of public buildings. The House Committee refused to
comply with the request, saying that the state had no surplus
money and that there was no immediate necessity for new build-
ings.^^
The depression of 1893-1897 represents a significant
stage in the evolution of the theory of public works as a re-
covery measure, because the work was of more value to the
community and wages were in some cases those prevailing in
regular work. Moreover, the weaknesses of "relief" work be-
came more apparent as inefficiency, political corruption, and
lack of planning prevailed.
33
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The Depression of 1907- 1908
The first decade of the twentieth century brought the
depression of 1907-1908, short in length but severe in its
intensity. This depression was marked by a hesitancy to pro-
vide "relief" work. The prevailing sentiment was manifested
by an editorial in the Charities and the Commons on April 4,
1908. This editorial said that it was:
"... inadvisable to suggest or advocate the substi-
tution of artificial employment on a large scale for
ordinary relief until a condition is reached in which
savings and other resources are exhausted; until labor
organizations can no longer provide for their idle mem-
bers; until general unemployment means deprivation of the
necessities of life for large ^numbers who would not be in
distress for other reasons.
Several cities, however provided small relief projects.
New York city and its wood pile are of interest, inasmuch as
an enlightened attitude was manifested by the Charity Organ-
ization Society, which sponsored the pile, when It declared
in its report of 1908 that the work was not educational but
37
a work test. In Chicago men with families were employed
by the Eli Bates Settlement at $1.35 a day (later $1.00) to
clear bad areas. The maximum period that could be worked was
six and one-half days. The Indianapolis Charity Organization
"^Editorial in the Charities and the Commons
,
April 4,
1908, cited by Feder, Unemployment Relief~ln Periods of De-
pression, pp. 214-215.
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adopted a unique plan in which cottages were built by men of
different trades and land around t.ie cottages was improved.
Visages were 15 cents an hour, paid in food or coal, and the
duration of work was only two days a week.
In the realm of regular public works there are favor-
able examples set by some cities. Newai k appropriated money
for work to employ 500 men. Philadelphia increased the school
repairs. Cleveland increased its building repairs, and order-
ed wagons, boilers, and other naterial which was really not
needed until sometime in the future, Cincinnati spent 320,000
to employ men on heavy work in parks at $1.60 a day for a
40period of only one v;eek.
In general this depression indicates that people were
cognizant of the weaknesses of work relief and more willing
to expand regular public works.
The Depression of 1910-1911
Although this depression was an extremely minor one, it
is important to students of the theory of public works as a
recovery measure because of tne method used by the City of
Duluth, Minnesota in confronting a large number of seasonal
workers, unemployed through the closing of transportation on
41
the Great Lakes.
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The city realized that at some time in the future it would
have to cut trough a wall of rock, blocking the chief thorough-
fare, so it decided to do the work beforehand in order to
employ the jobless men. Regular city employees did the work
of drilling and blasting, but the unemployed prepared the rock
for the crusher. An average of three days' work was obtained
by each unemployed worker and wages were $1,20 a day, which
was little less than the current rate so that those v/ho could
find employment elsewhere would not be attracted. To be hired
and to hold his job, a man had to be fit and willing to work.
The associated charities referred the men to the work and
gave payment in meals, clothing, employment agency fees, or
j
railroad fares, being reimbursed by the city. The experiment
was so successful that it was repeated in subsequent years.
Its influence was felt in the city's shifting much of its
sewer building to the v/inter season in order to equalize the
amount of employment. In it were many of the prerequisites
of a program of public works aiming at business recovery -
notably tjie higher wages, the efficiency demanded of the men,
and the deliberate shifting of work to a time when it was
needed to relieve unemployment.
The Depression of 1914-1915
This comparatively mild depression did not endure long,
but for a brief period enough unemployment was rife to ne-
cessitate the providing of work by the cities. The trend of
(
Improvement in the nature of the work, that had been notice-
able in previous depressions, appeared stronger in this de-
pression. Most of the work was still of the "relief" type,
but there was more work that was necessary and not just
42
"made". In addition, an effort was made to adapt work to
the abilities of the unemployed, Txiis favorable trend was
pointed out by Otto Mallery in his study for a CoraLmittee of
the President's Conference on Unemployment, he stated that
better hours and wages prevailed and the results of the work
programs were better, In most of the cases distinct savings
in labor and materials were made in performing necessary work.
Leah ri. Feder, in her excellent study, commented in the follow-
ing manner on the work done in this depression:
"Public v/orks were clearly defined in 1914-1915 as
work undertaken according to the usual procedure, either
through contracts or by direct employment on "force ac-
count^ by the city."^^
Almost 100 cities in 29 states organized public work,
financed partly by relief societies, partly by the cities
45
alone.
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Relief societies still played an important role in the finan-
cing of public v/ork, but cities assumed a greater part of the
burden as they realized more so in tliis depression that un-
employment was a municipal responsibility and was not the
fault of the workers,
Portland, Oregon had its wood cutting camps for married
46
men to clear the land and cut wood for fuel. \iVages were
$3,00 for eight hours work and four days at a time. The city
appropriated S4,500 for this purpose. In general tie men were
found to be as efficient as regular employees.
Columbus, Ohio spent ^?10,500 for its waterv/orks and
47
the results were satisfactory. in New York City the Mayor's
Committee on Unemplo3niient organized 22 workrooms and employed
5000 people daily. Such work as bandage rolling and chair
caning was done. The v/ork was for five hours a day for five
days a week with wages of 50 cents a day and lunch for men,
and 60 cents a day and no lunch for the women. Cincinnati
issued bonds and obtained $100000 for municipal improvements.
The labor was secured through relief agencies and 2815 persons
49
were employed in two weeks shifts at ^2,00 a day,
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The types of projects undertaken in the cities were
various. Among them were sewer building, street and road
making, quarrying, forestry, drainage, waterv/orks, school-
houses, painting, clerical work, and the repairing of public
buildings. Such projects were of a better quality than those
undertaken in previous depressions. Some of them had been
planned ahead, as in the case of Pittsburg, v/here ^100,000
was spent on planned public works,
Outstanding among the cities in the planning for public
works v/as Alameda, California, which adoptea a plan similar
in its fundamental respect to tnat advocated oy modern public
works theorists. This city passed a municipal ordinance in
1915 to provide a reserve fund for public works, ^-^ According
to the ordinance a tax of 1 cent was levied on each <iplOO worth
of valuation of taxable property, and the fund established by
the levy was to be spent for laoor on puolic work organized
for the relief of unemployment, (|^20,000 was expected to be
yielded. This plan had been voted on by San Francisco but
was defeated. The part of the plan that is sound and would
be endorsed by modern public v/orks theorists is the provision
for a reserve fund. Such a fund is needed by every unit of
government to aid in the financing of public works in times
of depression.
Ibid., p. 288,
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It is apparent from the foret^oing discussion that this
depression of 1914-1915 was marked by more rational thinking
on the subject of public works.
The Depression of 1920-1922
The war prosperity of the years 1915-1920 was ended by
the depression of 1920-1922. Production dropped below normal
in October, 1920, hit a new low in June, 1921 and regained its
52
normal position in November, 1922. Public works were again
initiated in an effort to stem the tide of unemployment. As
usual, there was no advance planning and because of txiis fact,
53
most of the projects did not begin until 1922, a little too
late for real effectiveness in relieving unemployment. It is
asserted by some, however, that the execution of public works
brought recovery sooner than it would have come normally.
Such an assertion is important, because it indicates that
municipal public works were being considered not merely as a
method of giving work to the unemployed but also as a possible
stimulant to business recovery. The main factor in this new
conception of the role of public works was President Harding*
s
Conference on Unemployment, which met at Washington in Sept-
ember, 1921.
52
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The projects initiated by the cities were of a better
quality than those of previous depressions, St. Louis passed
an act providing first, ::380,000, and later, >?20,000 more for
public work. With the money v/ere built streets, sev/ers, parks
buildings, power plants, and municipal lighting systems, .dages
were h;2,50 a day.^^ Cleveland spent :$15,000,000 on six large
construction projects,^^ Nev/ Bedford built needed schools .^^
Minneapolis sold bonds for public v/orks amounting to .;^980,000.
In Boston $2,650,000 was spent on streets and sewers; cp400,000
for public buildings, and $325,000 for parks and playgrounds.^
Louisville spent 3400,000 on puolic buildings, -^700, 000 on
streets, and '^l, 000,000 on a new terminal,^® On the nest Coast
San Francisco expended $500,000 for paving streets, 3,000,000
for schools and central buildings, and ;;]>500,000 on service
construction.^^
From a glance at tnese examples of oublic works ex-
ecuted in this depression, it is evident that the projects
were large, useful to the community, and suih a type as to
involve a large demand for '.nxterials, and thus indirect em-
Feder, Unemploynu nt Relief In Periods of Depress ion
,
p. 323. 55
Ibid
., p. 324.
^^Ibid.
57
Margolin, Public uorks As a Re medy For Unemployment
in the United States , p. 24.
^^Ibid.
59
Ibid.

ployraent as well as direct employment on the site.
The Great Depression
The cities of the country were ill-prepared to meet
the severe unemployment caused by the Great Depression, which
was set in motion by the stock market crash in the fall of
1929, The prosperous years precedin^^ the crash v/ere marked
by huge expenditures on public construction programs. Such
expenditures tended to increase the severity of the general
boom in business throughout the country. The recommendations
of tne President's Conference on Unemployment and the sugges-
tions of public works theorists had not been heeded by the
cities. As a result, the latter could not stem the tide of
unemployment and revive business as they did in the depression
of 1920-1922. Instead of expanding construction to give work
to the unemployed, they reduced expenditures, and delayed and
postponed construction. The reasons underlying the reductions,
delays, and postponements were numerous. The necessary funds
could not be obtained, as municipal bonds became increasingly
difficult to place, due to the lack of reserves of borrowing
power which had been almost exhausted by the large bond issues
for public works sold in good times. Early in 1932, New York
City, which had a good credit record, compared v/ith other
city governments, had difficulty in borrowing $100,000,000
and finally succeeded only by drastically reducing expendi-
iI
tures and paying the high rate of 6 per cent.^^ The falling
off of tax receipts v/as another cause of financial embarass-
ment •
The causes for delays and postponements were slowness
of official procedure; delays in drawing plans, securing bids, i
and awarding contracts; litigation; site selection; condem-
nation proceedings; and difficulties in securing legislative
appropriations; as well, of coiirse, as inability to obtain
money through bond issues and tax receipts. ^1
It is not necessary to comment further on puolic works
I
initiated by the cities in this depression as a later survey
of the New Deal public works program will indicate the nature
of such construction. The main point to empnasize, however,
is that the public works that were provided oy the cities were '
inadequate to meet unemployment.
Conclusion
The cities of the United States have used public works
as a method of providing relief for the unemployed since the
middle of the nineteenth century. The objective aimed at by
municipal authorities was relief of distress. There was in
general no thought of reviving business by a concerted effort
of cities to expand construction until the depression of
Arthur D. Gayer, Public tfilorks In Prosperity and De-
pression , New York, National Bureau of £.conomic Research,
1935, pp. 204-205,
61
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1920-1922, It cannot be said that the public work programs
initiated by the cities in the depressions heretofore men-
tioned were successful in their objectives. Not a great
number of the unemployed seems to have been absorbed and as a
result private charity and the dole were necessary to pre-
vent suffering. The workers v/ho were employed did not secure
enough earnings to live decently. They realized the futility
of some of the work and took no interest. As a result, in-
efficiency, mental demoralization, and the shame of being
recipients of relief marked the actions of the workers.
The weaknesses of these work relief programs were
realized by a few enlightened persons, and gradually an im-
provement in the nature of the work provided became noticeable.
Some cities emphasized regular public works programs with very
little trace of the characteristics of relief works. The
types of projects were of a better quality. Wages were higher.
Efficiency of v^orkmen was demanded. For cities with such pro-
grams of public work, the results were favorable.
In general, hov/ever, the municipal public works pro-
grams have been marked by relief characteristics and had little
success in meeting the problem of unemployment. It v»fas because
of this failure of relief work that a cry for regular public
works programs arose - the kind advocated by modern oublic
works theorists.

Chapter III
State Governments And Public Works
Although at first the problem of unemployment was be-
lieved to be the responsibility of only the city or town, the
regular occurrence of industrial crises and the increased
amoiint of unemployment accompanying them awakened the real-
ization on the part of other units of government that their
cooperation was necessary to combat effectively the evils of
enforced idleness. This realization came slowly to the states,
however, just as it did to the cities, and it was not until
the second decade of the twentieth century that state public
works programs came to be used primarily to remedy the prob-
lem of unemployment in periods of depression. With the entry
of the states into the field of unemployment relief, the
concept of public works as a recovery measure gained greater
strength and slowly divorced itself from the concept of public
works as a relief measure. This chapter discusses the develop-
ment of the former concept among state governiiients
,
The Idaho and New Jersey Legislation of 1915
The year 1915 is a significant year for state legis-
lative activity in the field of public works, as in that year
Idaho and New Jersey enacted legislation embodying ideas on
public works that were different from those held by most of
the cities of the country.
((
II
The Idaho Law recognized for probably the first time
in this coiintry's history trie right to work."^ By the pro-
visions of this act the board of county commissioners was
j
authorized to provide emergency employment for unemployed
United States citizens who had resided in the state uninter-
ruptedly for 6 montns and in the county for 90 days, and who
did not possess property of a total value of more than ^^1000.
The type of work that was to be provided was work on the pub-
lic highways or other work that was considered suitable by
the commissioners. The work was to be financed partly by
current county funds out 50 per cent of the expenses were to
be deducted by the state from the taxes levied by it upon the
county. A special provision stated that the amount of work
to any one person could not exceed 60 days in any fiscal year.
The Law never went into operation, as it was declared
unconstitutional on technical grounds in the case Epperson v
.
Howell {1916)> but it is of importance to regular public works
advocates because it indicated that there was a belief held
by a state government that needy unemployed were entitled to
work. Such an attitude is reminiscent of France's Louis
Blanc, who advocated government workshops for the unemployed.
I
The act did not meet all the standards established by modern
public works theorists, inasmuch as it emphasized relief, but
'
"Precedents in Stabilizing Employment By Expansion
of PubliclVorks , " Ivlonthly Labor Review , 29;184, October , 1929
i

its imderlying policy stood in striking contrast to the "hands
off" policy of other state governments as well as the Federal
Government
.
In the same year. New Jersey passed a law similar to
2
that of Idaho. There was no improvement over the latter,
however, and the main elements consisted of aid to the needy,
and the providing of work by the state. There were no sig-
nificant results.
The Pennsylvania Legislation of 1917
The state of Pennsylvania was one of the first states
actually to plan for public works. It did so in a law passed
on July 25, 1917. According to this lav/, an appropriation of
$40,000 was made to constitute an emergency fund, the trustees
of which were to be the governor, the auditor-general, the
state treasurer, and the commissioner of labor and industry.
This fund was to be given to state departments for public
construction whenever it was determined by the industrial
board of the Department of L'abor and Industry that extraordi-
nary unemployment existed. The purpose of the construction
was to provide "the maximum of public employment in relief of
the existing condition of extraordinary unemployment, con-
sistent with the most useful, permanent, and economic exten-
2
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sion of the works aforesaid." Lists of applicants for public
employment were to be prepared by the Commissioner of Labor
and Industry and submitted to the commission to be passed on
to departments doing public work. One important provision
made it the duty of the trustees of the fund established to
persuade city and county governments to do the same as the act
provided for; and also to coordinate the execution of all
4public work in the state.
The Act was used in the depression of 1920-1921 when
all the money appropriated was spent.
Several parts of the law were necessary for an effec-
tive program of public works aimed at the creation of employ-
ment or the revival of business. The fund set aside was a
reserve which could be drav/n upon when the state needed large
sums of money. The requirement that the work be "useful,
permanent, and economic" was important as it was an effort
to preclude "made" work.
The California Legislation of 1921
California was the next state to enact important public
works legislation, when it approved on May 26, 1921 the Cal-
4
Vernon Arthur Mund, "Prosperity Reserves of Public
Works", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
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ifornia Unemployment Relief iict,^ Under this Act a Board
of Control was set up to secure from state departments tenta-
tive plans for the expanding of public works in times of
temporary unemployment and to report to tne Governor on facts
relating to extraordinary unemployment. An emergency fund
of $1,000,000 for each biennial period was to be disposed of
among the state departments whenever the ooard was advised
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics that any unemployment emer-
gency existed.
1/Vith such machinery set up, California was prepared to
relieve her unemployed in the winter of 1921 and was able to
supply President riarding's Conference on Unemployment with
7data.
Of particular importance in the Act was the provision
for the planning of public works by the various state depart-
ments. Also important was the method by which the Board was
to be advised of industrial conditions, ^n accurate index
of business conditions is essential in an effective public
works program to stimulate recovery, and in the California
law the Bureau of Labor Statistics in cooperation with the
Immigration and Housing Commission and the Industrial nVelfare
Commission was a good body to advise the Board, The large
Report and Recommendations of the California State
-Unemployment Commission, pp. 578-579 ( chart )
,
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,
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size of the reserve fund was also commendable.
There were defects in the Act, however, and they were
striking enough to place it below the standards prescribed
by modern public works theorists. These defects were real-
ized by the California State Unemployment Commission and set
forth in its report in 1932. They were as follows:
(1) The Board of Control actually had no centralized
control over public works,
(2) Although the Board was directed to secure tentative
plans from the state departments, no provision
was made for the coordination of all public works
into a comprehensive program.
(3) The appropriation for the emergency fund was not
an adequate method of financing.
(4) There was no provision for restraining public con-
struction in prosperity.
(5) The "timing" set up was too loose and slow in
operation.
Other State Legislative Activity in 1921
In tne same year as the enactment of the California
Law, two other states. New York and Louisiana, manifested
evidence of the realization of a need for a change in their
public works programs. In the Nev/ York legislature a resolu-
tion was proposed to establish a legislative committee to co-
ordinate plans for public works to relieve unemployment, but
9
no action came from it, Louisiana v/as more successful in its
Report and Recommendations of the California State
Unemployment Commission, p,79,
Q
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efforts to promote public v/orks planning, as it passed a law
authorizing the release during depressions of public works
already contemplated.-^^ This law is important because it was
an embodiment of the idea that in times of depression public
works should not only be expanded but they should be those
that were planned for and would have been constructed even if
a depression had not occurred.
Undoubtedly the year 1921 v/as significant in the de-
velopment of the theory of public works as a recovery measure,
even taough the state legislation that was enacted had as its
objective the relief of unemployment, because some of the
ideas embodied in the legislation are tnose recommended by
modern public works theorists,
The Massachusetts Legislative Proposal of 1924-1925
Massachusetts proposed public works legislation in the
legislative session of 1924-1925, that was considered by one
public works authority in 1926 to be better in advance plan-
ning than any legislation adopted in the United States or
elsewhere . "^"^ The defeat of the proposal was a bitter blov; to
the proponents of sound public v/orks planning.
The title of the proposed act was, "An Act to Provide
Ibid.
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for the Establishment of a Reserve Employment Fund." The
purpose was stated as follov/s in Section 1:
"In order to provide increased opportunities for em-
ployment in this Commonv/ealth during periods of industrial
depression, there is hereby created a fund to be Imovm as
the Reserve Employment Fund. Said Fund shall be held by
the Treasurer of the Commonwealth in a separate accoimt,
to be drawn upon by order of the Governor and Council
whenever, due to industrial depression, it shall be deemed
advisable to expend the whole or portion thereof upon
public improvements, or upon any other project which, in
the opinion of the Governor and Council, may be undertaken
in behalf of the public welfare, either in local^gcommuni-
ties or generally throughout the Commonv/ealth."
According to Section 2 the Commission on Administration
and Finance was authorized to sec\ire from the various depart-
ments, bureaux, boards, and commissions of the state, plans
for extending public works which would be most likely to pro-
vide increased opportunities for employment during depressions,
together with estimates of the amount, character and duration
of such employment, the number of persons who could "profit-
ably" be employed, rates of wages, or other information
considered necessary by the Commission. If and when the
Commission believed that excessive unemployment in the state
existed, it would recommend to the Governor an allotment of
part or the whole of the Reserve Employment Fund among the
departments, bureaux, boards and commissions v/hich would fur-
nish reserve employment.
Massachusetts Legislative Proposal, "An Act to Pro
vide for the Establishment of a Reserve Employment Fund,"
Session 1924-1925, cited by Bellerby, Stabilization of Em-
ployment in the United States, pp.78-7^"T

ISection 3 was concerned with the applicants for public
works employment. It was stated to be the duty of the com-
missioner of Labour and Industries, when so requested by the
Commission on Administration and Finance, to prepare lists of
applicants for employment, including full information as to
their industrial qualifications and citizenship. The Gom-
i mission would then select "qualified" applicants and recom-
mend them for employment to the departments, bureaux, boards
and commissions, A proviso in this section was that prefer-
ences in making appointments be given to citizens of the
Commonv/ealth.
In Section 4 the financing of the public works program
was provided for. The sum of ^^50,000 was appropriated to be
held in the Reserve Employment Fund, and there was to be added
to tais sum such sums as the General Court might appropriate
from time to time. Other additions to the fund could be ac-
quired by gift or bequest. The Commission on administration
and Finance was constituted a body corporate with the right
on behalf of the State, to hold property, receive and solicit
gifts or bequests, and to spend such in providing employment
in depressions under conditions prescribed by tne donors pro-
vided"the expenditure of such funds shall not be contrary to
sound public policy."
Ibid., p. 79.
I
i

This legislative proposal contained several sound
provisions. Advance planning was provided for in detail.
Rates of wages, amount and duration of employment were to be
ascertained before work was released. The provision in Sec-
tion 3 for the adaptation of workers to the type of work was
important, because it insured efficiency in construction and
precluded v/aste and the possibility of tolerating "relief"
work. Also important was Section 4 as it provided for the
reserve fund and thus incorporated in the act a principle of
the theory of public works which is almost indispensable.
Although these provisions were all commendable, the words in
Section 1 "either in local communities or generally through-
out the Commonwealth" are especially noteworthy because they
indicate the sentiment v/hich had gathered strength after the
War that local communities were unable to meet the problem
of unemployment unaided.
States and the Great Depression
Although states were beginning to become av/are of the
importance of effective public works programs in meeting the
problem of unemployment in depressions, and some even enacted
legislation to establish better programs, the Great Depression
found them generally ill-prepared to absorb the great numbers
of the unemployed by aublic work, even in cooperation v/ith
the cities. The suggestions of the public works theorists
had fallen on deaf ears for the most part but the day of
retribution came. It may be said in all fairness that perhaps

the states, along with the cities, could not, with the aid
of the Federal Government, effectively have combatted the
waves of unemployment, because the Great Depression was the
severest that the coxintry had ever faced. Granting this
assumption, however, it seems that state public works pro-
grams could have been planned in a more effective manner than
they were
•
It is not necessary to describe in detail the nature
of state work programs. They were so influenced after the
advent of the New Deal by federal legislation that Chapter
VIII v/ill afford a glimpse at the important characteristics.
In this section it will be sufficient to indicate the general
results of the efforts of states to expand public works in
the early years of the depression. The similarity of these
results and efforts to those of the cities may be observed.
As the states had not set up reserve funds for public
works, they resorted to borrowing. In 1930 interest rates
were low and borrowings were accordingly large. The follov/ing
table indicates their size, compared with previous years?

Table I
LONG TERM BORROV^ING BY STATE
GOVEHNLiENTS, 1923-1933-'-^
Year Amount
( in thousands
)
Percentage of Total*^^
' Munic ipal ' Borrowings
1923 $232,725 21.88
1924 249,517 17.83
1925 161,919 11.56
1926 130,574 9.57
1927 131,289 8.70
1928 162,492 11.49
1929 159,744 11.17
1930 237,288 15.95
1931 247,632 19.69
1932 196,207 23.09
1933 192,685 37.02
Source: State and M\micipal Compendium and Commercial
and Financial Chronicle , cited oy Gayer, Public Vi^orks i"n
Prosperity and Depression, p. 127.
14Emergency borrowing from RFC and PVtfA omitted. Returns
limited as a rule to civil divisions having indebtedness of
^25,000 or more.
15
Term municipal covers state and local subdivisions.

Toward the middle of 1931 and the following year, when con-
ditions for local borrowing became unfavorable because of
decreased tax receipts and the gradual realization of the
irregularities and precarious position of local finances,
state borrowing increased in a remarkable manner and state
bonds remained a high grade form of investment. In 1933,
however, the credit of the states weakened. vVith the excep-
tion of a few states like Nev/ York, Pennsylvania, and Massa-
chusetts, budgetary deficits were almost universal. Bond
defaults ensued in some states like Arkansas, South Carolina,
and Louisiana, and many Issues could not be floated. If it
had not been for the aid of the Federal Government and the
resorting to emergency borrowing clauses in constitutions,
state public works programs would have been almost non-exist-
ent .
These financial experiences of the states constituted
proof to public works theorists that public v/orks planning in
accordance with their precepts v/as essential. As a result of
the lack of planning , financial embarrassment fell upon the
states, many public works projects were of questionable value,
and waste was prevalent.
The Pennsylvania Proposal of 1951
It was in the Great Depression that advocates of the
theory of public v/orks as a recovery measure secured a foot-
hold and effected the passage of legislation embodying many

of their recommendations. Before proceeding to a survey of
such legislation, it is of interest to refer to a proposal
embodied in the Report of the Pennsylvania Committee on Un-
employment to Governor Pinchot with the title "Alleviating
Unemployment", This proposal does not appear to have been
adopted, out it is of Importance in the development of the
theory of public works as a recovery measure, because it pre-
sents evidence that before the arrival of Harold ickes and
other public works advocates of the New Deal, an enlightened
view of public works programs was at work in at least one of
our large states.
The theory of long range planning of public works was
17fully embodied in this Pennsylvania proposal. A public works
planning board was suggested, to consist of the Secretary of
Property and Supplies, the Secretary of xiighways, and the head
of another administrative department appointed by the G-overnor,
as ex officio members, and five members appointed by the Gov-
ernor. Of these latter five, two were to be appointed from
one of the principal regional planning federations in a city
of the first and second class respectively; one vvno was fam-
1 fi
Report and Recommendations of the California State
Unemployment Commission
,
p7576.
17
Gayer, Puolic Vii'orks in Prosperity and Depress ion
, p.9
.
18
Report and Recommendations of the California State
Unemployment Commission .p .bV5
«

iliar with city planning; one economist or financier; and one
representative of the building industry or a building Congress,
This Board, under the direction of a full time executive, was
to formulate methods of advance planning for state and local
authorities, and to report to the Governor and Legislature
periodically. Each state a^^ency would prepare a six year plan
of public construction to be approved by the iSecretary of
Property and Supplies, A consolidated plan would be submitted
periodically to the Legislature, a revision coming every two
years. Projects were divided into three groups. The first
group was composed of work that had to be done immediately
according to a fixed time schedule. The second group con-
sisted of projects which had to be done within a six year
schedule but otherwise had no fixed time schedule. The third
group contained work for wnich money would not be available
within six years or for which public demand did not necessitate
action for sd me time. It was the second group which was in-
tended to constitute the reserve for periods of depression,
but the third group could be drawn upon in periods of severe
depress ion.
The financing of the scheme was to be accomplished by
appropriations from current funds but it was stipulated that
the bond issues for the projects in the second group should
Gayer, Public VJorks in Prosperity and Depression, p, 9
,
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be authorized in advance. In cases where communities ap-
proached their constitutional debt limits, it was suggested
that flexible borrowing powers be provided for, or the
issuance of additional oonds be permitted, when the Board
considered, a state of emergency to exist.
In addition to these foregoing suggestions, it v/as
proposed that the board study means of preventing peaks of
public construction coinciding in time with peaks of private
construction, and that cities, towns, and other units be
assisted in developing advance programs.
A perusal bf this scheme indicates that it surpasses
previous proposals or legislation in several respects. The
personnel of the planning board was commendable, as it con-
sisted of specialists in fields related to public works. The
six year plans and t.ie coordination of those of state agen-
cies were excellent ideas. The suggestion to authorize bond
issues in advance was important as it is necessary to avoid
delay in releasing public works. In this connection, the
suggestion to allov/ communities to exceed debt limits when it
was considered necessary was rational, inasmuch as flexible
borrovi/ing powers are needed in periods of severe depression.
Another important proposal was that calling for a study of
ways of preventing peaks of public construction coinciding in
time with peaks of private construction. A public works
2oReport and Recommendations of the California State
Unemployment Commission, pp.578- 9 TG^fi^^^^tJT

program in order to be effective as a recovery measure must
consist of the curtailment of a large amount of public con-
struction in times of prosperity to lessen the peak to which
business activity is rising, so that the ensuing depression
will not be so severe. Moreover, in periods of increasing
prosperity, costs of public work become excessive as private
and public agencies compete for labor, materials, and money.
Too much emphasis cannot be placed on this Pennsylvania
scheme. It was an approximation to an ideal program of public
works, although it contained weaknesses. Its importance was
recognized by the California State Unemployment Commission, for
it devoted a large section of its Report and Commendations to
the suggestions embodied therein, and recommended a similar
public v/orks program.
Conclus ion
The theory of public v/orks as a recovery measure devel-
oped rapidly under the guidance of state governments. Not very
much legislation embodying phases of the theory v/as passed,
but the subject was under discussion in many state capitols
and valuable studies had been made. Such discussion and
studies served to educate the public authorities and the pub-
lic in the effective v;ays of systematizing public works so as
to absorb unemployment, as well as to stimulate business re-
covery.
Whereas the cities had emphasized "relief" work, the
states emphasized "regular" public work, iiilith this latter

emphasis came many of the ideas of the public works theorists
who were interested in stimulating business recovery. Among
these ideas were the reserve fund, long-range planning, co-
ordination of public works agencies, the cooperation of state
and local governments, useful projects, efficiency of labor,
adapting of laborers to vvork, the curtailment of public con-
struction in times of increasing prosperity, and the authori-
zation of bond issues in advance.
The Federal Government has the honor of enacting legis
lation that went the farthest in incorporating the precepts
of the public works theorists but it is to be realized that
txie states, and the cities to a slignt degree, played an im-
portant role in making possible the enactment of such legis-
lation.

Chapter IV
The Federal Government And
Public Works
I
The experience of the Federal Government in providing
public works for the relief of unemployment and the stimula-
tion of recovery from depressions has been similar in many
respects to that of the states. Time was required to educate
state governments to the need of providing public work during
depressions, and it was also required to impress upon the
minds of our national legislators the fact that state and local
governments were unable effectively to cope with the problem
of modern cyclical unemployment. The Federal Government be-
lieved in leaving the problem to state and local governments,
and it was not until the New Deal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt
that a change in belief resulted. Such a change was not sudden,
as it is sometimes supposed. The New Deal public works pro-
gram was the result of a gradual growth of the theory of puDlic
works as a recovery measure in the field of Federal legislation
and activity. With the entrance of the Federal Government into
the realm of public works, the recovery aspect of the latter
triumphed after years of struggle. It is tne purpose of this
chapter to trace the development of the attitude of the fed-
eral government toward public works.

Early Federal Thought
It is possible to find evidence as early as the years
1914 and 1915 of early thinking in Federal circles on the
subject of public works in relation to the business cycle.
In his Fourteenth Annual Report of the Reclamation
Service (1914-1915), the Secretary of the Interior stated that
the costs of the Service were greater than the estimates be-
cause of the cost of laoor and materials,-^ He said that the
efficiency of labor decreased in the construction season and
freight facilities became congested, thus leading to an in-
crease in costs,
A similar line of reasoning was follov/ed in the annual
report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the year 1914-1915,
when he approved a statement made in 1908 by the former Sec-
retary Cortelyou that in the interests of economy the construct
tion of many public buildings could be postponed for several
2years
.
Such reasoning as that of the tv/o Secretaries consti-
tuted strong aj?guments for public v/orks theorists in recom-
mending the postponing of public construction in times of
i
John R, Shillady, Planning Public Expenditures to
Compensate for Decreased Privat e Eraployment During Busines s
Depress ions , Extension of An AcTdress, in the section on Un-
employiaent of the Forty- third Annual Session of the National
Conference of Charities and Correction, Indianapolis, I.iay 16,
1916, Rjayor's Committee on Unemployment, New York City, Nov-
ember, 1916, p. 20.
^Ibid.

prosperity and its expansion in time of depression.
Senator Kenyon and Public Works Legislation
Among the early efforts on the part of the Federal
Government to expedite public works in time of depression were
those of Senator Kenyon in the years 1919 and 1921,
On January 21,1919 the Senator introduced into the
Senate a bill, the aim of which was to expedite the release
of public works in depressions. This bill proposed the cre-
ation of a United States Emergency Public Works Board con-
sisting of the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army,
an officer of the Treasury, one of the Department of the
Interior, and two citizens of the country to be appointed by
3the President, The Board was to cooperate with the Federal,
state and municipal agencies and make reports on the plans of
these agencies, including estimates of the number of employees
who could be put to work. The sura of ;;]jlOO,000,000 or as much
as would be considered necessary was recommended as an emer-
gency public works fund. There could be no spending of this
f\ind until the Secretary of Labour filed a certificate with
the Board, stating that extraordinary unemployment existed
near the sites where the planned public works were.
This bill was reported unfavorably but it is important
because it represents a worthy effort to remedy a serious
Margolin, Public vt<ork s As a Remedy For Unemployment
in the United States, p,7.
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1
defect in the Federal public works system. The latter was
marked by decentralization. There was no cooperation between
the Federal, state, and local governments in their public
works programs, and as a result a simultaneous attack could
not be made on unemployment in the event of need. In the mindii
of modern public works theorists, a concerted attack is nec-
essary. Another important part of the bill was the reserve
fund.
Two years later, on November 21, 1921, Kenyon intro-
duced another bill "To prepare for Future Cyclical Periods of
4Depression and Unemployment by Systems of Public ^n'orks".
This legislation was the product of the discussion caused by
the President's Conference on Unemployment. According to this
bill, the department heads of the Federal Government were to
prepare plans and revise them periodically so that public works
could be released immediately when the need arose. In order
to aid in the forecasting of the approach of business depres-
sions and thus place the Government in a more strategic
position to combat them, the Secretary of Commerce was to
publish monthly reports on business and oncoming depressions,
and give copies to the President, Congress, and tae department
heads. The bill further called for the authorization of de-
4
Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 1st session,
S-2749, p,8039, cited by Mund, "Prosperity Reserves of Public
Vi/orks "
, p . 7
,

partment heads to withhold public works in periods of indus-
trial expansion, if no time limit had been set on such works,
and release them in impending periods of depression and un-
employment
.
The bill attracted wide attention and was hotly debated.
It was recommitted to the Committee on Education and Labour,
however, and was dropped. Such a defeat was discouraging to
the public works advocates, but all had not been in vain. The
bill tended to educate many to the need of public works re-
form. It, moreover, marked the appearance in Federal legis-
lation of the belief of the soundness of withholding public
works in periods of industrial depression.
President Harding' s Conference on Unemployment
The most important event in the history of the Federal
Government and its attitude toward the theory of public v/orks
as a recovery measure, before the Great Depression, is Pres-
ident Harding's Conference on Unemployment of the fall of 1921.
This Conference stimulated interest throughout the country in
public works reform. In addition, its committee reports
clearly expressed the views of the enlightened public works
theorists. A discussion of some of these reports will indi-
cate the reasoning of the Conference.
The Report of the Committee on Public Works entitled,
"The Long-Range Planning of Public Works" adopted by the
Conference on October 13, 1921 is important. It stated in
substance that the competition of public construction

Increases the height of inflation and that the stabilization
of business would result if a lot of money were spent in
depressions.^
It is in the reports of two subcommittees of the
Committee on Public Works that excellent reasoning is found
on the problem discussed by the Conference,
The first report was that of the Economic Advisory
Committee on Emergency Public Works. Herein were presented
several reasons for reviving industry and creating employment
6by public works in the winter of 1921-1922. The first reason
was that employment was needed as a solution for unemployment,
and public work would give such employment. The second reason
was that indirect as well as direct employment v/ould be given,
A third reason was that the wages from public work v/ould
create a demand for many commodities. The fourth reason was
that public work was a substitute for private relief and char-
ity. After presenting these reasons the report stated certain
conditions to be necessary for an effective public works pro-
gram. The program would need to be on a "commercial" not a
"relief" basis. This meant that conditions of employment
would have to be normal. Wages would be standard. Efficiency
would have to be required. Furthermore, the work performed
Report of the President ' s Conference On Unemp1 oymen
t
,
Washington, Government Printing Office, p .9o
,
^Ibid., p. 98.

would have to be necessary and not "made". !
The second report was that of the Economic Advisory
Coimnittee on Long Range Planning of Public Works. In this
report were stated the purposes of the long-range planning of
public works.''' They were (1) tne revival of private industry;
(2) the checking of depressions; (3) the prevention of com-
petition for labor and materials; (4) the stabilization of
industry and employment. To effect these ends it was then
recommended that a central Federal agency be created to ex-
ecute public works, advise the President when Federal public
works should be released, and to suggest means of synchro-
nizing them with local construction.
Other reports were presented to the Conference, the
general result of which was to give wide publicity to the
wisdom of the contraction and expansion of public works in
order to stabilize our economic system.
The Federal Highway Act of 1921
The influence of the President's Conference was felt
immediately in the passage of the Federal Highway Act in Nov-
ember, 1921, as this Act was a clear affirmation of the
principle of increasing public works in depressions. It ap-
propriated $75,000,000 for the subsidizing of road construc-
Q t
tion. This sum was to be distributed among the states, each
|
7
Ibid., p. 99.
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Bellerby, Stabilization of Employment in the United
States, p. 75-76.

of which v/ould spend an amount equal to the federal subsidy.
The Act was evidence that Congress realized that the Federal
Government needed to supplement and stimulate the public
works programs of the states,
Herbert Hoover ' s Recommendation to President Harding
It was in the year 1923 that one can find evidence of
still more of the influence of the President's Conference on
Unemployment, and also how public works could be managed in
time of an approaching boom. It has been seen how the public
works advocates reasoned that public works should be restrain-
ed in periods of increasing prosperity so that the evil after-
math of an inevitable boom v/ould be avoided, ^ihat the Federal
Government did in 1923 is evidence of the beneficial applica-
tion of such reasoning. '
On March 3, 1923 President Harding sent a letter to
Secretary of Coimnerce, Herbert Hoover, asking his opinion as
to what the Government's policy should be in carrying on
construction at that time. Hoover had a survey made and re-
9
sponded to the President on March 17, 1923. His findings on
the prevailing situation in the construction industry were thatj
I
construction orders were large, that labor was fully employed,
there even being some shortage of v/orkers, and tiiat transport-
I
ation facilities were so taxed that a shortage vi/as complained
^Ibid., p,82.
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of at times. With such conditions prevalent. Hoover stated
that if the Government entered into competition v/ith private
construction at that time, it would not give any additional
employment to workers, nor increase the production of materi-
als, but would in the end displace so much private construc-
tion. He said that the national and local governments v/ere
in a better position than private industry to restrain con-
struction and could speed up construction easier in time of
less demand, "as we did in the last depression as the result
of the Unemployment Conference . ""^^ By the restraining of
public construction, he reasoned that the Federal Government
could contribute something to a more even flow of employment
not only directly in construction but in the material trades.
The letter ended with the recommendation that:
"you direct tae different divisions of the Government
to initiate no new v^ork that is not eminently necessary to
carry on the immediate functions of the Government and
that there should be a slowing down of work in progress
so much as comports with real economy in construction,..,
imtil after there is a relaxation in private demands."
As a result of this letter. Government construction was
stopped considerably. This action, along v;ith the publication
of Business Cycles and Unemployment, which reasoned that the
disaster of 1921 was a result of the preceding boom, led priv-
ate industry after March 1923 to take v/arning so that the
"^^Communication from the Secretary of Commerce to the
President of tae Republic, cited by Belleroy, Stabilization
of Employment in the United States, pp. 82-85,
11
Ibid., p.83»

growing boom that seemed dangerous was brought under control.
Hoover's recommendations were undoubtedly valuable and
fully in accord with the public works theorists.
The Speech of President Coolidge
Two years after Hoover's letter, the proponents of
public works as a recovery measure were again encouraged by
a speech of President Coolidge before the Associated ixeneral
12Contractors of America, on January 12, 1925. This speech is
important because it manifests the belief held by one of our
pre-New Deal Presidents that public works could be a powerful
factor in the stabilization of employment in the business
cycle. It constituted evidence that the proponents of public
works expansion and contraction included not only theorizing
economists and friends of labor but such realistically minded
men as Coolidge and his advisers.
The general tone of the speech was optimistic. Stating
"The idea of utilising construction, particularly of public
works, as a stabilising factor in the business and employment
situation has long been a counsel of perfection among students
13
of these problems," he proceeded to express his belief that
Bellerby, Stabilization of Employment in the United
States
, p,80.
Speech of President Coolidge before the Associated
General Contractors of Amei'ica, Jan. 12, 1925, cited by Beller-
by, Stabilization of Employment in the United States
, p. 80.

if construction work were somewhat relaxed in periods of great
business activity, and expanded in times of business depres-
sion and slack employment, it would result in stabilization
and equalisation which would "moderate the alternations of
employment and unemployment,"'^'^ which would favorably modify
the business cycle. He then said, that although such action
was to be greatly desired, it would be difficult to accomplish
in the realm of private activity, for it was difficult to con-
vince a man whose factory was idle or working only part time
to spend money on an addition to it, although it would be
needed in good times, and moreover, if the Lxovernnient with-
drew from the market others v/ould likely follow. He reasoned,
nevertheless, that the first and easiest application of such
a regulation was in the field of public works, and in times
of depression the Federal Government as well as the states,
counties, and cities could start building.
In addition to the foregoing, Coolidge mentioned the
economies that would be obtained in building in times of de-
press iont
"More than this, the economies possible under such a
plan are apparent. When everybody wants to do the same
thing at tn.e same time, it becomes unduly expensive. Every
element of costs , in every direction, tends to expand.
These conditions reverse themselves in times of slack
employment and subnormal activity, with the result that
important economies are possible." 1^
14
Ibid.
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In conclusion he says;
"I am convinced that if the governmental imits would
generally adopt such a policy, and if, having adopted it,
they would give the fullest publicity to the resulting
savings, the shov/ing v/ould have a compelling influence
upon business generally."
It is apparent from President Coolidge's speech that
the theory of public works as a recovery measure was occupying
national attention a long time before President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and his "pump-priming" measures.
Unsuccessful Attempts to Enact Federal Legislation Embodying
Suggestions of the Public Viforks Theorists
It would seem that the President's Conference on Un-
employment, the passage of tne Federal Highway Act of 1921,
the action of the Federal Government in the boom of 1923, and
President Coolidge's speech would have been sufficient to
stimulate the enactment of legislation to enable the Federal
Government to plan its public works program in accordance with
the teachings of the public works theorists. Such legislation
was not enacted, hov*fever and the history of public works and
the Federal G-overnment for the rest of tne decade to the
Great Depression is marked by the defeat of all proposals.
The defeats suffered are of interest, because they show how
difficult it is to enact legislation that will undoubtedly be
necessary in the future. Reform in public v/orks legislation
°Ibid.

was necessary to enable the Federal as well as state and local
governments to cope effectively with the Great Depression be-
ginning in 1929, but legislation to that effect could not be
passed.
In December, 1925 a bill was introduced into the House
of Representatives, providing for the appropriation of $150, -
000,000 for tae construction of public buildings - .;25,000,000
17per year for 6 years. The object was to place the principle
of advance planning as an aid to tne stabilization of employ-
ment in the public buildings program. The bill was defeated.
A year later an arnendraent to a public buildings bill
was introduced into Congress authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury to take into consideration "the stabilizing effect
governmental construction policy may exert upon general em-
ployment and industrial activity." and to report to Congress
and give recommendations as to what to do when the volume of
construction in the United States in any period fell one-third
18
below the volume of the corresponding period of 1925. This
bill was not adopted.
Two more years elapsed before another effort was made
to enact legislation, when Senator Jones introduced in Febru-
ary 1928 a bill to create a prosperity reserve to stabilize
Unemployment and Public Works , Studies and Reports,
Series c no. 15, Geneva"^ International Labour Office, 1931. p.55<
Stewart, Unemployment Benefits In the united States ,
p. 58.

Industry and employment by construction in times of business
19depression. The bill called for the expansion of public
works v,'hen the volume of general construction based upon value
fell 20 per cent over a three months period below an average
of the corresponding three months period of 1926-1927. y^hile
in the Committee on Commerce, this was changed to 10 per cent
over the three months period below the average of the cor-
responding periods of the preceding three years .^^ An appro-
priation of $150,400,000 was made for a reserve fund. Hearings
were held and the Committee reported favorably, but the bill
failed to pass. This failure was remarkable when it is real-
ized that, according to John B, Andrews at one of the Hearings,
the bill had been worked out by the President's Conference on
Unemployment
•
The primary reason for the failure of the bill to pass
was political, certain weaknesses tended to hinder passage
The amount of money appropriated was considered too small for
any but temporary and partial depressions.^ The bill did not
19
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go into effect at the beginning of a depression, and therefore
did not appear to aim to prevent depressions. Furthermore,
there was only one index of declining business upon which ac-
tion was to be based, and that was building contracts. Besides
these specific defects in the bill, there was the feeling en-
countered in the opposition to public works legislation that:
"This remedy v/ould be palliative rather than curative;
partial rather than fundamental; general rather than
specific; temporary rather than permanent. In order to
be fundamental and specific the remedies must deal with
the fundamental and specific causes, namely over produc-
tion and under consumption."^"*
The three foregoing efforts at reform in the Ftederal
Government's construction program were badly needed. The
construction industry rose to boom proportions prior to the
Great Depression, and a wise public construction policy would
have diminished the height of the boom and consequently less-
ened the amount of readjustment necessary in the Great De-
pression, Moreover, more planning was needed in the Federal
program so that public works could be released immediately
when the right m oraent arrived in a period of depression.
Herbert Hoover's Plan
The election of Herbert Hoover to the Presidency in
November 1928 furnished cause for encouragement to advocates
of public works reform. The letter he had written as Secre-
tary of Commerce to President narding was in their minds. The
future looked still brighter, as immediately after his election^
24
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Hoover asked Governor Brewster of Maine to announce at a
conference of state governors in New Orleans his approval of
a proposal to create a 3, 000, 000, 000 reserve f^ond to stabil-
ize prosperity by expanding public works in times of depres-
25
sion. The announcement was made on November 21,1928,
The plan v/as judged with varying degrees of criticism,
sympathy, and skepticism. William Green of the American Fed-
eration of Labor said, "The proposal is the most important
26
announcement on wages made in a decade" and that it was
"the first definite movement to systematize wages and employ-
27
ment." James O'Connell, President of tae metal trades de-
partment of the A.F.ofL. said, "It should usher in a new era
for the workers of the country, "^^ Critics, on the other hand,
described it as "an effort to outlaw the law of supply and
demand; "^^ "at best a makeshift ; "'^^ chimerical idea tinged
with Socialism. "'^'^
Stewart, Unemployment Benefits in the United States,
p. 58.
26
"Hoover* s Plan to Keep the Dinner pail Full", Liter-
ary Di^?:est, 99:5-7, December 8, 1928, cited by Muller, Gov-
ernment Fund for Unemployment, p. 55.
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The coiiiraents of the newspapers are interesting. The
St. Louis Star said, "The Hoover plan is a step in the right
"52
direction," The Philadelphia Record said, "It is a logical
development of modern economic thought" and added:
"Until within recent years the xmiversal belief was
that prosperity and depression alternated in waves or
cycles completely beyond human control. But that theory
has been discarded. Industrial and business leaders now
conceive of prosperity as something that can be regulated
and stabilized."
"Vtfhile the proposal is complex in detail, the principle
is simple enouj^h. Joseph made it work in the matter of
Egypt's food supply several thousand years ago. ^^hy
shouldn't our highly organized society make it work nov/
in indus try , " 33
According to the St. Louis Post Dispatch , "While it would
offer relief, it would not touch tlie underlying causes of the
slackening of industry and commerce. It is not a fundamental
remedy, but merely a temporary relief devjce." The New
Republic believed the "recoimnendation was immediately derived
from the ideas of i.iessrs Foster and Gatchings, as expounded in
35
their books 'Profits' and 'Business Vy'ithout a Buyer'."
Nothing ever came of this proposal. In the session
of Congress immediately follov/ing the announcement by Governor
Brewster, Representative Macleod introduced into the House a
Ibid., p. 57.
33
Ibid
., pp. 57-58.
34
Ibid
., pp. 58-59.
35
New Republic
,
57:55-56, December 5, 1928, cited by
Muller, Government Fund For Unemployment, p. 168.

resolution to create a commission to study means of main-
taining consumer income and steady production so as to pre-
vent \meraployment . There was also to be created a federal
agency through which the Government could regulate such thing
as public works to maintain a steady flov/ of income to con-
sumers and steady production and employment. Hearings were
held by the Senate Committee on Education and Labour and in
the report of this committee it was stated that, although no
one disagreed with the idea of using public works as a "buffe
in times of unemployment and the Federal trovernnent could set
a good example, still the states and other public authorities
were in a better position to use public works for this pur-
ose because their volume of construction was much larger in
37
amount than that of the Federal Government,
Conclusion
It may be observed from the preceding sections of this
chapter that although the theories of the public works advo-
cates were well developed in the third decade of the twenti-
eth century and had been brought to the attention of the
country and especially Congress, nothing of importance was
done to embody these theories in legislation. As a result,
the Great Depression found the national government ill-pre-
pared to cope with the serious volume of unemployment that
Unemployment and Public y^lorks, p,56.
37
Ibid.

arose. The public works theorists went into action immedi-
ately on a greater scale than ever before, and met with
greater success. Yet, all the desired legislation was not
obtained until the advent of the New Deal, it is the pur-
pose of the next chapter to describe the struggle for the
expansion of public works during the Hoover administration.

Chapter V
The Federal Government And
Publ i c Vj orks ( C ont •
)
The Hoover Administration
The role played by President Hoover in the development
of the theory of public works as a recovery measure is not
as great as might have been predicted from his letter to Pres-
ident Harding on March 17, 1923. From that letter one might
suppose that he was a firm believer in the theory. The truth
is that he was, but there were beliefs guiding him which made
it impossible for him to put into practice the ideas of the
theorists. What these beliefs were will be revealed in this
chapter. The result was that Hoover hindered public works
expansion in the Great Depression, Yet, some important legis-
lation was passed during his administration, the most impor-
tant public works legislation passed by the Federal Government
prior to the New Deal. It is because of this legislation that
the Hoover Administration is important in the history of the
development of the theory of public works as a recovery
measure
•
The Woods Committee
The first important action taken by President Hoover
in the depression was the appointment of Colonel Arthur Woods,
announced on October 21, 1930, to take charge of a program
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dealing with unemployment ."^ The underlying thought of the
program was that the responsibility lay with the state and
local governments and that the Federal (xovernraent should
supplement their activities. This thought was partly based
on the belief embodied in the conclusions of a group of econ-
omists and business men and members of the Committee at a
meeting in the winter of 1930-1931 that recovery would easily
come of its own accord and that it was accordingly unnecessary
to take unusual measures. That belief is important to re-
member because Hoover was motivated in all his policies by the
fear of doing something to retard the normal forces of recov-
ery.
One of the major objectives of the program Woods was
placed in charge of related to public works, inasmuch as it
was intended to develope work opportunities for the imemployed,
"by pointing out the value of expediting necessary public and
semi-public construction already planned in providing eraploy-
ment in the emergency."
One of the first steps taken by the Committee was the
offering of suggestions for Hoover's address to Congress. In
these suggestions are found valuable statements on the role
"^E. P. Hayes, Activities of the President's iilmergency
Committee For Employment ,( Oct o1»er 17, 1930 - August 19, 1931)
Concord, New Hampshire, The Rumford Press, 1936, p,2.
2
Ibid., pp. 2-3.
3
Ibid,, p. 4.

that should have been played by public works in the depres-
sion. One suggestion was an appropriation of ;:?830,000,000
for cooperation with the states in highway construction, pub-
lic iiiiprovements, and the repairing and maintaining of Federal
4property. A second suggestion was low cost housing, rural
electrification, and slum clearance, which was a foreshadov/-
ing of New Deal public works legislation. A third suggestion
was the placing of su^is at the disposal of the President for
the long-range planning of public works in fut'ore depressions.
Closely allied to this third suggestion was a fourth that
Hoover recommend the passage of S.3059, ^mgner's public con-
struction bill.
Such suggestions were not v/elcome to Hoover. In his
address to Congress on December 2, 1930 he manifested opposi-
tion to a greatly expanded public works program. He said:
"Economic wounds must be healed by the action of the
cells of the economic body - tne producers and the con-
sumers themselves . "5
By such words Hoover manifested his faith in private initiative
bringing recovery. His belief that the depression was not
serious is evidenced by the statement "The fundamental strength
Harry L. Hopkins, Spending to Save , New York, \i, W,
Norton and Company, Inc., 1931, pT23.
President Hoover's kessage to Congress of December 2,
1930, cited by Hayes, Activities of the President * s Emergency
Committee For Employment, p . 6
.
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6
of the Nation's life is unimpaired," Referring to the danger
of increased taxation with which to finance public construc-
tion he said, "To increase taxation for purposes of construc-
tion work defeats its own purpose, as such taxes directly
7
diminish employment in private industry." This latter
statement was sound, but public works theorists would answer
by saying that public construction in a depression should be
financed by loans, which woald not diminish employment in
private industry. Another statement of Hoover's indicated
that the program already planned, amounting to an expenditure
of $520,000,000, was enough as he said it was "already at the
maximum limit warranted by financial prudence as a continuing
Q
policy," The statement that is a key to tae aim of the
Viloods Committee is as follows: "The best contribution of gov-
ernment lies in encouragement of this voluntary cooperation
gin the community "...
As a result of this message to Congress, all extensive
public works legislation was voted down in the ensuing session,
In addition to offering suggestions to the President,
6
President Hoover's Message to Congress of December 2,
1930, cited by Hopkins, Spending to Save
, p. 24,
7
Ibid. p,25.
8
President Hoover's Message to Congress of December 2,
1930, cited by Hayes, Activities of the President ' s Emergency
Committee For Employment, p. 7,
g
Ibid., p,6.
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the Woods Coramittee carried on a propaganda campaign to stim-
ulate needed construction in the states and communities. On
November 24, Colonel Vk'oods issued a press release, which in
part was as follows:
"It is felt by the Committee and by economists gener-
ally that tae carrying out of a broad and comprehensive
public roads program at a time like this is one of the
soundest procedures to meet a situation of depression
because it not only employs labor and materials necessary
in its actual construction, but also utilizes a back-
ground of additional labor to provide the materials and
the effective completion of such a program. It is esti-
mated that for every man actually employed in working on
a road, three other people become gainfully employed as
a result, not only in the supplying of materials and
-j_Q
equipment, but in other industries all along the line."
This release v/as in accord v;ith the viev;s of public works
theorists on employment created indirectly by construction.
On November 25, 1930, in a radio address, ^lloods empha-
sized roads as effecting "a return to business stabilization
by employing labor, and by buying materials . . . when they
are cheap and when their use will be important in restoring
normal business condit ions . "^"^
On November 22, 1930 following a conference with repre-
sentatives of the American Association of State Highway Of-
ficials, the Woods Committee recommended in a confidential
memorandum to the President $840,000,000 for authorization
"^^Press statement by Colonel IVoods, on November 24,1930,
cited by Hayes, Activities Of The President's Emergency Com-
mittee For Employment, p. 41,
Radio address by Colonel Woods, cited by Hayes,
Activities Of The President's Emergency Committee For Employ-
ment, Po42.

12
and appropriations. Of this sum ;p365,000,000 v/as to be for
the extension and acceleration of the Federal- state highway
construction; $336,000,000 for necessary public improvements
already planned and authorized but for which there was no
appropriation; and (#120,000,000 for miscellaneous government
work. Furthermore, the memorandum said tnat !;?250,000,000 of
the $365,000,000 could be started in six months and would in-
duce the states to build.
The recommendations in the memorandum were considered
imprudent by Hoover who stated:
"The government must not undertake works that are not
of sound economic purpose and that have not been subject
to searching technical investigation, and which have not
been given adequate consideration by the Congress."
"Our immediate problem is the increase of employment
for the next six months, and new plans which do not pro-
duce such immediate results or vmich extend commitments
beyond this period are not warranted, "13
Along with its efforts to expand the federal construc-
tion program, the V^oods Committee endeavored to accelerate the
present program, realizing that it was slow in starting. The
Committee was fairly successful in this respect. In a radio
talk on the National Broadcasting System, December 2, 1930,
Lewis Meriam, a member of the Committee described the amount
12
Hayes, Activities Of The President * s Emergency Com-
mittee For Employment
,
p7^3.
president Hoover's Message to Congress of December 2,
1930, cited by Hayes, Activities Of The President ' s Emergency
Committee For Employment, p. 44.

of red tape involved in releasing public work. As a result
of this propaganda a bill was approved in Congress on Febru-
ary 6, 1931 empowering the Secretary of the Treasury to (1)
obtain by contract without competition a topographical survey
of sites, test pits, and borings when the sites were selected
but the title of which was not vested in the United States
Government; (2) limit the days in the advertising of bids;
(3) obtain outside architects, engineering, or similar ser-
vices which seemed necessary when the sites were selected but
the title of which was not vested in the Federal Government . -^^
Such legislation was valuable because timing is important in
the effective working of a public works program.
On February 26, 1931 another bill was approved to en-
able the Federal Government to take possession and title of
15
other sites before final decrees in acquisition were issued.
As a further aid to the acceleration of construction,
the Committee on April 22, 1931 recommended in a memorandum to
Secretary of Commerce Lamont that each department and bureau
prepare for immediate construction all needed work that would
be done anyway within the next two to four years in case ex-
panded construction was needed in the fall. It said, "The
past winter was a bright example of this, - public works cannot
14
Hayes, Activities Of The President 's Emergency Com-
mittee For Employment
, pp. 49-50.15"
Ibid., p. 50.

be used to help in a time of depression because they have
not been planned ahead. "^'^ Such emphasis on planning was
necessary because the Federal Government was very slow in
releasing its construction program. The New York Times in
an editorial on September 8, said, "With every incentive to
speed up work, it has taken the Administration nearly two
years to begin construction on 45 per cent of the projects
ivin its present program," Such condemnation might have been
avoided if the pleas of the long-range planners of public
works had been heeded in the years following the President's
Conference on Unemployment.
Along these same lines Colonel x^oods testified before
the Indiana Conmiission for the Relief of Distress due to Un-
employment on March 5, 1931 that the construction industry
I
was the most vulnerable of all the industries in a depression
and would be greatly strengthened by advance planning. He
I asserted that restraint should be exercised in the public
buildings program whenever possible during a boom so that
instead of adding to the boom by building when prices were
high we could build up great reserves of construction. He
advocated, furthermore, that sites be selected, and litigation,
authorization, and appropriations be attended to beforehand.
Memorandum of Colonel Woods to Secretary of Commerce
Lamont, April 22, 1931, cited by Hayes, Activities Of The
President ' s Erne rgency Committee For Employment
,
p.5T7
17
Editorial in the New York Times , September , 8, 1931, cited
by Hayes, President's Emergency Committee For Employment,
p
. 52.
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so that at a moment's notice, the building programs could be
put into operation. In summary, he said, "One lesson that
has emerged from this depression is to contract building in
18
good times, expand building in bad times."
Before concluding the discussion of V»ood's ideas on
advance planning of public works, it is important to refer
to his speech of March 18, 1931 before the Woman's City Club
of New York. In this speech he listed three essentials for a
program of public works that is to be effective in combatting
oncoming unemployment. The first he stated to be the suffi-
ciency of the volume of public work, which he further added
meant billions. The second essential was having construction
in such a state of preparedness - plans made, sites owned, and
financing completed that it could be released immediately.
The third essential was that governments be wise enough to hit
upon the right time to expand construction. In his ovm words.
Woods said, "If these three essentials are carried out, and
enough public work can be put immediately into operation at
just the right time, we shall have strong defense against in-
dustrial depression, "'^
^°Speech of Colonel VJoods before the Indiana Commission
for Relief of Distress due to Unemployment, March 5, 1931,
cited by Hayes, Activities Of The President 's lilmergency Com-
mittee For Employment
,
p. 54.
19 I
Address of Colonel Woods before the Woman's City Club
of New York, March 18, 1931, cited by HAyes, Activities Of The
President ' s Emergency Committee For Employment
, p. 55.

It is apparent that Colonel iioods and his Committee
were imbued with many sound ideas on the subject of public
works. These ideas were not always adopted by the federal, or
the state and local governments, but laid the seed for the New
Deal and its public v/orks programs.
In addition to its activity in the stimulation of fed-
eral construction and long-range planning, the V/oods Committee
carried on an intensive campaign to encourage state and local
authorities to expand public and semi-public works. Favorable
results were achieved. Letters v/ere sent to the jPresidents
of more than two hundred and fifty large universities urging
construction and calling attention to the low costs then
prevalent. In an address on the radio in February 1951 V<oods
said, "Costs are reduced - in some cases as much as 20 per
20
cent," The Committee held a series of radio talks by pro-
minent leaders in the institutional field, with the aim of
stimulating interest in the construction of schools, hospitals
libraries, college buildings, and so forth. Among the speakeri,
were the Reverend "William Hiram Foulkes, D.D,, pastor of the
Old First Church, Newark, New Jersey, and Vice-i^resident of
International Society of Christian Endeavor, Alfred S. Smith,
and Robert M, Hutchins
.
The Reverend Foulkes said that it was the best time for
Radio address by Colonel woods, first in a series of
radio broadcasts in Februeiry, 1931, cited by Hayes, Activi t ies
Of the President's Emergency Committee For Employment, p,58.

churches to make repairs and improvements. His reasoning was
strongly akin to that of public works theorists. The follow-
ing is part of his speech:
"It would give employment, in the aggregate, to
thousands upon thousands of men and would release for
normal purchasing power large sums of money, widely dis-
tributed, paid out as wages. It would also guarantee,
because of available economies, that every dollar spent
for building at the present time would do a full dollar *s
worth of work. "21
Alfred E. Smith, speaking of the housing field said:
"The fundamental problem which could help to re-estab-
lish the industrial cycle and really help to relieve us of
our economic difficulties and at the same time accomplish
a much-needed reform is the provision of decent, sanitary,
attractive housing for our lowest income groups. "22
Robert M. Hutchins as id:
"If the 754 colleges and universities in all parts
of the country will hasten the construction of new build-
ings and resist the temptation to defer maintenance they
will make a decided contribution to the solution of the
unemployment problem . . .23
The Woods Committee undoubtedly was an important factor
in the development of the theory of public works as a recovery
measure. If it had been born at the beginning of the New Deal
its importance would be greater as its views would have been
Radio address by Rev, William Hiram Foulkes, cited by
Hayes, Activities Of The President ' s Emergency C ommittee For
Emp1oyment, p. 59,
22
Radio address by Alfred E, Smith, cited by Hayes,
Activities Of The President 's Emergency Committee For Employ-
ment
, p . 60
.
23
Radio address by Robert M. Hutchins, cited by Hayes,
Activities Of The President ' s Emergency Coimnittee For Employ-
ment, p. 61.
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1
put into action. As it v/as, its claim to fame is its role as
a publicity agent on behalf of the "pump- priming" theory prior
to the New Deal.
The Gifford Committee
The Woods Committee was replaced by a committee termed
"The President's Organization on Unemployment Relief", an-
?4
nounced by the President on August 19, 1931," The chairman
was Walter S. Gifford, President of the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, The purpose of the committee was "to
mobilize the national, state, and local agencies of every kind
which will have charge of the activities arising out of un-
employment in various parts of the nation this winter. "^^
A subcommittee headed by James R. Garfield of Cleveland
was appointed to study the means of increasing employment
through public works. The task facing this committee was
greater than that which faced tie Woods Committee because
there was more unemployment and localities were nearing the
end of their resources. Despite the greater distress pre-
vailing, however, the Garfield Committee did not accomplish ver;s
much of importance. It was a very conservative body and in
accord with Hoover's policies. It made a study of four means
of expanding public works: (1) the floating of various bond
issues for a large scale Federal public works program; (2) a
24
Edward A. Williams, Federal Aid For Relief, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1939, p. 30 ,
25
Ibid.
1
1
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Federal appropriation of varying sums for grants or loans to
the states and municipalities for the stimulation of their
public works; (3) more Federal road appropriations; and (4) the
acceleration of federal projects.
In its report of December 16, 1931 the committee con-
sidered all these suggestions unfavorably. It argued that the
Federal program was going well and hurrying it would cause in-
efficiency, that Federal credit would be strained, that taxes
would be increased, and local responsibility weakened, It
said that in the long run the real problem of unemployment
should be met by private business initiative if it were to be
27permanent 1 and that the problem of unemployment could not
be solved by any magic of appropriations from the public
treasury, Moreover, it stated that bonds could not be sold
unless high yields were given, and high yields would ruin the
market for lov/er interest government bonds, causing bank fail-
ures. In this connection it asserted that the market for
corporation and municipal securities would be lowered.
Such views were based on a rosier picture of the eco-
nomic condition of the country than actual conditions warrant-
ed. These conditions were made evident by hearings on Con-
gressional legislation, as those testifying called attention
^'^Ibid., p. 35.
27
Hopkins, Spending to Save, p,59.
28
Ibid.

29to the plight of the unemployed. Nevertheless, the commit-
tee maintained such viev;s and, supported by Hoover, the
(jifford CoiTimittee placed emphasis on stimulating state and
local relief and employment activity, it was a remarkable
task faced by this committee. Indeed the task was satirized
by Vdill Rogers, speaking over tae radio in December 1931 on
behalf of the Committee, He described a conversation between
30
IvlT, Hoover and Gifford:
"Gifford, I have a remarkable job for you; you are
to feed the several million unemployed,"
"With what?" says Gifford,
"That's what makes the job remarkable. If you had
something to do it with, it wouldn't be remarkable,"
The Gifford Committee and its subcommittee headed by
Garfield do not play a large role in the development of the
theory of public works as a recovery measure. They accom-
plished something in advertising the need of state and local
activity, but tne country needed more than words.
The Federal Employment Stabilization Board Act
As much as one may criticize the Hoover Administration
for its views on the subject of public works, a certain amount
of credit must be given for the enactment of two important
bills, which represented the most important legislation passed
29
30
Edward A, Williams, Federal Aid For Relief, p,40.
Radio talk by Vilill Rogers, cited by ^opkins. Spending
to Save, p,63.

by the Federal Government prior to the New Deal, In these
bills were embodied many of the suggestions of public works
theorists
.
The first bill was entitled "Employment Stabilization
Act," which became a law on February 10, 1931. Sponsored by
Senator Vi/agner, its purpose was to "provide for the advance
planning and regulated construction of public works for the
stabilization of industry and for aiding in the prevention of
unemployment during periods of business depression. "^-^ Its
importance is attributed to the fact that it was the first
32large scale operation of the theory of planned public works.
Underlying the Act was the belief that public works could
stabilize industry by increasing public works in depressions
and decreasing them in prosperity, and it represents the
culmination of a decade's efforts to enact such legislation.
The first part of the bill created a Federal Employment
Stabilization Board consisting of the Secretaries of the Trea-
sury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor whose duties were to
(1) advise the President of the trend of employment and busi-
ness activity and the existence or approach of a business
31
Public - No. 616-71st Congress (S.5776), cited in
Advance Planning of Public Works in the District of Columbia
,
Washington, UniteT"States Government Printing OfflTce, 1933, p.
1
32
Gayer, Public l/Vorks in Prosperity and Depression
,
p,12b
33
Pauline E. Thompson and Leon C. Marshall, Help to the
Jobless , New York City, Bureau of Publications: Teachers Col-
lege, Columbia University, 1934, p. 13.

depression and unemployment; (2) cooperate with government
construction agencies in formulating methods of advance plan-
ning; render reports on its progress; and (4) miscellaneous
duties such as obtaining information on the construction plans
34
of public and private agencies. The decisions of the Board
were to be based on the volume of contracts on a value basis,
awarded for construction work in this country during a three
months period of the three previous calendar years. It was
also provided that the Index of employment of the Department
of Labor, or any other pertinent information could be used.
The second part of the bill required government agen-
cies to prepare six year detailed advance plans with yearly
estimates of the projects. Each agency was to prepare its
program for immediate release at any time. Plans were also
to be made for the acquisition of sites. All plans were to
be reviewed by the Stabilization Board and the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget. Every year the plans had to be revised
and extended for one more year. The object of this part of
the bill was apparent. The actual wording in part was as
follows
:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to
arrange the construction of public works so far as prac-
ticable in such manner as will assist in the stabilization
of industry and employment through the proper timing of
such construction, and that to further this object there
shall be advance planning including preparation of detailed
34
Report and Recommendations of the California State
Unemployment~Commission, p.575»

construction plans, of public works by the construction
agencies and the board. "35
The third important part of the bill authorized the
President when he was sure that an emergency existed or would
exist within six months to tell Congress of the estimated
appropriations needed to carry out the purposes of the Act,
Such appropriations, however, were limited to highVi/ays, river
and harbor works, flood control projects, public buildings,
or others authorized by Congress and in the six year plans.
This Act made possible a good beginning in the advance
planning of Federal public works. The six year programs it
made necessary were to become useful to the Public ii»orks Ad-
36
ministration of the New Deal in expediting its program. The
Board never utilized its potentialities, inasmuch as a period
of depression was prevalent, but it accomplished enough to
warrant its continuance under the i^ew Deal, Its fimctions
were transferred by Executive Order to the Department of
Commerce in March 1934, In 1936 its records were transferred
to the projects division of the Public Works Administration,
which carried on the six year planning activities among Fed-
eral agencies,"^
Public - No. 616-71st Congress (S,5776), cited in
Advance Planning of Public Vtforks in the District of Columbia
,
p.l.
36
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37
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The Emergency Relief and Construction Act
The second important bill, passed by Congress was the
Emergency Relief and Construction Act, "An Act, to relieve
destitution, to broaden the lending powers of the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation, and to create employment by provid-
ing for expediting a public works program, ""^^ reluctantly
signed by President Hoover on July 21, 1932. Although this
Act did not grant all the demands of the more fervent publi c
works advocates, it is important because it represents a com-
promise between the liberals and conservatives among the
advocates, broke the ground for further legislation of this
type, and indicated the growing strength of the demand for
Federal aid to public construction bodies. As one writer
stated:
"Finally, Congress was beginning to listen to the
pump-primers who wanted billions for a great federal pro-
gram to revive industry, but iii)322,000,000 of federal
funds was all it was willing to spend to try to set the
pump in motion again. "39
The attitude that Hoover and his cabinet officer Ogden Mills
took over the bill is indicated by statements they made con-
cerning a previous bill which was very similar but shelved
for it. Hoover in his veto message said:
"I have expressed myself at various times upon the
38
Public no. 302, 72nd Cong., approved July 21,1932, 47
Stat. 709, cited by J. Kerv/in Williams, Grants- In- Aid Under
the Public Works Administration, New York, Columbia University
Press, 1939, p. 24 (footnote).
39
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extreme undesirability of increasing expenditures on
non-productive works beyond the ^500,000,000 of construc-
tion already in the Budget. It is an ultimate burden
on the taxpayer. It unbalances the Budget after all our
efforts to attain that object.
Mills, in his testimony before the Committee on Banking and
Currency of the United states Senate in Jiuie 1932, asserted
that he was opposed to expanding public works at that time
because it would have meant an unbalanced budget; that al-
though it might cause a temporary pick up of business it would
cause a later recession. In his ovm words:
"... when you attempt to bust this depression with a
$300,000,000 appropriation for public works it is just
like asking a 10-year-old boy to go and pick up the
V^ashington monument and bring it to this room, "41
He favored loans for self-liquidating projects, which as will
be seen in chapter VI are not recommended by public works
theorists because they take money from the consumption stream
as well as add to it.
The Act carried out the policy of the Employment
Stabilization Act,"^^ Title I authorized the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation to advance sums at 3 per cent interest
to states and territories to the amount of ^^5300,000,000 for
direct aid and work relief. Political subdivisions of the
40
Cited by Hopkins, Spending to Save, p. 89.
Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency,
U.S. Senate, 72nd Cong., 1st Ses., on S,4755, June 1932, p. 106,
cited by E.A.Vililliams, Federal Aid For Relief , pp. 46-47.
42
Thompson and Marshall, Help to the Jobless , p. 14,

states could obtain funds through the governors, who would
make the appropriation. Before the governor could obtain
funds, however, he had to certify that his state *s resources
were inadequate. The money had to be paid back by deductions
from the federal-aid highway allotments, unless other arrange-
43
ments for payment were made. If the governmor of a state
approved, and the Corporation did, part of the state sums
available for municipalities and other political subdivisions
were to be repaid like other public debts.
Title II empowered the Reconstruction Finance Corpor-
ation to grant loans for certain types of self-liquidating
projects, such as (a) projects by states or subdivisions, or
public agencies like public corporations; (b) housing for
low income families or reconstructing slum areas undertaken
by corporations formed with that in mind and state and munici-
pal regulated as to rents, charges, rates of return, capital
structure, and methods of operation; (c) construction, re-
placement, or improvement of bridges, tunnels, docks, viaducts
waterworks, canals, and markets when private limited dividend
corporations devoted to public use undertook them; (d) forest
protection and development and other renewable natiiral re-
sources if private limited dividend corporations undertook
them and if regulated by the state or a political subdivision
of the state; (e) construction of bridges owned by the public
Isakoff, The Public Works Administration, p. 14,

if the cost were returned partly by tolls, fees, rents, or
other charges, and the rest by taxes imposed before the
passage of the Act. This section v/as never important. The
total loans to states, municipalities, and other public bodies
to the end of 1935 amounted to less than $200,000,000.^^ This
small amount of borrowing was due to the strict legal require-
ments of the self-liquidating loans, and the hesitation to go
further into debt.
Title III, which stated the purpose of this section of
the Act as "providing for emergency construction of certain
authorized public works with a view to increasing employment
and carrying out the policy declared in the Employment Stabi-
lization Act of 1931 . . ."authorized appropriations of
$120,000,000 for the "emergency construction" of federal-aid
highways, $30,000,000 for the prosecution of river and harbor
projects previously authorized, $15,500,000 for already
authorized flood-control projects, ;jplO , 000 , 000 for the con-
struction of the Hoover dam and incidental works, and a total
of $4,310,000,000 to be spent by the department of Commerce
for air-navigation facilities, lighthouses, tenders, light
45
vessels, and other aids to navigation. {$1,250,000,000 was
granted to previously authorized engineering projects of the
44
Edward A. Williams, Federal Aid For Relief
, p. 44.
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J. Kerwin Williams, Grants- In-Aid Under the Public
Works Administration, pp.24-2F^;

Coast and Geodetic Survey of the Department of Commerce.
Certain construction work of the Bureau of Yards and Docks,
Navy Department, which had been included in the January 1932
report of the Federal Employment Stabilization Board and were
either authorized already or required no specific authori-
zation had total appropriations of ;iplO,000,000 . In addition
to this there was an appropriation of [^100,000,000 for the
emergency construction of public buildings projects outside
the District of Columbia, on projects to be selected from a
list of public building projects specified in House Document
788, 71st Congress, third session; and §15,164,000 for a
number of buildings and utilities and appurtenances at sixty-
five specified federal military posts, aviation fields, and
hospitals
.
The Act went beyond any other Federal legislation for
the expansion of public works, but on the v/hole it can be
termed a failure. The appropriations were insufficient to
meet the need for employment. Many of the projects were in
46
remote regions rather than where unemployment was greatest.
The Act was slow in going into operation. The self-liquida-
ting feature was especially bad, and served as a valuable
lesson to the follov/ers of the Hoover Administration,
Conclusion
During the Hoover Administration the struggle for
46
Ibid., p. 29.

public works expansion and reform continued fiercely and
greater success was obtained by the theorists. Part of this
success was due to the fact that the need for public works
to create employment was prevalent. In the face of wide-
spread unemployment the Federal Government could not sit idly
by. It had to do something and did so at the instigation of
fervent advocates of public works as a remedy for unemploy-
ment and as a recovery measure. The Federal Employment
Stabilization Board Act and the Emergency i^elief and Con-
struction Act were the main direct results. Indirect results
were the splendid publicity given to the theories of "pump-
priming" by the Vi/oods Committee and to a lesser extent by the
G-ifford Committee, and the valuable experience offered the
New Deal by the weaknesses of the Hoover philosophy and the
Emergency Relief and Construction Act, As much as one may
criticize the "hands off" policy of the Hoover Administration,
it can be said that New Deal "pump-priming" obtained a start i
with the Administration. The next logical step, in the face
of dire necessity was the New Deal public works program.

Chapter V.I
American Theorists and
Public VJorks
Although cities, states, and the Federal Government
have been important factors in the development of the theory
of public works as a recovery measure It is the economists
and certain writers in the field of public works who have been
the greatest contributors to this development. It is they
who studied the question, reasoned in an unprejudiced manner.
Incorporated their conclusions in writing and influenced the
city, state, and Federal Grovernment to plan their public works
programs in accordance with their suggestions. The influence
of such men has become greater and greater as governments have
learned to consult men of authority in their respective fields
of study instead of political career men actuated by selfish
motives
•
John R. Shillady
Among the early important American theorists on public
works as a recovery measure is John K. Shillady, Secretary of
the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, I'iew York City. In his
Planning Public Expenditures to Compensate for Decreased Priv-
ate Employment During Business Depressions , an Extension of an
address before the Forty- third Annual Session of the National
Conference of Charities and Corrections, Indianapolis, May 16,

1916, he called for the expansion of public works to revive
business
.
In the first part of this brief pamphlet, Shillady
cites the opinions of various persons on the subject of public
works as a recovery measure and the experiences of various
countries. He refers to resolutions passed by Conferences of
the American Association on Unemployment, favoring reform in
public works systems, and statements of professors such as
C,A,Henderson and H.R.Seager, suggesting planned public works.
As to the experiences of the foreign countries he refers to
Great Britain's Development and Hoad Funds Act of 1909,
Prance's sentiments and policies, and the experiences of (Jer-
man cities.
In the second part, Shillady considers the possibili-
ties of public works expansion in the United States. Assuming
that the total public (Federal, state, county, and city) and
railroad expenditures on non-administrative and non-operative
items amounted to $633,000,000 as a conservative annual aver-
age, or a total of $6,330,000,000 in ten years, he said that
it was generally agreed that the country could postpone one-
tenth of the yearly expenditures and thus accumulate in ten
years a reserve fund of about 2j)633,000,000. Further assuming
that about 45 per cent, 30 per cent for larger public works
for direct wages and about 15 per cent for indirect wages in
prices paid for materials and services, although this per-
centage would vary v/ith the nature of the work, he figured
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that at the end of ten years we v/ould have i|285,000,000 as a
1
reserve from which wages could be paid,
1
He then stated that in 1910, 18,413,251 persons, male
!
and female, were engaged in trade, transportation, manufac-
tviring, and mechanical pursuits, and in 1913 about 21,470,000.
1
84 per cent of these he figured would be males and 16 per cent
1
females. Assuming that in 1913 ^12 a week for males and $7
for females was the average wage for all classes of labor and
for all ages he computed that there would be needed about a
$24,000,000 weekly wage bill to support one-tenth of the
groups named. To keep one- tenth of the whole working popu-
lation of the country in the above named groups employed at
the average wage reckoned over a period of tv/elve weeks it
would cost $288,000,000. As there would be available
$285,000,000 as a reserve fund at the end of ten years, we
would have the money, and accordingly encounter no financial
difficulty.
In this manner Shillady indicated in figures the
potentialities of public and quasi-public expenditures in con-
trolling employment fluctuations, and it is to be noted that
he considered only the more or less permanent improvements.
Other aspects of the theory of public works as a
recovery measure were discussed by him. he related hov; recovei
would come. Corner restaurants, tobacconists, milliners,
1
He assumed that serious trade depressions occurred
every ten years.
1
1
1
1
i
1
y
1
1
1
1
1

confectioners, printers, jewelers, and all commerce, manu-
facturing and industrial workers would be affected by public
improvements
.
"If this takes place on a nation-wide scale, confidence,
and enterprise may return so generally and completely,
soon after the first symptoms of a slump have made them-
selves felt, that the shutting dov/n of plants or laying
off of men is stopped almost before it has been started,
so that the financial crisis, whatever may have been
its origin, does not deeply affect trade at all and may
itself be lessened both in severity and duration by the
continued optimism of the producers. "2
He also discussed the favorable terms to be secured on
loans during depressions, the lower prices prevalent, the
necessity of planning ahead, and the necessity of paying
standard wages so that the program would not be a relief pro-
gram. In this latter connection, he would give no preference
to the unemployed but hire only the most efficient workers.
It is apparent that Shillady was interested merely in
the recovery aspects of a public works program. His views,
coming at a time v/hen the theory of public works as a recovery
measure was not well knov/n, were very enlightened. The
pamphlet embodying these views is a classic in the literature
on public works reform,
William Hard
William Hard may not be familiar to everyone, but to
students of economics, especially in the field of public
Shillady, Planning Public Expenditures to Compensate
for Decreased Private Employment During Business Depressions ,
pTT9.
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works, he is ranked as one of the best early theorizers and
i
1
writers on the value of public works as a recovery measure,
1
His article entitled "Big Jobs For Bad Times" in Everybody's,
i
August 1916, suggested a plan which was to command the atten-
tion of the entire nation. In this article appears the
expression "pump-priming" in relation to business recovery,
an expression which did not originate v/ith the A\iew Deal,
Hard's plan is presented through the mouth of his
fictitious President of the United States, who says:
"Now, you will feel, I am sure, as I feel, that the
1
minds of men are turning to the thought: * If this prim-
ing of the pump of business can be done by the sudden
1
endeavors of war, why may it not be done by sudden en-
deavors of peace, by great outlays on great improvements
in our common life, on our highways, and our streams and
our marshes and our deserts? '"4
The President calls in the Secretary of Labor, bankers,
and citizens skilled in the practical administration of laws
affecting labor and capital, and tells them that he is
charged by Congress to lay before them a new public duty.
Citing the example of England's setting aside money for road
construction, not to be released until a crisis comes, when
it could be served to revive business ty employing labor and
capital; he asks why it is not possible for the American
national and local governments to accumulate similar funds
William Hard, "Big Jobs For Bad Times", Everybody's
35:129-41, August 1916, in Muller, Government Fund For Un-
employment, p,99,
^Ibid., p.lOO.
r

as a reserve against days of fear and then ''pouring them out
on great public enterprises which will set the waters of
labor and of capital flov/ing once more in the channels of
courage and of certainty?"
The President then asks the group he has before hira
to study the problem and observe that the governments of the
country give less employment when more is needed, and build
in boom times when labor needs employment least. In this
connection, he says that in boom times construction materials
such as stone, bricks, sewer-pipes, and water-mains have to
be bought at top-notch prices. He says that they will further
observe that the amount of public money spent on permanent
improvements is prodigious - about ^^600,000,000 a year. If
one-tenth of this sum were put aside each year, there would
be available $300,000,000 at the end of five years. This sma.
would employ more than 1,000,000 wage earners at average wages
for a period of twelve weeks.
The President continued in this manner, using the
reasoning of later public works theorists. Especially pro-
phetic and valuable, however, was his statement that the pub-
lic works needed were too large for the local governments to
finance and that the aid of the national government was
necessary.
After having the President address a group in the
5
Ibid.

foregoing manner. Hard continues himself. He is especially
critical of the captains of industry, as illustrated by the
following excerpt:
"The day comes. Private business begins to slow down.
As soon as its leaders notice that it is slowing down
they get frightened and refuse to give it fresh money -
fresh power - anywhere; and then of course it slows down
worse than before.
"Again the captains of industry have led their soldiers
to defeat and discharge and destitution. They deserve a
court-martial, and, in the present temper of the world,
they are likely to get it some day, unless they adopt the
clear, known means by v/hich such occasions can be changed
from defeats to victories. "6
He then explains how his plan would bring recovery.
The National Unemployment Crisis Commission reports to the
President when the depression arrives. The President acts
and public works projects are started. Men are employed
directly, the materials and machines required come from manu-
facturers, who put other men to work. By means of such direct
and indirect employment the depression is reversed and an
upward impulse has been started. As recovery proceeds, the
public employees leave their emergency work and return to the
higher wages of ordinary normal employment.
In conclusion. Hard optimistically asserts that two
million men, if necessary, could be transferred to useful
public work, and instead of begging be purchasing, "The de-
pression never lived," he says," that could take such a blow
without losing half its power of inflicting misery, and with-
_
Ibid,, 110.
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out also losing half its power of duration,"'''
This article was a good presentation of the theory of
public works as a recovery measure and created wide discussion
throughout the country. The following remarks by prominent
persons in the country indicate hov/ well the article was re-
ceived!
Editor of Everybody's: "We believe that the idea developed
by Mr, Hard in this article is big and simple and prac-
ticable. We have tested it by the judgment of men who
are authorities on unemployment and on 'big jobs', Ue
submitted this article to each of them and asked him to
express his opinion for publication, on the soundness of
its central idea. You know these men, and you will read
the article more appreciatively because of their com-
ments ;ic3
John Mitchell, Labor Leader: "l have read with care and
interest Mr, Hard's article. Big Jobs For Bad Times , The
plan he proposes for minimizing and reducing the hardships
and evils of unemployment is thoroughly practicable and
should receive the earnest consideration of federal, state
and municipal authorities having control of public improve-
ments ,
Franklin K, Lane, Secretary of the Interior:"! have looked
over Mr, Hard's article. His idea is not impracticable.
A little thought and a little money, and we need have no
more long periods of unemployment . "10
Henry Seager, Professor of Political Economy, Columbia
University: "I have read with great interest kr. Hard's
article. The plan he advocates in his usual striking and
effective way seems to me entirely practicable if we have
at Vtfashington the machinery for a continuing policy of
such high statesmanship. It is a big 'if', but I believe
the President and Congress who inaugurate such a plan
8
10
Ibid,, p. 112,
Ibid
. ,
p,96.
Ibid., pp, 96-97,
Ibid,, p,97.
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would not find other presidents and congresses bacl'cward
in carrying it forward. "11
Samuel McCune Lindsay, Professor of Political Science,
Columbia University: "I have read Mr. Hard's article with
interest. The basic thought is, of course, sound and
practical. I might also add feasible, though it does not
seem to me that his concrete suggestions of ways of
carrying out his plan are altogetner adequate or happy.
It will receive the almost unanimous support of economists
and social workers. "12
Undoubtedly Hard contributed a lot to the development
of the tneory of public works as a recovery measure. Similar
to Shillady in his views, and writing at a time when the
country considered public works primarily as a relief measure,
he was ahead of his time on the subject of "pump-priming".
Otto B. Mallery
1
The name of Otto B. Mallery is probably more familiar
to students of economics than that of William Hard or John
R, Shillady, To students of public v/orks he is famous. Not
only has he written many articles on tne theory of public
works as a recovery measure, but he has testified many times
before Congressional committees considering public works bills.
His views are best revealed in chapter IV of Business Cycles
and Unemployment, An Investigation Under the Auspices of the
National Bureau of Economic Research Made For a Committee of
the President's Conference on Unemployment. The chapter,
entitled "The Long-Range Planning of Public \i'iorks" is a
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
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scientific study of the pros and cons of the theory of public
works as a recovery measure.
In the first part of this chapter, Mallery discusses
the dangers involved in the expansion of public works in times
of prosperity. Among these dangers he lists (1) the high
prices of wages and materials; (2) the overtaxing of trans-
portation facilities; (3) the increase in labor turnover;
(4) high interest rates; and (5) the increase in the costs
and the selling prices of commodities.
He then indicates the benefits of expanding public works
in depression. He says that poor relief is decreased. He
illustrates the widespread effects of the wages obtained by
the employees on public works. Taking the example of a worker
buying a shirt with his money, he says that the cotton and
wool workers are put back to work, that cotton bales come from
the South and wool from the West, that frozen credits in cotton
and wool are liquefied, and that the railroads take in receipts
through the increased freight.
In his own words Llallery summarizes his conclusions on
the question of public works as a recovery measure:
"... under favorable circumstances it seems reason-
able to believe that the public v/orks reserve fund would
make a substantial contribution toward the mitigation of
general unemployment ,"13
13
Mallery, "The Long-Range Planning of Public Works",
in Business Cycles and Unemployment, p. 236,
1

In the second part of his study Mallery surveys the
experience of England, France, Germany and the United States
in the field of public works.
The study is concluded by his recommendations for the
long-range planning of public works. For the National Gov-
ernment he recommends a "reserve" clause in all annual appro-
priations, a department of public works for the centralization
of public construction, advance planning such as was called
for in the Kenyon bills, and tie development of the Survey of
Current Bus iness as a guide for public v/orks . For the states
he recommends a Commission on public works, planning, and
a central purchasing supply body. For the municipalities he
suggests a city plan broken up into projects that were needed
and those that could be postponed, a reserve fund, and an
educational campaign to familiarize the public with the value
of public works,
is not necessary to discuss further the views of
Otto Mallery, as they are similar to other theorists. His
importance cannot be emphasized too much, however, as his
reasoning in Chapter IV of Bus ine s s Cycles and Unemployment
greatly influenced the Federal Government and business in
their construction policy in the boom of early 1923. Before
concluding a discussion of his views, it is interesting to
quote part of his testimony before a Senate Committee in 1929.
The following excerpt illustrates his reasoning:
"a relatively small amount of new orders, such as a
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public works program can reasonably offer, v/ill do much
to sustain the structure, for new orders multiply them-
selves with surprising rapidity. The American dollar in
circulation is a speed devil. It may jump quickly out of
your pocket, but the next fellov/ is also competing for the
record. The dollar, like Paddy's flea, is never where it
was. Look for the public works dollar where it was - in
public works - and it is not there, having jumped into
a corner of the storekeeper's pocket. It jumps so fast
that you cannot trace it, but, like the flea, it leaves
its mark. The steel v/orker feels it and the ice cream
man, an excellent thermometer of prosperity. The teddy-
bear maker and the garment v/orker feel it. It wakes the
alarm-clock maker and speeds up the scooter specialist.
It creates jobs as apparently unrelated to public v/orks
as Spitzbergen is to Africa. A few hundred millions of
nev/ public v/orks credit is like the flow of water in an
irrigation ditch. It spreads above ground and under-
ground, "^^
This description is an excellent illustration of hov/ public
works stimulate business in general.
Poster and Catchings
William Trufant Foster and i^addill Catchings are well
known v/riters in the field of business cycle literature.
^
Authors of Money, Profits, Business *vithout A Buyer, and Road
To Plenty, they have developed a plausible theory of the
business cycle. In their remedy for the periodic descent of
business, public works play an important part. As previously
mentioned, their views were believed to be behind Hoover's
public works plan announced by Governor Brewster of I.Iaine in
karch 1923,
It is in an article in the July 1928 issue of Century,
14
Hearings on Unemployment in the United States, Before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Education and Labor, iiallery, 1929i
p,200, cited by Epstein, Insecurity A Challenge to America,
pp, 187-188,

entitled "Progress and Plenty" and their book Road to Plenty
that their theories are well presented.
According to this article and book, depressions are
caused by the lack of purchasing power with which to buy the
products of industry. The authors say that money goes around
in circles constantly and that if business paid back to con-
sumers all the money it received from them, and the latter
spent all the money, there would be a steady circuit flow and
no trouble in selling a given volume of goods at a given level
of prices.l^ The fact is, however, that the circuit flow is
broken by profits and also by savings, corporate and individu-
al. The result is that the money distributed in a given year
is not sufficient to buy the goods produced, •'^ In other words,
the automatic-product ion- consumption theory of John Stuart
Mill is unsound.
To the argument that savings and profits do not lie
idle, and actually are invested, thusly putting men to work,
Foster and Catchings respond by saying that the money is not
always borrowed, especially in depressions, as indicated by
the fall in bank loans, and that even if the savings are put
back into circulation in production, the result may be more
trouble, for as the Business Man said in The Road To Plenty ;
15
Vtfilliam Trufant Foster and Waddill Catchings, The
Road To Plenty
,
Cambridge, The Riverside Press, 1928, p. 76,
16
Vililliara T, Foster and V^/addill Catchings, "Progress
And Plenty", Century , Vol, 116: 259, July 1928.

"The process of producing such goods does not yield
consumers enough money to buy even those goods, to say
nothing of the goods which remained unsold in the first
place, because the money in question was being saved
Instead of being spent, '17
Assuming that this lack of equilibrium between income
and outgo is the cause of depressions , -^^Poster and Gatchings
believe that the remedy lies in the planning of the flow of
money to consumers so that the goods coming onto the market
will be bought. The flow is not right unless the shortage
due to savings is offset, and in addition, there is a suffi-
cient flow of new money to bring about the distribution of
19
a constantly increasing output. They state that such a flow
can be obtained and has been by the construction of new
20
capital facilities and by public works. In the case of the
construction of new capital facilities, these mean new wage
advances to consumers to buy goods. The deficiency in demand
is offset because the money comes to consumers before the
goods are produced. In the case of public works, these enable
wage earners to buy goods without adding goods to the market.
17
Foster and Gatchings, Road To Plenty
,
p,135,
18
Poster and Gatchings do not claim to prove that busi-
ness depressions are initiated by shortages of consumer income,
as this cannot be proved. For their purposes, they do not have
to, as all they insist is that a decline of business, hov;ever
initiated, cannot develope into a depression if consumer in-
come is sufficiently sustained. ( Road to Plenty p,175),
19
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20
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Without either of these two, the authors admit that sometimes
the right flov/ of money comes by chance, but sooner or later
depression comes.
Stating that a well-planned flow of money to consumers
is the remedy for depressions, Foster and Catchings suggest
the need of facts to indicate wiien the flow of money needs
adjustment. Pacts on unemployment would be necessary as they
v/ould certainly show a falling off of business activity. Re-
tail prices would also be useful as they would indicate whether
or not incomes were increasing at the right rate. Rising
prices mean that demand is ahead of supply, and falling prices
mean that the flow of money to consumers must be increased.
Exceptions to this reasoning, however, are admitted on the
use of a rising price index.
The Government, according to the authors, should col-
lect the data on business and consider this in its ov/n fiscal
operations. It should make appropriations, borrow money,
spend, pay debts only with reference to economic conditions,
A Board of the Government would be advisable to make reports
on business conditions and advise the Government, and at the
same time afford leadership to private business so it would
act wisely. When the indices signified that a greater flow
of money was needed, the Board would advise the Government,
which should then borrow and spend money, ^-^ Moreover, in
21
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periods of rapid expansion of business. Government construc-
tion should be curtailed or postponed as such periods indicate
that too much money is flowing to consumers
•
In reference to an increased Federal debt, Foster and
Catchings see no danger and state that it is sometimes better
to increase it than to decrease it. Moreover, they believe
that when business realizes the Federal G-overnment is going
to increase consumer incomes purposely, it will increase its
own capital expenditures so that government expenditures would
really be unnecessary.^^
The theorizing of these two men influenced many persons
and attracted the attention of the business world. It undoubt-
edly aided in paving the way for the triumph of the theory
of public works as a recovery measure.
Frank G. Dickinson
Among the foremost of the optimistic advocates of pub-
lic works as a business stabilizer is Frank G. Dickinson. He
was a firm believer in the efficacy of public works planning
and has contributed a lot to the educating of the country as
to the importance of the reforms he advocated. To the student
of public works he is especially important because of his
scientific illustrations of how employment can be stabilized
by the systematic distribution of public construction. As his
other views are similar to most of the public works theorists
22
Ibid., p. 267

this discussion v;ill be limited to his illustrations as em-
bodied in his article "Public V»orks as a Prosperity Reserve"
published in the March 1929 issue of the American Labor Legis-
lation Review,
In this article Dickinson figured that most of the
workers who suffer from economic fluctuations were factory
23
workers. He reaches this conclusion by saying that there were
11,090,000 factory workers employed in 1920 and 8,707,250 in
1921, In all enterprises 28,051,500 were employed in 1920
and 24,819,000 in 1921, Among the factory workers there was
a decrease of 2,392,000, Of this latter decrease the former
represents 73 per cent.
He then assumed that (1) the value of public construc-
tion contracts was ;ii>674,000,000 in 1919 and $1,283,000,000
in 1925; (2) that 80 per cent of every dollar paid in con-
struction contracts went to wage earners within a year; and
(3) that the employment index with 1919-1925 as 100 or the
base year was 105 in 1919, 108 in 1920, 186 in 1921, 95 in
1922, 108 in 1923, and 99 in 1924,
Prom this index it may be seen that in some years there
was abnormal employment and in some years sub-normal employ-
ment. The problem, according to him is to avoid the fluctua-
tions in the index and make it 100 in each year. He reasons
Frank G, Dickinson, "Public Vii'orks as a Prosperity
Reserve," American Labor Legislation Review
,
19:89-94, March,
1929.

that this can be accomplished by public v/orks , As factory
wages, he computed, were 38,202,000,000 in 1921 or 86 per cent
of the average of the period, there would be needed an increase
of about one- third of a billion dollars in wages, or on an 80
per cent basis, an increase of two-thirds of a billion dollars
in the value of public construction contracts to bring the
index from 86 per cent to 100. This increase could be ob-
tained by taking $1,668,000,000 worth of public works from
1919,1920, and 1923, in which years they were not needed, and
building them in 1921, In this way the employment index is
raised to 100 for 1921 and lowered to 100 for 1919 and 1920.
The same procedure can be followed in respect to the years
1922 and 1924.
By such mathematical computation Dickinson would have
stabilized employment merely through shifting ^2,366,000,000
of public construction from good to bad years. A 33,500,000-
000 shift would have stabilized all emplo3nnent. Looking into
the future, he says, "Probably four billion dollars would be
necessary for the period 1929-1935 because of the increase
in population and other factors of growth. "24
In describing in greater detail the mode of procedure
that should be followed in effecting stabilization of employ-
ment, he says that all possible public construction should
cease when the index was four or five points above average for
24
Ibid., p.92
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the preceding half dozen years and expand when the index was
four or five points belov/ this period. In his ovm words he
expresses his hope:
"Let us hope that Mr. Hoover's administration will
demonstrate that a nation can be the master of its
economic destiny and that these ever-recurring periods
of joblessness v/ill be prevented, "25
Dickinson's mathematical illustrations of the possi-
I
bilities of public works expansion in time of depression and
contraction in time of boom greatly aided in clarifying the
problem of public works as a recovery measure and placed it
in more of a realistic atmosphere,
Vernon Arthur Mund
One of the most scholarly treatments of the subject of
public works as a recovery measure was an article written by
Vernon Arthur Mund entitled "Prosperity Reserves of Public
VKorks" published in the Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science , in May 1930. Not only did the
article present the European and American background of the
subject, but it emphasized the theoretical phases of the prob-
lems involved. Mund did not aim to present a case for or
against public works reform. His aim was "to draw logical
conclusions from unbiased facts." He did, however, draw
certain conclusions and these, emanating from a scholarly source,
are important. They express the beliefs of one who studied the
25
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subject with an unprejudiced mind,
Mund summarized his conclusions under two heads. The
first concerns the efficacy of timed public works in control-
ling prosperity and depression. The second is related to the
administrative provisions necessary for the efficient working
of the principle of public works.
As to the efficacy of public works in controlling
prosperity and depression, he concluded that a curtailment
of such construction would mean a lessening of the demand
for goods and thus cause a slov/er and less intense rise in
prices. This, however, according to his reasoning, would
not prevent the business cycle since other factors involved
remain unchanged. He further concluded that 90 per cent of
the total public works was done by states and their subdivi-
sions so that a study in one state would be necessary to test
the theory. Such a study he made for the state of Washington
for the years 1920-1927 and found that if work had been prop-
erly allocated, the first spendings of the construction money
would have relieved all the unemployment in the extra-hazard-
ous occupations. Such a finding was important, because he
believed that these occupations were greatly affected by the
business cycle.
In the administrative details of public v/orks planning,
he offered several suggestions. He v/ould not provide for a
depression by a fixed deferral of public works. Rather, he
would make the amount of deferred work dependent on the

rapidity and extent of the rise of business activity. As
business activity became greater, the deferral of work should
be greater.
Secondly, he suggested a State Board of Control to
insure intelligent timing of public works. This Board would
exert influence by controlling the issue of bonds for new
public construction. Its judgement would be based on indices
of payrolls and employment.
Thirdly, he suggested that Federal and state legis-
lation provide that puxiLic works agencies always have ready
advance engineering plans for the succeeding three years.
Among Mvmd's conclusions that are important to students
of public works as a recovery measure is the one that states
that planned contraction and expansion of construction would
not prevent the business cycle. This is undoubtedly true.
Public works control would only aid in preventing business
cycles. Other remedies are necessary in conjunction with
public works,
V>/ illlam Randolph Hearst
Although one can hardly term vvilliam Randolph Hearst
an economist or theorist on the subject of public works as
a recovery measure, it is difficult to omit him in a study of
the development of the subject of this thesis. He is impor-
tant in this development because he adopted the ideas of the
public works advocates and spread them throughout the country
by means of editorials in his newspapers. These editorials

are excellent illustrations of the popular version of the
theory of public works as a recovery measure. Coming during
the Hoover administration they did much to educate the country
in the doctrines to be embodied in the i^ew Deal*s public works
legislation.
On February 5, 1931 in an editorial entitled, "Millions
For Unemployment, But Not One Gent For Dole", Hearst pleads:
"The policy of employment for the idle and needy on
public works is Mr, Hoover's program: and it is a splen-
didly sound and effective program; IF HE k^'OULD OWLY PUT
IT INTO OPERATION."
In a radio address from New York City on June 2, 1931,
reprinted in the Hearst papers on June 7, 1931, he said:
"The whole nation knows that if sufficient labor were
promptly employed at good wages, buying at the stores
would promptly be resumed, the stores would immediately
order from the factories, the factories would immediately
order from the farms and the mines and the great flywheel
of prosperity would be set in steady and sturdy motion."
On October 28, 1931 in an editorial he wrote such
statements as the following excerpts:
"It would put money into circulation."
"It would revive buying at the store; and that buying
would cause millions of dollars' worth of goods to be
ordered from the factories."
"The factories would re-employ discharged hands,"
"Raw materials would be ordered from the farms and the
mines ,
"
"They do not want Alms"
"They want Wages"
"They want to be paid for service rendered"

"They want Work"
On February 8, 1932 in an editorial entitles "To Giire
Hoarding Revive Prosperity" he said:
"Vi/hat is needed to restore confidence is not merely
words but WORKS."
"You must restore prosperity in the only way it can
be restored - by giving work to the workers."
It is in a letter to Honorable Reed Smoot, Chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, however that Hearst's views
are clearly stated, ITiis letter which appeared in the Hearst
editorial columns on February 22, 1933, was in part as follows:
"I have continually urged that one very important way
to accomplish this is for the Government, during periods
of depression, to make exceptional expenditure in public
works, and not only give direct employment to some mil-
lions of unemployed, but indirectly to give employment to
laborers in those industries which create the products
in construction, and to salesmen and accoimtants ; and also
indirectly to give employment, through the increased
consuming power of the public, to the workers employed
generally in the shops and the factories, et^ cetera .
"It would seem that the plan should be comprehensive
enough to include a system, as was proposed by the Hoover
conference, greatly to increase public works during periods
of depression and to decrease them to a minimum during
periods of prosperity^ since in prosperous times not only
is employment generally obtainable in private enterprise,
but the cost of public construction is excessive; while
in periods of depression. Government work takes up the
slack of unemployment and also has the advantage to the
Government of being performed at lower cost.
"in order to provide for this increased construction
in bad times, a reserve fund could be accumulated in good
times; but since no such reserve fund has been accumulated,
the only practicable plan is to issue bonds sufficient to
pay for this extraordinary Government construction in bad
times and redeem the bonds in good times,"
It is apparent that Hearst was imbued with the ideas
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imderlying "pump-priming" • His newspapers have always been
influential in molding public opinion on various national
issues. Among these issues during the latter years of the
Hoover administration was that of work for the unemployed.
Vyith such publicity given to the theory of public works as a
recovery measure, by a publicity agent like Hearst much of the
ground work of the Nev/ Deal public works programs was laid
before Franklin D, Roosevelt was elected,
Gonclus ion
It is writers such as those previously discussed in
this chapter that have been the real driving forces in the
development of the theory of public works as a recovery
measure. Institutions, customs, and the minds of the mass of
the people as well as those of legislators change slowly. It
is only through the work of a comparatively few enlightened,
original thinkers that an impulse is given to change. The
change arrives only when the people and their representatives
are imbued by indoctrination. So it is with the theory of
public v/orks as a recovery measure. It was formulated by
thinkers who observed the actual systems of public works, the
unemployment prevalent, and the characteristics of the busi-
ness cycle. By placing facts together, along v/ith a little
theory, thinkers have arrived at the ways in which public
works can be a recovery measure. Governments - Federal, state,
and local have been slow in adopting the ideas of original

thinkers on the subject of public works. This explains the
slow growth of the theory of public works as a recovery
measure. It was not until the time of the New Deal, when
the country was well acquainted with the theory that the
Federal Government put the theory partly into practice on a
great scale.
Just as it is apparent that progressive economists
and social scientists were behind the New Deal of Franklin
D. Roosevelt, so it may be said that p? ogressive thinkers
were behind the theory of public works as a recovery measure.
Among these thinkers were those discussed in this chapter.

Chapter VII
The Theory of Public
Works As A Recovery
Measure
By the time the end of the Hoover Administration had
arrived, the idea of public works as a recovery measure had
been worked out in theory, if not in practice. Economists
knew what was necessary for an effective public works program
to stimulate business. The New Deal brain trusters did not
formulate the details of the public works programs that were
to be released; the details were knovm to all economists and
students of the subject of public works. It is at this point,
I
before proceeding to a description of the New Deal public
works programs that a fuller understanding of the theory is
necessary. Some understanding may have been obtained by
!
the reader of this thesis from the foregoing pages where it
has been necessary to refer to certain aspects of the theory.
As a more detailed discussion is necessary, however, it is
the purpose of this chapter to present it.
How public Works Bring Recovery
There are several ways in which public works can bring
recovery.
In the first place, they stimulate the capital goods
industries, which are so badly hit by a depression. In a

depression there is a slowing up in the heavy industries
that provide materials for construction, plant expansion,
machinery building, and durable goods in general. The con-
sumer goods industries also slow up, but not to the degree
that the capital goods industries do, "^because more of the
necessities of life such as food and clothing constitute
most of the consumer goods and people cannot abstain long
from such things, Qn the other hand, it is possible for
business men to curtail plant expansion, the buying of new
machinery, and the employment of more workers.
If public works are expanded by the Federal, state,
and local governments, orders for machinery, cement, steel,
iron and other products of construction industries will be
given. By such orders the capital goods industries v/ill be
speeded up, men will be hired, and many of the unemployed
absorbed. Employment does not cease v/ith the hiring of men
by the durable goods industries. These men will have money
to spend and will buy the products of other industries, thus
stimulating these industries and causing them to hire more
workers to fill the increased orders, A wave of employment
is started in this way.
Another factor enters into the foregoing picture. Not
Gayer, Public \niorks in Prosperity and Depression,
p,163,
2
Ibid., 370.

only do the capital goods industry ovmers and other industry
owners affected indirectly, obtain greater profits but they
become imbued with a spirit of optimism,'^ They see that
business will undoubtedly improve, and, therefore, expand
their plants irrespective of actual market conditions at the
time. It is important to realize that many economists assert
that prosperity depends on the attitude of business men, who
will curtail or expand their businesses according to their
view of the prospects of future profits. It is well known
that in depressions a mood of pessimism prevails and business
men curtail activities.
The second way in which public works bring recovery
is similar to the first. It is that purchasing power is
given to the consumers by employment on public construction.
It is not necessary that Government orders stimulate the
capital goods industries, When people obtain wages from
direct employment on public works a series of waves of employ-
4
ment may result. The men directly employed spend their wages
for consumer goods. If a worker buys more loaves of bread,
the increase of orders is transmitted by the retailer to the
wholesaler, to tne factories manufacturing bread, and to the
"Public Works and the Trade Cycle," Barclay' s Bank
Limited Monthly Review , 13:5, April 1931,
4
John M.Keynes, Can Lloyd George Do It? , London, The
Nation and Athenaeum, 1929, p. 25,

producers of the raw materials contained in the bread. In
addition, there is the increased activity on the part of the
I transporting of the raw materials and finished products. In
this way, the repercussions of the paying of wages to workers
directly employed are widespread. Examples can be given of
the effects felt in the consumer goods industries, but the
results are all the same - greater demand for consumer goods
causes greater business activity so that business men are
forced to hire workers to meet the orders, Vxhen the country
as a whole feels the stimulus of greater purchasing power,
business is definitely on the recovery path. Unless some
such stimulant is given to business, the results are disas-
trous. Business men discharge workers, a fact which causes
a loss of purchasing power, and more unemployment. A vicious
circle results.
As the effects of the expenditures on public works
are so great, it is important to be able to calculate these
effects. It might appear that the effect of a certain ex-
penditure would be endless so that the increased purchasing
power would eventually result in the employment of most of
the jobless. There is a limit, however, and it is caused by
certain leakages. If one can compute the magnitude of these
leakages it is possible to predict the magnitude of the effect
of an initial expenditure on public construction.
Willford I. King, The Causes of Economic Fluctuations ,
Wew York^ The Ron_ald Press Company , 1938
,
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The leakages are several. One arises from savings of
the increased income,^ Sorae workers do not spend all they
earn. They save a certain amount and this amount can be
deducted from increased initial expenditure. A second leak-
age results from the expenditure on public works which is
7
only a substitute for unemployment insurance or charity. The
amount substituted does not cause increased employment. A
third leakage is the amount of money that will be used to
8
pay old debts. Business men as well as individuals will
have contracted debts in prosperity and depression and when
they obtained increased income they will use part of it to
pay off the debts. That amount which cancels debts does not
create employment, A fourth leakage results from the spend-
ing of money on imports.^ These imports are the products of
foreign industries and do not to a certain extent create
employment in this country. Of course, these imports finance
our exports and employment may be created for our industries
in this way,"*"^ A fifth leakage might arise from an increase
6
John M. Keynes, The Means To Prosperity, London,
MacMillan and Company, Limited, 1933, p. 10,
7
R. P.Kahn, "Public Vyorks And Inflation," Journal of the
American Statistical Association, Supplement, 28:171, March,
1933. Q
Day Throop Smith, Deficits And Depressions, New York,
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1935, p,95.
\ahn, "Public YJorks And Inflation", p. 171.
Seth Axley, "The Spending Cure for Depression,"
Barron's, 14:3, February, 12, 1934,

in prices, which would diminish consumption and offset to a
certain degree the effects of increased employment. Higher
prices do not usually prevail in a depress ion, "'"^however, so
that the leakage here is not a certainty, although a badly
planned public works program will raise prices.
As to the calculation of the effects of an initial
expenditure on public works, there does not appear to be great
unanimity among theorists as to the total amount of employ-
ment that would be created. The calculation of John Maynard
Keynes, the English economist, is accepted by many. He fig-
ures that the multiplier relating the total employment to the
primary employment or that which is created on the construc-
tion site and in producing and transporting the construction
12
materials, is 2, The method of calculation is as follows:
Keynes figures that in serious depressions, 30 per cent of
public works expenditures does not increase income. Of the
70 per cent representing the additional income he assumes
that perhaps 70 per cent will be spent and 30 per cent saved.
On this basis, the first repercussion is 49 per cent (7x7) of
the primary effect, or about 50 per cent. The second reper-
cussion is one-half of the first repercussion or one-fourth
of the primary effect, and so on. Thus the multiplier is
2, (the sum of the series 1 plus J- plus plus etc.). It is
11
Paul H. Douglas, Controlling Depressions , New York,
Vtf. W. Norton Inc, 1935, p.TSBT
12
Keynes, The Means To t'rosperlty
, pp. 11- 16

difficult to calculate the exact proportion of expenditure
that becomes additional income but Keynes thinks that it is
I
not less than 60 per cent and that not less than 75 per cent
of this would be spent. In the United States he thinks that
the multiplier would be more than 2, and explains this fact
by the comparative self-sufficiency of the country, for there
are smaller leakages due to imports.
The third v/ay in v;hich public works stimulate recovery
is by reducing costs of living for the working class .-^^ This
aspect of the theory has not attracted great attention among
theorists but it appears to be important. Public works that
lower costs are better housing, cheaper electricity facilities,
and better roads. They increase the standard of living of
j
the working class, and yet do it at lower costs so that more
I
money is available for purchases of food, clothing and other
I
!
consumer goods.
I
I
A fourth way in v^hich public works bring recovery is
related to one of the explanations of the business cycle, and
one's belief in it is based on the fact whether or not one
believes in the explanation of the business cycle related to
over-saving. It is not necessary to explain the over-savings
I
theory as it has been referred to in the section on Foster
and Catchings in Chapter VI. To the argument that savings
Henry Clay, The Post-VJar Unemployment Problem ,
London, MacMillan And Co., Limited, 1930, p. 127.
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1
do not result in a deficiency in purchasing power, but are
spent by those who borrow money to expand businesses and
start new ones, resulting in employment of workers and thus
new purchasing power to offset the savings, public works
theorists point to idle money in the banks. In this conten-
tion of the public works theorists there is a lot of truth.
Idle money in banks during depressions represents, to a great
14degree, savings. Such money should be used by business
men to finance production and employ people. In depressions,
hov/ever, business men will not borrov/ money. Therefore, there
is a good reason why the Federal, state, or local governments
should borrov/ the idle savings and put men to work. If this
is done, the shortage of purchasing power caused by savings
will be offset. When prosperity arrives, private business
will borrov/ and spend the savings.
The last way in which public works can be useful in
bringing recovery is more preventive than the other ways.
The latter are useful after business has started on the dov/n
grade or has reached bottom. The way nov/ to be discussed,
which is the postponement of public works during a period of
business boom, -^^ aims to prevent a depression or at least
i
14
Henry S. Dennison, Lincoln Filene, Ralph E. Flanders,
and Morris E, Leeds, Tov/ard Full Employment, i^'ew York,
Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1938, p,196.
15
Leo Wolman, "Employment Stabilization Through Public
Works," in Stabilization Of Employment, Charles F. Roos, Ed-
itor, Blooraington, Indiana, The Principia Press, Inc., 1933,
p.91.

diminish its severity. It is a fact that each depression is
preceeded by a boom. Buying and selling activity is feverish.
Employment is full. Plants are running over time, Jr'rices
usually rise. Speculation is rampant. It has been the custom
of governments - Federal, state, and local to expand public
works and keep pace with private business expansion. As a
result, governments have added to the height of the boom.
The higher the boom rises the higher go prices, cost of mate-
rials, and credit costs. The inevitable crash comes, and
recovery usually does not appear to come until a good deal
of liquidation has resulted. The more liquidation there is,
the longer is the depression, as abnormal costs of materials,
credit costs, and prices must fall.
Federal, state, and local governments can lessen the
height from which business activity falls and the amount of
necessary liquidation by curtailing their construction when
business reaches an unhealthy height.-^" Such a curtailment of
construction will decrease prices, lessen plant expansion,
ease the money market, and warn business men that the boom
is at a dangerous height; thus lessening the amount of mal-
adjustment that occurs in a boom.
By the five preceding ways public works are supposed
Yvette Popin, La Politique Pes Travaux Publics con-
sideres comme un Remede Au Ghomage , These Pour Le Doctorat
presentee et soutenue le"T4 decerabre 1934, a 14 heures, Typo-
graphie Firmin - Didot Cie 56 Rue Jacob, Paris, Universite de
Paris, 1934, p. 28,
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to bring recovery after a depression has started, or as in
the fifth way, to tend to avert a depression or diminish its
severity. Certain conditions are necessary, however, before
these ways can work effectively, and they will be discussed
in the next section.
Conditions Necessary Before Public Vilorks Will Bring Recovery
The first condition essential for an effective public
works program aiming at recovery is related to the types of
projects executed, it is necessary that the projects be real
public works and not "made" or "relief" works. To be sure,
the wages paid to those employed on the latter work represent
purchasing power and can stimulate business to a certain
degree. The repercussions are not as great, however, as those
resulting from real public works. The projects that theorists 1
recommend involve a large amount of employment on the site of
construction and also a large amount of indirect employment
through expenditures on construction materials. Among the
projects recommended are schoolhouses
,
dams, roads, housing,
sewerage systems, post offices, and public buildings of dif-
ferent types. The projects that are not recommended are leaf
raking, sand shoveling, street cleaning and similar work. The
latter work may be valuable and undoubtedly has to be done,
but it does not belong in a public works program aiming at
bringing immediate recovery as much as it does in a public
works program aiming at the creation of employment alone.

For examples to illustrate the necessity of the proper
choice of projects, one can refer to the experience of early
American cities providing employment relief. The work done
did not create much employment and was costly. It was not
until later, v/hen the cities executed better projects that
employment was created to a greater extent than ever before
•
Theorists do not consider as useless public works that
do not involve very much indirect employment for they realize
that not all of the unemployed can be assigned to large con-
struction projects which involve a lot of skilled workers,
and that such large projects are slow in spreading employment.
They therefore accept work that involves little material
expenditures, but require that it be useful and beyond the
criticism of "relief" or "made" work. Such work provides
employment for different types of workers,-^''' who could not
obtain work on heavy construction, until the wide -spread
effects of the heavier projects are felt.
The second condition necessary for the effective stimu-
lation of business is the method of financing public works.
It is generally agreed that in periods of depression funds
for financing projects should come from borrowing through the
banks or people who have more money than they can spend. The
reason that borrowing from the banks is necessary is that it
17
planning of Public VVorks in Relation to Employment
,
Geneva, International Labour Office, 1937, p. 256,

does not take money away from consumers, whereas taxation to
obtain funds does. Taxing people at the same time as you give
them wages means that part of the wages does not go into the
purchase of consumer goods. The taxation of higher income
groups is not precluded by theorists because these groups do
not have to curtail their purchases when taxes increase.
Borrowing means a net addition to the purchasing power
of the community or nation. The funds that are borrowed would
be idle, if they were not put to use by the Federal, state,
or local governments.
Not only must there be borrowing during depressions to
finance public works, but there must be available a reserve
fund which has been built up during the years of prosperity
This fund may be derived from taxation in the prosperous years.
Taxation at, such times does no harm. The national income is
high and tax receipts are greater than in depression years.
People can afford to pay taxes in years when business is active
and income steady, whereas they cannot do so in years of stag-
nant business and decreasing or fluctuating income. Moreover,
in prosperity a lot of money goes into stock market specula-
tion, excessive plant expansion, and inventory accumulation;
whereas if it were diverted into more productive channels , booms
would not be so great and the succeeding depression so severe.
Popin, La Politique Pes Travaux Publics cons ideres
comrae un Remede au Chomage
,
p,39
•
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Another aspect of financing that is included in the
reasoning of the public works theorists involves the relation-
ship of the Federal, state, and local governments. Experience
has demonstrated that modern depressions are so serious that
state and local governments are unable to find fimds to
finance public works. The Federal Government is in a better
position to borrow money and tax the proper sources of funds.
It is because of this greater financial strength of the Fed-
eral Government that theorists suggest that it lend and grant
money to the states and cities. The folly of not doing so was
demonstrated by the Hoover Administration, The wisdom and
necessity of doing so was demonstrated by the New i^eal.
Closely related to the financin,;^ of a public works
program by borrowing, supplt;mented by a reserve fund built up
in prosperous years by taxation, is the type of public works
project termed "self-liquidating". This type, which includes
construction financed by fees, or tolls paid for the use of
the facilities of the project has no place in a public works
program aimed at the recovery of business. The explanation
is similar to the reason why taxation should not be used in
depression, because such projects put money into people's
pockets with one hand and take it out with the other. There
19
is no net addition to purchasing power,
19
David Cushman Coyle, Roads To A New America
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Boston,
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The importance of the proper financing of a public
works program cannot he emphasized too much. Unless money
can be obtained without taxing the people in a depression,
public works expenditures lose their stimulating effect.
Moreover, if the Federal Grovernment should weaken its credit
by poor financing which leads into excessive debt, the fear
of inflation arises. Vtfhen this fear arises, private business
becomes alarmed and \vill not invest.
The third condition that is essential in an effective
public v/orks program aimed at recovery is very important. It
concerns conditions of employment - method of hiring workers,
wages, hours, efficiency, and adaptation of work to the
previous training of the jobless.
The wages paid to those employed on public works must
be similar to those prevailing in private employment. It is
not necessary that they be exactly the same, as there must be
some incentive to force a return to private industry. To force
such a return to private employment when prosperity returns
it is usually provided that although hourly wages should be
standard, total weekly earnings should be curtailed by em-
ploying the v/orkers for fewer hours.
The reasons standard wages must be paid are several.
In the first place, as it is the aim of the public v/orks pro-
gram to create purchasing pov/er, not paying very much in wages
weakens the possibility that there will be much employment

creation and stimulation of business. In the second place,
the morale and efficiency of workers are aided if standard
wages are paid, because the employed feel that their work is
useful. This attitude on the part of public workers is
illustrated by the story of the woman wnose husband was work-
ing for the Vi/PA only: a New Deal work program which had as one
of its objectives the removing of the stigma of "relief" work.
Some one asked the woman if her husoand was on relief. She
answered proudly and said, "No I He is working for the Govern-
ment . " The third reason that standard wages should be paid
is that lov/ wages paid to public workers may force down wages
in private industry.
It is for reasons similar to those underlying the pay-
ing of standard wages that standard hours are also advocated
by many public works theorists. The number of hours cannot
be too small or purchasing pov/er will be curtailed and the
morale of the workers weakened. Neither can the number be
excessive. There must be a medium of some sort.
The method of hiring workers plays an important role
in effective public works programs. It is generally agreed
that applicants for employment on public works snould be re-
21
cruited through public employment exchanges. These exchanges.
20
Planning Of PuPlic \m0rk3 in Relation to Employment ,
International Labour Office, p,148.
21
Ibid., p.loO,

131
if sponsored properly by the Federal Government, are in a
good position to become acquainted with the aptitudes and
training of workers seeking employment. Furthermore, these
exchanges increase the mobility of labor, because they find
positions and can tell job- seekers where to go and be certain
of being hired. In addition to these advantages it may be
said that the exchanges eliminate the evils that arise when
public v/orkers are hired directly by private employers,
^o combat imemployment effectively it is necessary
that public works programs provide jobs that meet the apti-
tudes and previous training of those seeking employment. It
had been the custom to put the unemployed on work for which
they were not fitted. This caused not only inefficiency but
distaste for the work, and eliminated employment opportunities
for diversified occupational groups. Public works theorists
advocate jobs of various types. As it has been stated pre-
viously, it is the capital goods industries that are hit so
severely by a depression and it is they who are in a good
position to influence business activity. I'his is why most of
the projects recommended by theorists involve heavy construc-
tion. There must be other projects provided, however, because
modern depressions result in the unemployment of clerical
workers, professional workers, women, and workers of all sorts.
If a public works program is to be effective it must put
purchasing power into the hands of those unemployed workers.
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as well as construction workers. This is why theorists
recommend Federal writers projects, sewing rooms. Federal
drama and music projects, and projects of a similar nature.
These projects are useful and create purchasing power.
The efficiency of workers is important in public
work. It is essential that those who are hired be hired not
merely because they need employment but because they perform
certain tasks efficiently. If efficiency cannot be obtained,
projects become costly and the morale of workers is destroyed.
The last condition essential to a public works pro-
gram that aims at the recovery of business from a depression
is the proper timing of the expansion of projects in a period
of falling business activity or their contraction in a period
of a boom of business. It is difficult to time the projects
properly and theorists are not all agreed on the subject.
After a boom and the ensuing crash a certain amount of liquid-
22
ation is necessary and public works should not be released
until excessive costs, prices, costs of credit, and security
values have fallen to normal. If the liquidation does not
come, public construction will only maintain business in an
unhealthy position. It has been said that Hoover's construc-
tion program came too early and did not allow time for the
Arthur D. Gayer, "Monetary Policy And Public Vdorks,
in Economic Reconstruction
,
Report of the Columbia Univer-
sity Commission, New York, Columbia University Press, 1934,
p,163.
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necessary liquidation. Too long a period must not elapse
before the expansion of projects, however, because the forces
of depression are cumulative and it is often easier to make
adjustments on a rising market than on a falling one. The
proper time to begin public construction, therefore, seems
to be just after a certain amount of liquidation has occurred
and before the cumulative forces of depression have grown to
such an extent that there is widespread unemployment.
In the timing of the contraction of public v/orks in
periods of booming business, difficulty is met. There is the
danger that the contraction may come too soon and initiate
a business depression. I'he best time seems to be when prices
have risen too high in comparison v/ith those of other years,
credit conditions become a bit stringent, overtime prevails
in industry, and costs rise. Correct indices will be able
to guide public authorities in ascertaining these facts.
Assuming that proper timing is necessary, it is essen-
tial that public v/orks programs be organized in certain ways
or correct timing cannot be obtained.
In the first place, it is necessary to have advance
planning of projects,^^ All the arrangements for the immedi-
ate release of projects must be made before the hour of need
comes. This means that projects would be arranged in the
23
Unemployment And Public Vrforks, International Labour
Office, pp. 22-23.

order of their urgency as public Improvements. A sewerage
system would require construction before a nev/ road or court
house. All details of architecture, financing, employment,
and other arrangements would have to be made beforehand.
Contracts would have to be let and sites purchased. In brief,
all the arrangements which would enable public authorities to
start construction immediately and employ workers would have
to be made long before the depression arrived. The need of
long-range planning is evidenced by the experience of all
governments - Federal, state, and local - in this country.
In 1933 in particular, public construction should have been
started sooner than it was but could not De because of the
lack of long-range planning.
In the second place, all public agencies controlling
24public construction should be coordinated. In local, state,
and even Federal governmental circles there have been and
still are many different agencies controlling construction.
Unless there is some coordination of all agencies, public
works programs are bound to be marked by duplication of pro-
jects, lack of broad planning, and ill-timing. It is easy to
see how more effective a public works program would be if
projects of local, statewide, and nationv/ide importance were
released at the same time rather than at different times.
24
Public Works Policy , International Labour Office,
Studies and Reports Series C, (Employment and Unemployment)
No. 19, Geneva, International Labour Office, 1935, p. 134,
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In order to insure the proper coordination of all
public constraction agencies it is necessary that a single
agency be in control of public works in each of the units
of government - local, state, and national. In addition it
is necessary to have a Federal agency control the state
agencies, and the latter the local agencies so that a nation-
wide coordination of public works can be obtained. To secure
such coordination it is not necessary to have a highly central-
ized government. Public works theorists believe that the
cooperation of all units of government can be gained by
financial aid and publicity.
The coordination emphasized in the preceding paragraph
is not limited to national boundaries. It is asserted by
theorists that there must be international cooperation so
that a world wide attack can be made on the depression. This
view has been stressed by the International -Ljabour Office,
which stated in 1935:
"If it is the intention of the authorities of a
country to put in hand a programme of public works
sufficiently large to stimulate economic activity, the
absence of any international coordination is likely to
have unfavorable repercussions ."25
It is believed by adherents to this view that public works
expansion will cause a rise in prices and incomes. As a
result, the demand for imports will increase and that for
25
Public Works Policy , International Labour Office,
pp.ios-ioT;;
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exports decline. This may lead to an increase in interest
rates to prevent an outflow of gold, assuming that the country
executing the public works is on the gold standard. The
increases in interest rates would discourage borrowing by
private investors and tend to offset the benefits of the
public works program. Moreover, an increase in the cost of
financing public works would result. These foregoing diffi-
culties would be avoided if public works were executed at
the same time in all countries because the rise in prices
and incomes would occur simultaneously in all countries.
It is also recommended by the proponents of inter-
national public works collaboration that creditor countries
lower tariffs and expand public works and their monetary
policy so as to spend more money on imported goods of every
kind. Such an action would enable debtor countries to pay
off debts. In this connection it is recommended that the
countries with stronger credit situation aid the weaker coun-
tries by loans.
The last condition essential to the proper timing of
public works programs is the availibility of many accurate
27indices with which to measure the pulse of business activity. '
26
Ibid., p,110.
27
Popin, La Politique Pes Travaux Publics consideres
comme un Remede Au Chomage , p,96.

Unless public authorities are in an advantageous position to
know exactly when prices and costs are too high, transpor-
tation facilities are congested, plant expansion is excessive,
and inventories are accumulating too fast, they cannot proper-
ly time the execution of public works programs.
It may be apparent from this section that a public
works program aiming at the recovery of business has many
important conditions, the absence of any one of which may
preclude the reaching of the recovery goal. There never has
yet been a public works program of any unit of government,
which has fulfilled all these conditions.
Criticisms Of The Theory Answered
There have been many critics of the theory of public
works as a recovery measure and their arguments have seemed
valid. The theorists have presented count er-arg\jraents, hov/-
ever. It is the purpose of this section to list various
criticisms and the ansv/ers of the theorists.
The first criticism that is important states that the
financing of public works by loans diverts money from private
industry's use. The follov^ing quotation illustrates the
reasoning of such criticism:
"it is not permissible to regard the additional employ-
ment offered by the enlargement of public building activ-
ities as so much net increase in the total volume of
employment available. The assumption disregards the fact
that an extension of public works has to be financed
with funds, part of which at least would otherv/ise have

been used by private enterprise,"
In answer to this criticism, it may be said that in periods
of depression money lies idle in banks and is not used by
business men because they are unv/illing to incur indebtedness.
The use of such idle funds by public authorities does not
mean that the money is being taken away from private industry,
as the money v/ould not be used at all if public works were
not financed with it. Moreover, other sources of money are
29found by public authorities. First, funds v/ould cone from
savings on the dole or insurance fimd. Secondly, as business
conditions improved, increased receipts from taxation would
arrive. Similarly, as income increased, there would be more
money available in the banks for loans . Thirdly, the cost
of raw materials imports would be offset by a reduction in
foreign lending, by the export of gold, or by borrowing abroadJ
The International Labour Office made a study of this
criticism and came to the conclusion that generally speaking,
governments said that public works could be financed with-
30
out endangering the supply of capital,
A second criticism put forth by opponents of public
works as a recovery measure states that increased taxes will
G, Bielschowsky, "Business Fluctuations and Public
Works", quarterly Journal of Economics , Vol, 44: 297, Feb,, 1930.
29
Unemployment and Public Works , International Labour
Office, TpT^oT
30
Ibid,, p,30.
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result from the incurring of debt "by units of government.
This criticism may be answered by the arguments that the in-
creased business activity resulting from public employment
means greater receipts from taxes already imposed, and that
a wise program of taxation in prosperity will eliminate the
necessity of taxing the consumer in periods of depression.
A third criticism is that waste is involved in public
work. To confirm such criticism, critics point to men lean-
ing on their shovels, political graft, and workers who have
obtained public employment after having been discharged from
private employment because of unsatisfactory work. In well
planned public works programs there is no need for waste.
The workers will be hired through public employment exchanges,
free from the taint of political bribery. The workers who
keep their jobs on public work as recommended by theorists
must work hard and efficiently.
The fourth criticism set forth by the opponents of
public works expansion is related to occupational shifts. It
is argued that a program of public works broad enough to be
effective is not possible because the necessary occupational
shifts could not be arranged. Critics say that clerks can-
not be made into bricklayers, bank tellers into hodcarriers,
31
E.C.Harwood, "A Criticism of Stimulated Construction
As a Cure for Business Depression", The Annalist, Vol. 35:1155,
May 30, 1930.

and musicians into manual laborers. Advocates of public
works answer by saying that no such occupational shifts are
required."^ As has been previously stated in this thesis,
an effective public works program sets off repercussions that
create jobs for all types of v^orkers. Moreover, a broad
program would provide work to meet the previous training of
the jobless. All these criticisms have been propounded many
times and often for good reasons. There has been such an
improvement in the public works programs now recommended,
however, that the criticisms have been answered to a great
extent
.
Reasons ^{hj Public ^^brks Should be Executed in Depressions
In the foregoing sections of this chapter have been
set forth the ways in which public works may stimulate recov-
ery, the conditions necessary for an effective program of
public construction, and the answers to some of the criti-
cisms advanced by opponents of public works expansion,
A discussion of the theory of public works as a recov-
ery measure should not stop here. There are reasons, outside
of the recovery of business realm that are given by theorists
for expanding construction in periods of depression. These
reasons- have been influential in causing public authorities
Vtfilliam N. Loucks, The Stabilization of Employment
in Philadelphia , jr^hiladelphia. University of i'ennsylvania
Fress, 1931, p. 235.

to execute construction in depressions even if the stimulation
of recovery was not the primary aim.
The first reason influencing public authorities to
expand public works in depressions is that there are present
in such periods idle men, idle machinery, '^'^ idle plants, and
idle money, all going to waste. The morale of men is under-
mined by forced idleness, and their occupational skills
deteriorate. Machinery depreciates in idleness. Overhead
costs in plants continue whether or not the plants are work-
ing full or part time. Money idle in banks could be put to
needed use. Proponents of public works state that idle
resources would be put to work by public expenditures and
not only the evils of idleness avoided but permanent improve-
ments created for the material benefit of the community, state
or nation. V^hen one-third of the nation is ill-housed, when
communities are badly in need of new schools, roads, when
dams are needed for conservation and electric power purposes,
it is foolhardy not to meet such needs when the resources are
available and going to waste. Some projects would have to be
constructed sometime, so why not in periods of depression.
The second reason advanced for executing public works
in times of depression is that savings in costs result. These
savings come from several sources. One source is in the cost
of construction materials. Such materials are cheaper in
Douglas, Controlling Depressions , p,123.

depressions because the demand for them is not so great as
in periods of prosperity when private construction is ex-
panding. The following table illustrates this fact:
Table II
INDICES OP WHOLESALE PRICES OF BUILDING LliiTER IALS
1919-1930
1926=100
Other All
Year Lumber Brick Cement Struc
.
Paint Bldg Bldg
Steel Mtrls Mtrls Mtrls
1919 113.0 91.9 102.3 128.7 140.3 116.8 115.6
1920 165.2 118,4 117.2 144.4 148.1 135.0 150.1
1921 88.9 105.7 110.8 104.4 83.9 111,1 97,4
1922 99.1 99.4 103.5 88.5 93.8 95.3 97.3
1923 111.8 103.6 107.9 123.7 101.3 105.9 108.7
1924 99.3 103.4 105.7 114.2 99.7 104.0 102.3
1925 100.6 100.1 102.6 102.2 109,3 100.4 101.7
1926 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1927 92.5 93.2 96.7 97.7 91.0 94.1 93.3
1928 90.1 92.7 95.9 95.2 86.6 101,3 93.7
1929 94.5 91.1 91.8 98.1 91.3 106,9 97.1
1930 85.7 84.7 91.8 87.3 84.9 101.1 90.3
Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Bulletin No. 521, Wholesale Prices , 1929, p 7; Monthly
Labor Review, Vol, 32, p,211.
It may be observed from the table that in the years 1919, 1920,
1923, 1925, 1926, and 1927, when public works should have
been retarded because of boom conditions, prices of building
materials were high, whereas in the other years when public
works should have been expanded, such prices were lower.
34
Loucks, The Stabilization of Employment In Phila-
delphia, p. 201.
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A second saving comes from lower borrowing charges.
These lower charges may be explained by the fact that idle
money is seeking outlets for investment. Private industry
will not compete for investment funds, so public authorities
can obtain money at lower charges, 'L'he following table in-
dicates the lower average yields of municipal bonds for the
depression years of 1921, 1922, 1924, and 1928-1930, Federal
and state bonds shov/ similar tendencies.
Table III
35
AVERAGE YIELDS OF FIFTEEN MUNICIPAL BONDS
1919-1930
1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Jan 4.43 4.53 5,05 4.43 4.13 4.31 4.10 4.10 4,04 3,89 4.16 4,23
Feb 4.46 4.62 5.12 4.43 4.12 4.31 4,08 4.09 4.04 3.89 4.25 4.24
Mar 4.53 4.62 5.11 4.37 4.15 4.31 4.07 4.09 4.00 3.89 4.32 4.12
Apr 4.52 4.83 5.12 4.20 4.18 4.30 4.05 4.07 3.96 3.93 4.29 4.11
May 4.47 5.03 5.12 4.17 4.20 4.23 4,02 4.06 3.94 4.02 4.23 4.11
Jun 4.44 5.23 5.27 4.18 4.21 4.19 4.01 4.06 4.00 4.09 4.26 4.10
Jul 4.44 5.25 5.34 4.21 4.31 4.16 4.06 4.06 4.02 4.13 4.28 4.05
Aug 4.45 5.28 5.25 4.18 4.33 4.15 4.03 4.04 4.00 4.16 4.31 3,97
Sep 4.44 5.22 5.14 4.11 4.36 4.08 4.12 4.08 3.96 4.17 4.32 3.97
Oct 4.45 5.06 5.07 4.14 4.34 4.10 4.15 4.09 3.93 4.17 4.29 3.94
Nov 4.45 5.02 4.93 4.20 4.32 4.09 4.22 4.09 3.93 4.15 4.25 4.00
Dec 4.47 5.10 4.52 4.15 4.35 4.12 4.13 4.07 3.90 4.15 4.22 4.05
Av. 4.46 4.98 5,09 4.23 4.25 4.20 4.09 4.07 3.98 4.14 4.26 4.07
Source: Standard Statistics Corporation.
A third savings results from the lower bids of con-
tractors.*^^ The latter realize that the demand for private
'^^Ibid., p. 220.
36
Ibid., p. 211.
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construction work is small and that any work is better than
none. They therefore reduce their bids to obtain orders.
Moreover, the contractors have to meet overhead costs such as
interest, depreciation, and salaries. An effort to meet these
costs results in bids even as low as to cover only such costs^
A fourth saving arises from the greater efficiency of
workers in time of depression. Laborers realize that the
demand for their services in depressions is small, and that
they will have to work efficiently to avoid being laid off.
Moreover, they will not strike as they do in prosperity.
A last reason set forth by public works theorists for
the expanding of public works in times of depression involves
a discussion of the merits of dole versus public work. It is
asserted that public work averts the demoralization of the
unemployed when they receive dole.*^® President Roosevelt in
his annual message to Congress on January 4, 1935 said:
"I am not willing that the vitality of our people be
further sapped by the giving of cash, of market baskets,
for a few hours of weekly work cutting grass, raking
leaves or picking up papers in the public parks. We must
preserve not only the bodies of the unemployed ... but
also their self-respect, their self-reliance and courage
and determination. "39
Ibid ,
Maxv^fell S, Stewart, This question of Relief , Public
Affairs Committee, Incorporated, 1939, p. 18.
39
Message to Congress of President Roosevelt on January
4, 1935, cited by Maxwell S. Stewart, This Question of Relief ,
p. 18.

Undoubtedly Roosevelt was sound in his reasoning in this
speech.
These three reasons presented by the public works
theorists are important. They have been influential in stimu-
lating interest in public works expansion in depressions.
Conclusion
The main aspects of the theory of public works as a
recovery measure have been presented in this chapter. There
may be some disagreement among the theorists over a few of
the details but there is fairly general agreement over the
main aspects of the theory.
Some critics of the theory state that although the
reasoning of the theorists appears valid, the results ex-
pected would never come in actual practice. Fortunately the
United States has had an opportunity in recent years to see
and study the cl.osest approximation to an ideal public works
program as the oountry has ever seen. An examination of the
New Deal*s public works program v/ill enable us to visualize
what may be expected of the theory in practice. The next two
chapters are therefore devoted to a description of the New
Deal's public v/orks programs and an attempted appraisal of
the results derived from them.

Chapter VIII
The New Deal And
Public Vi/orks
A description of public works under the New Deal during
the years 1933-1937 involves a discussion of four agencies
which have had under their control most of the public works
projects financed entirely or partly by the Federal Govern-
ment. These agencies are the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, the Civil Vilorks Administration, the V^orks
Progress Administration, and the Public Vi/orks Administration.
An understanding of each necessitates a consideration of the
types of projects released, the methods of financing, the
employment conditions, and the administration organization.
Before beginning a discussion of these agencies, it
appears opportune at this moment to cite an excerpt from two
speeches of Franklin D. Roosevelt, when he was campaigning
for the Presidency in 1932, These excerpts are of interest
because they lead us to believe that perhaps he did not be-
lieve in government spending to bring recovery but that
later economic developments left him no other alternative. At
Sioux City, lov/a, on September 19, 1932, he said:
"I accuse the present administration of being the
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greatest spending administration in all our history,
Then at Pittsbiirg in October, 1932, he said:
"I regard reduction in federal spending as one of the
most important issues of the campaign. In my opinion
it is the most direct and effective contribution that
government can make to business ,"2
This latter statement sounds like President Hoover, The years
ahead for Roosevelt, however, were to make his administration
the "greatest spending administration in all our history,"
The Federal Emergency Relief Administration
No sooner had the Roosevelt Administration taken
office, than a policy was adopted, which was a sharp break
with the policy of the Hoover Administration,^ This policy
was embodied in the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933,
approved on May 12, 1933, According to this Act, Section
4(a), an Administrator to be created was authorized to make
grants to the states to aid in financing the costs of relief
and work relief; and to relieve the hardships and suffering
4
caused by imemployment . The Administrator created was Harry
H, Hopkins, who had been in charge of relief activities in
'•speech of Franklin D. Roosevelt at Sioux City, Iowa,
on September 19, 1932, cited by Charles F. Phillips and J. V.
Garland, Government Spending and Economic Recovery, Nev/ York,
The H.Vif.Wilson Company, 1938, p. 15.
2
Speech of Franklin D, Roosevelt at Pittsburg in Oct.
1932, cited by Phillips and Garland, Government Spending and
Economic Recovery, p. 15.
\rthur IvI. Schlesinger, The New Deal In Action 1933 -
1939, New York, The MacMillan Company, 1940, p. 5,
4
E, A. Williams, Federal Aid For Relief, p,62.
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the state of New York when Roosevelt was G-overnor.
©le PERA had three primary objectives:^ adequacy of
relief, the use of the work principle for employables, and
diversification of the relief program. At that time the
problem of unemployment was not being handled v/ell by the
states and local governments. There was a lot of direct relief,
Most of the work that was executed was no better than a work
test, where the idea v/as to make the work just as disagree-
able as possible. There had been no planning of projects, and
funds to finance them were limited. As a result, most of the
work consisted of light construction, road biilding, and
maintenance. The pay was inadequate and not commensurate v/ith
hours of labor and skill. Inefficiency and lack of diversifi-
cation on jobs were further evils.
^
The PERA set out to provide a genuine work relief pro-
gram. It endeavored to require the execution of useful
projects. The Federal Government saw that most of the persons
on the relief rolls were employables and should be given v/ork
instead of direct relief. Although it tried to influence the
states and localities to provide more and better work, its
efforts were not successful at first. It was difficult to
^Ibid,, 87,
Arthur E, Burns, "Federal Emergency Relief Administra-
tion," The Municipal Year Book
, 1937, Chicago, International
City Managers^ Association, reprinted in L. Laszlo Ecker-R,
Financing Relief and Recovery
, p. 395,

find projects that did not compete v/ith private industry."^
There v/as a shortage of skilled labor and materials v/ith
o
which to construct useful projects. As a result of these
and other obstacles, the PERA work relief benefits were made
avaiable to somewhat less than one-half of the persons receiv-
ing relief.^
Of the total employment on the work relief program,
work on public property represented about 78 per cent.^^ Pro-
jects included the building of highways, roads, streets,
erosion control, grading, public buildings, sewers, parks, and
playgrounds. Most of the projects afforded employment only
for manual laborers. Efforts to execute projects for workers
of varied occupations did not meet with great success. In
general, it may be said, hov/ever, that the PERA achieved its
objective, as a steady improvement in the types of projects
and their diversification resulted. -^"^ The funds provided for
by the PERA Act consisted of $500,000,000 to be made avail-
able to the states. -^^ A maximum of $250,000,000 of this was
8
Pederal funds could not be used to purchase materials,
g
Burns, "Pederal Emergency Relief Administration," in
Ecker-R, Financing Relief and Recovery , p,396,
"^^Ibld.
11
Gorrington Gill, V/asted Manpower , New York, vV, W.
Norton and Company, Inc, 1939, p,151 •
12
E. A. Willians, Federal Aid For Relief, pp, 62-63,

to be granted on the basis of |l,00 for every ^3.00 of public
funds spent in the state for unemployment relief during the
preceding three months. The rest of the money was a dis-
cretionary fund for grants to those states whose finances
were inadequate to meet relief needs on the matching basis.
Before the PERA ended in 1935, over three billion had been
disbursed for relief piorposes.
One of the conditions required by the PERA was related
to hours, wages, and working conditions. The early Federal
rules in this connection stated that v/ages should be based
upon the relief need of the individual and /or his dependents,
that the rate of wages should be a fair rate of pay for the
work performed, but the total compensation siiould meet only
the budgetary requirements of the relief recipient. Skilled
wages were to be paid to skilled workers. As v/ages became
depressed and hours of work increased, hov/ever, a regulation
was issued July 21, 1933 to be effective August 1, 1933
stating:
"on and after August 1, 1933, grants imder the Federal
Emergency Relief Act of 1933 can be used in paying vwr'k
relief wages only at or above 30 cents an hour. The
local prevailing rate of pay for the type of work per-
formed should be paid if it is in excess of 30 cents an
hour. "14
T-he number of hours v/as limited to 8 a day and 35 in one week
13
Ibid
., pp. 102-103.
14
Monthly Report of F-E-R-A, July 1933, p,ll, cited
by E. A. vailiams. Federal Aid For Relief , p. 104,
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if the labor was physical; 8 hoiirs a day or 40 a week for
office work.
It may be said that total earnings obtained by PERA
workers v/ere not sufficient to afford a great stiraiilus to
business
•
The administrative organization of the FERA was marked
by extreme decentralization. The Federal G-overnment did not
have very much control over the state and local programs.
After the funds left its hands, it had little control. The
funds were given to the state governors, who gave them to re-
lief organizations for disbursement. These latter organiza-
tions would determine who v/as eligible for relief and work---
relief . If the Federal Government had had more control over
the state and local public works projects, better results
would have been obtained.
The PERA was interrupted by the Civil Works Administra-
tion, which will be discussed in the next section, but it
continued in the form of the Emergency Work belief Program
after the CWA was liquidated.
The EWR had as its objective the furnishing of work to
those on relief rolls. A decided improvement in all aspects
of public works appeared under this new program. Greater
diversification of projects resulted as work was provided for
Burns, "Federal Emergency Relief Administration", in
Ecker-R, Financing Relief ami Recovery , p. 584,
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white collared workers - men and women. The quality of pro-
jects improved, partly because there were added to each state
relief organization a staff of engineers having supervision
over the progress of work projects, l^yages were those prevail-
ing in private industry, with a minimum of 30 cents. This
minimum was dropped, however, on November 19, 1934 and the
prevailing rate was allowed. The number of hours that could
be worked was governed by the budgetary allowance needs.
The FERA and the KWR served a useful purpose. They
prevented many people from starving. -^'hey added useful pro-
jects to tne country's material wealth. They bolstered the
morale of many discouraged unemployed. A change in policy,
however, was needed. Not much of a stimulus was afforded to
17business, as not enough was spent for recovery purposes.
As one economist said, "Clearly the recovery program was in
need of revamping and this involved the wholehearted accept-
ance of public spending as a recovery technique."-^® The
program was primarily one of relief. The Federal Government
could not continue a relief program of its type and created
the works Progress Administration to take its place. This
Administration will be discussed in the third section.
E. A. Williams, Federal Aid For Relief , pp. 125-126.
17
Gill, Wasted Manpower, p,211.
18
Ibid,, p. 213,
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The Civil V^orks Administration
The Civil Works Administration, referred to in the
previous section, was created by Executive Order 6420-B under
Title II of the National Industrial Recovery Act with three
objectives. ^ There was great disatisfaction with the early
work relief program under the PERA and the Federal Government
wanted to show the states and localities how a work program
should be operated. Furthermore, the i'ublic ^/i^orks Administra-
tion program was slow in starting and it was evident that it
would not offer much in the way of employment or recovery in
the winter of 1933-1934, The CWA program was expected to
20
employ 4,000,000 unemployed men and women. These workers
did not have to be on relief to obtain employment. A third
objective, which seems to have been lacking altogether in the
early FERA, was the injection of a large amount of purchasing
power into the hands of the people in a short length of time.
The projects provided by the CVi/A were an improvement
over those of the FERA. Road repair or construction consti-
21
tuted almost 35 per cent of the total expenditures, 255,000
miles of roads, streets, alleys etc, were improved or built,
95 per cent of it being repair and improvement,^^ School
19
E, A. Williams, Federal Aid For Relief, pp. 111-112,
20
Gill, Wasted Manpower, p. 165.
21
Corrington Gill, "The Civil Works Administration", The
Municipal Year Book, 1937, reprinted in L. Laszlo Ecker-R,
Financing Relief and Recovery p,424.
-
Ibid,, T3p.424*425.
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buildings were repaired; athletic fields, stadia, and swim-
ming pools were built. Mimicipal airports were built or
repaired; 450 landing fields were built. Recreational work
in communities was done in the form of the construction of
swimming pools, baseball fields, boathouses, athletic stadia.
Street cars, tracks and other equipment were repaired.
Reservoirs were improved.
Not only was valuable construction work performed, but
useful work was done in the form of administrative, profes-
sional and clerical projects. Such work was needed in the
CWA offices. Charts, maps, and diagrams had to be made. Sur-
veyors were needed for measuring boundary lines.
Federal projects provided most of the work for profes-
sional and non-manual workers. The Public Vtforks of Art Project
employed about 3000 artists, painters, sculptors, etchers,
and mural painters. Archaeological excavation on Indian sites
in Southeastern and Southwestern states employed professional
workers. A survey of historical buildings required many
architects. Scientific work was performed in experimental
stations of the Department of Agriculture, government fish
hatcheries, in the TVA and the Soil Erosion Service.
The following table demonstrates the types of projects
and their proportion as computed by cost:

Table IV
CWA: TOTAL COST OP PROJECTS 23
Type of Project
Work Projects
Improvements on Public Property
Roads, Streets, etc.
Public Buildings
Sewers, Drainage, and Sanitation
VJater VVorks, etc.
Recreational Facilities
V^aterways, Flood Control
Erosion Control, Grading
Airports and Airways
Tool and Sundry Equipment and Other Public
Property Projects Not Elsewhere Classified
Production and Distribution of Goods
For the Unemployed
Public Welfare and Health
Public Education, Arts, and Research
Administrative Projects
Accident Compensation
GRAND TOTAL
Partially estimated
Amount*
^888 ,
798,
313,
134,
90,
26,
45,
37,
94,
13,
427,600
493,600
290,600
346,000
582,000
555,000
893,000
473,000
654,000
046,000
42,654,000
11,566,000
25,629,000
52,739,000
36,177,000
647,000
$925,251,600
Although the work was of a better type than that of
the early FERA, a lot was left to be desired. The work was
perhaps not as permanent as it might have been, especially
in instances where plans had not been drawn up ahead. It
should be remembered, in criticizing some of the projects,
however, that time was a factor to be considered, because
winter was near and employment needed.
The program was financed mostly by Federal funds.
23
Ibid., p. 431.
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The total expenditures for the Civil »i/orks and Civil Viiorks
Service, conducted by the PERA in cooperation with the GVjA to
provide non- construct ion jobs, aggregated $933,950,000. The
Federal Government provided 5^844,000,000, the local governments
24
over $80,000,000 and the state governments the rest. Of the
Federal fimds $400,000,000 were diverted from the PWA appro-
priation under Title II of the NIRA, and $88,960,000 from
total FERA grants to the states.^^ This fund from the FERA
was necessitated by the rapidity with which the CvA spent
money. ^345,000,000 were obtained by an Act of February 15,
1934 without the passage of which the CVtfA would not have been
able to continue another week.
The following table indicates the types of expenditures:
Table V
TYPES OF EXPENDITURES UNDER THE ^„
CIVIL WORKS ADMINISTRATION AND THE CIVIL WORKS SERVICE
Amount Per Cent
Wages and salaries |740, 550,000 79.3
Teams, trucks, and equipment 63,150,000 6.8
Ivlaterials 115,700,000 12.4
Other costs 14,550,000 1.5
Total Costs 1933,950,000 100.0
24
E. A. Williams, Federal Aid For Relief , p. 119.
25
Gill, "The Civil Works Administration," in Ecker-R,
Financing Relief and Recovery
, p. 421.
26
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The program was financed federally because of necessity
as the states and localities were in no position to provide
much employment themselves
Employment conditions under the CWA were better than
under the FERA. Wages and hours were the same as those set
up under the PWA, inasmuch as the CVv'A received a large
allocation under the NIRA. Three Zones were established and
28
minimum hourly rates were set v/ithing them as follows:
Southern Zone Central ^one Northern Zone
Skilled $1.00 $1.10 $1.20
Unskilled .40 .45 .50
It was provided, however, that where prevailing or union
rates were over the minimum, the higher should be paid.
Maximum hours were at first set at 30 per week and
130 per month but in January 1934 a change in policy came and
the hours were reduced to 24 in cities of 2,500 and over, and
to 15 in the open country and in municipalities of less than
29
2,500. Living costs were the cause of the differential
between large and small cities. Such a curtailment in hours
meant a drop in total earnings and placed many on relief .'^^
As we have seen, proponents of public works advocated standard
28
Ibid. , 422.
29
Ibid., 423.
30I
E. A. Williams, Federal Ai^ £or Relief , p. 121.

wages and a satisfactory number of hours of work and undoubt-
I edly would have frowned on the reduction in the GVi/A policy,
!|
The change was necessitated, however, by the depletion of
CWA funds.
In iviarch 1934 the wage policy was modified as a general
30 cent per hour minimum was established, except in places
where prevailing hourly rates were more, in which case the
31greater were paid. This change was motivated by the fact
that the zone rates generally exceeded the prevailing rates
in many sections. The change meant a return to the FERA
standards
•
Undoubtedly, the wages and hours in the early stages
of the CV\/A contributed to making the program useful in stimu-
lating business and providing employment. The later reduc-
tion in wages was unfortunate.
The CWA was a federal- operated program and highly
centralized. The importance of such centralization was shown
by the speed with which the program was put into operation.
The program was administered by federal appointed officials.
A CVifA was set up in Washington with state, coimty, and city
32branches. Federal checks were issued, -^ome degree of
decentralization existed, however, as the states and local-
31
Ibid.
32
Gill, "The Civil Works Administration", in Ecker-R,
Financing Relief and Recovery , p. 420.
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ities played a large administrative role. They sponsored
projects and submitted proposals to the state CWA for approv-
al. After the proposals were approved, the sponsors had
charge of supervising the work.
The program began to be liquidated during February 1934,
as it was expected that the PWA and private employment would
increase in the spring. Moreover, it was hoped that the
increased purchasing power afforded by the CVtIA in the winter
months would stimulate business so as to greatly reduce un-
employment and relief. In addition to these reasons for
liquidation, there was criticism that the program was too
33
costly. Indeed, it spent more in its brief existence than
the combined FERA, state, and local relief during all of
1933. For all these reasons, employment was reduced weekly
and advances cut dov/n. The program was replaced by the EWR
which was to be merely for those on relief.
The life of the CWA was brief but full of accomplish-
ments. It had its weaknessess but it encouraged the advocates
of public works. It aimed at the employment of 4,000,000
jobless and by the week ending January 18, 1934 had 4,260,000
35
on its payroll. It afforded valuable experience for later
work programs as it demonstrated the necessity of planning,
33
M. S. Stewart, This ;^uestion of Relief , p. 8.
Gill, "The Civil Vrforks Administration", in Ecker-R,
Financing Relief and Recovery , p. 431.
35
Gill, V^asted Manpower, p.l65»

useful work, and adequate labor earnings. Business was
greatly stimulated as industrial production rose in December
1933 and continued to rise through May 1934, As the econo-
mist Gill said, "The immediate results seemed to justify this
rapid- spending program,"^''' The administrative organization
was quite successful, as it speeded up the work and enabled
the Federal authorities to force its requirements upon the
states and localities, Whatever one thinks of the CVtfA it may
be said as one writer stated, , . scarcely a community in
the United States was not richer for some useful project,
after the CWA had passed on."^®
The Vvorks Progress Administration
The Vi/orks Progress Administration arose out of the
inadequacies of the RERA program. As we have seen, the FERA
and the CVi/A were useful but had not solved the problem of
providing adequately for unemployment and stimulating recovery
to a great enough degree. By the end of 1934 over 20,000,000
men, women and children were on relief ."^^ Average monthly
relief benefits rose from $15,30 in July 1933 to ^28.40 in
40
December 1934, People began to criticize and say that relief
36
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*
should be left in the hands of the communities and not the
Federal Government •'^•^
To meet the need for a renovated public works program
the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 was approved
April 8, 1935. As Corrington Gill said,
"The relief policy definitely merged with the recovery
policy; 'relief and recovery' expenditures were expected
to restore business activity and at the same time provide
the relief needed by the unemployed. "42
Undoubtedly the New Deal aimed at stimulating recovery by
this program. Under the program the WPA was created by
Executive Order No. 7034 issued May 6, 1935.
The projects that were to be controlled by the WPA
marked a nearer approach to the high standards sought by public
v/orks theorists. Certain criteria were established. Plan-
ning had to be adequate before a project would be approved.
The projects had to be useful, economically speaking. They
! had to be desirable from a social point of view. There had
43
to be an availability of suitable labor, All these criteria
pointed to high standards for projects. The projects were
not, however, the types that would afford great indirect em-
ployment. This was due to the fact that employment was given
44precedence over construction efficiency. Therefore, most
^''M. S. Stewart, This question Of Relief, p. 9.
42
Gill, Vilasted Manpower, p. 213,
43
Ibid., p. 184,
44
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of the expenses were for wages (86 cents of every dollar);
lO-g cents for materials and equipment, and 3-^ cents for
administrative expenses, Projects were rejected by the Vi/PA
if outlays were too large for land and materials unless the
sponsor bore a good part of tne non-labor costs.
The types of projects that could be started were speci-
fied in general categories in the Emergency Relief Appropri-
ation Acts of 1935 and 1936, but the President could increase
the allocation for any category: not in excess of 20 per cent
of the total appropriation under the 1935 act and 15 per cent
j
under the 1936 Act.^^ The following table indicates the types
j
of projects placed in operation through September 30, 1936:
^^ibid., pol85.
46
Emerson Ross, "The Works Progress Administration,"
f
The Municipal Year Book
,
1937; reprinted in Ecker-R, Financing
j! HtlieT^nd Recovery , p. 440.

Table VI
NW/IBER OF WPA PROJECTS PLACED
IN OPERATION THROUOH SEPTEMBER 30, 1936
(Subject to Revision)47
Type of Project Number
Highways, Roads, and Streets 52,852
Highways - Primary ^oads 383
Farm- to-Market and Other sec. Roads 14,087
Streets and Alleys 6,859
Sidewalks, Curbs, and Paths 2,445
Roadside Improvements 2,424
Bridges and Viaducts 1,603
G-rade- Crossing Elimination 15
Other* 5,036
Public Buildings 15,881
Administrative 2,240
Charitable, Medical, and Mental Inst. 1,030
Educational 7,498
Social and Recreational 1,897
Federal( Incl, Military and Naval) 392
Improvement of Grounds 2,052
Housing and Demolition 42
Other* 730
Park and Other Recr. Facilities 6,600
Playgrounds and Athl, Fields 2,573
Parks 2,783
Other* 1,244
Conservation 4,353
Forestation 200
Erosion Control and Land Utiliz. 376
Irrigation and VJater Consv, 2,562
Plant, Crop, and Livestock Consv. 267
Other* 948
^Includes projects classifiable under more than one
of the headings above.
^"^Ibid,, p.442.

Table VI (cont.)
sewer Systems and Other Utilities 9,544
Water Purif . and Supply 3,012
sewer Systems 5,961
Electric Utilities 209
Other* 362
Airports and Other Trans • 856
Navigation 162
Airports and Airways 669
Other* 25
White Collar 17,004
Goods 6,576
Sewing 4,946
Canning 193
Other* 1,437
Sanitation and Health ^ 2,824
Elim, of Stream Polution 100
Mosquito Eradication 764
Other* 1,960
Miscellaneous 6, 195
GRAND TOTAL 102,685
Such projects as were undertaken were valuable and the
physical accomplishments of the program were great. The
following table illustrates some of the physical accomplish-
ments through September 15, 1936:
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Not only did the projects undertaken represent con-
struction that probably would not have been done for some
years, but they provided relief for the unemployed, better
standards of living, and stimulated business by the wages
paid.
The Federal financing of the V^PA was provided by the
two Appropriation Acts of 1935 and 1936. By October 1936,
11,442,127,500 was allocated to it from the 1935 Act and
$940,788,893 from the 1936 Act.'*^ For the entire VtfPA, in-
cluding the National Youth Administration, through December,
1936, checks issued amounted to over ^2,325,000,000, About
90 per cent of the total latter expenditures was made by
the states VVPA^s on projects sponsored by state and local
governments. Funds were also provided by the sponsors. The
latter furnished all non-labor costs in excess of Federal
grants for such costs. The Federal Government allotted a
certain amount for labor based on the number of employees and
their monthly earning schedules, and a certain amount for
material purchases. The proportion of the total cost between
sponsors and the VrfPA varied with the type of project but the
follov/ing table illustrates the proportion by general groups
of projects:
Ibid,, 437.

Table VIII
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED COST OP WORKS
PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION PROJECTS SELECTED FOR
OPERATION THROUGH APRIL 15, 1936
(By Source of Funds and Types of Projects)
Source of Funds
Type of project Works Progress
Administration Sponsors
PER CENT OF TOTAL
ALL PROJECTS 81.8 18.2
Sanitation and Health 74.2 25.8
Sewer and Other Utilities 76.3 23.7
Public Buildings 77.2 22.8
Highways, Roads, and Streets 78.1 21.9
Flood Control and Other Conserv. 84.7 15.3
Airports and Other Transport. 85.4 14.6
Parks and Other Recreational Facil. 88.9 11.1
Vtfhite Collar 90.6 9.4
Goods Projects 91.5 8.5
Miscellaneous 82.1 17.9
86 per cent of the funds of the sponsor went for materials,
supplies, and equipment and 78 per cent of federal funds went
51for wages. This meant that it was cheaper for sjDme states
and localities to construct projects involving mostly labor
costs
.
Such a system of financing the WPA program aided the
states and localities in their hoiir of need and insured the
types of projects that the Federal Government considered
50
Ibid., 439.
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desirable, although as was pointed out, some of the projects
suffered by lack of funds for materials.
Employment conditions under the VilPA were not those
advocated by public works theorists. They were of the "relief*
work type.
Employees had to be certified by local relief offices
and the Vi/PA would choose workers from the lists, compiled by
52the relief agencies. Only 10 per cent of the v/orkers on
any project could come from non-relief sources, if such
workers were needed to insure efficiency in the construction
of a project. Actually the percentage was about 5 per cent.^*^
Earnings for WPA workers were established by the
President in his Executive Order 7046, dated May 20, 1935.^
A schedule was made, dividing the country into three regions.
Within each region wages were set according to four occupa-
tional groups - unskilled, intermediate, skilled, and pro-
fessional and technical, and according to the size of the
city or township in the coimties in which projects are
operated. The follov/ing table is illustrative of the monthly
earnings t
5?
"-^ Gill, Vtfasted Manpower
, p. 183.
53
Ross, "The Works Progress Administration," in
Ecker-R, Financing Relief and Recovery, p. 444.
S4
Ibid., pp.447-448.

Table IX
SCHEDULE OF MONTHLY EARNINGS55
Regions
Counties in ^Iftiich the 1930 Population Vifas-
Over 50,000- 25,000- 5,000- Under
100,000 100,000 50,000 25,000 5,000
Professional and Technical Vi/ork
Region
Region
Region
Region
I $94 ^83 $77 $6.9 $61
II 79 73 66 57 48
"T*TTIII lo 68 62 53 4<5
IV 75 64 55 46 39
Skilled Vifork
I |85 $75 $70 $63 $55
II 72 66 60 52 44
III 68 62 56 48 38
IV 68 58 50 42 35
Intermediate Work
I |65 $60 ^55 $50 $45
II 58 54 50 44 38
III 52 48 43 36 30
IV 49 43 38 32 27
Unskilled Vifork
I |55 $52 $48 $44 $40
II 45 42 40 35 32
III 35 33 29 24 21
IV 30 27 25 22 19
^^Ibid., p.449.

57
Actually, average earnings rarely equaled the assigned
monthly wage rate.^^ Illness, labor turnover, and other
factors were the cause.
This policy was slightly changed by the ERA Act of
1935 -under which workers received their earnings despite
obstacles. A "security wage" was paid, and it was deter-
mined irrespective of hourly wage rates in the community.'
The ERA Act of 1936 made another change in the earn-
ings of the workers. Hourly rates were required to be not
less than those prevailing in the community for work of
similar nature. After this change in policy, average hourly
rates varied widely. In the entire coimtry for the half
month period ending November 30,1936, an hourly rate for
58
VVPA workers was about 50 cents
.
Hours were varied so as to enable workers to earn the
monthly rates at the prevailing hourly rates, but they v/ere
limited to a maximum of 140 hours for two consecutive semi-
monthly wage periods. In certain instances, the maximum
could be waived when conditions occurred which prevented
workers from making up lost time.
The earnings under the WPA were not sufficient for a
public works program which aimed at recovery and it may be
56
57
58
Ibid
., 448,
Ibid .
Ibid., p,449.

171
1
said that the WPA proved to be in this respect a "relief"
program.
The administrative organization of the Vy'PA was about
the same as the GVtfA and yet it represented more of a coop-
erative Federal-state-local venture. Vi/hile it was consid-
ered necessary to have general centralized planning and
responsibility, it was believed wise to have a system under
which local conditions and local needs could be ascertained,
T^he system that was established was of a pyramidal
structure. At the top was the Federal Administrator, riarry
Hopkins, Aiding him were five regional officers, whose
duties were to give advice and instructions to the state and
district offices and make reports and suggestions to the
Federal VVPA, Lower in the scale came an organization headed
by an administrator in each state. New York City, the District
of Columbia, and in Hawaii, These state officers were
charged with the task of coordinating the entire Federal-state
public works program and seeing that the state WPA worked
efficiently and economically,^-^ Within the states were
district organizations under district directors. These organ-
izations ranged from one to twenty in accordance with the
E. A. Williams, Federal Aid For Relief, p. 249.
Ibid,
61
Ross, "The Vy'orks Progress Administration,", Ecker-R,
1
Financing Relief and Recovery, p,435.
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state. These district offices were very important as they
were in charge of the direct supervision and operation of all
] "WPA projects.
The actual v/orking of the system led to a great degree
! of state and local responsibility. As was indicated pre-
i
jl viously the local relief agency certified applicants, sepa-
i' rating the employables from the unemployable s and the IjPA
'j
I
selected the v/orkers. The planning and operation of projects
lay to a great degree with the states and localities. The
' projects originated with the states and localities and engine-
ering, architectural, financial, and legal details were the
responsibility of the sponsor, vihen a sponsor wanted a project
it prepared for the district office information which contain-
ed such details as man-months of labor, a tine schedule, costs,
II and recornraendations of public planning or other similar
agencies. After the details v;ere checked and approved by the
I
district office, they v;ere sent to the state v^tA. When the
r
latter gave its approval the proposed project went to the
;
Federal ViiPA, which approved or declined it. If approved the
project Vi^ent to the President.
It is apparent from the foregoing description that there
was a great degree of coordination among project sponsors, and
Federal, state and local responsibility. Viith such a system
the Federal Government v/as able to influence greatly the
details of public works under the V/PA.

The VVPA undoubtedly represented the highest stage,
with the exception of the Public Vtforks Administration,
attained by the New Deal in providing work for the unemploy-
ed and a stimulus to business. That it provided a great deal
of employment, there being more than 3,000,000 persons being
employed early in 1936,^^ was true. Such employment consti-
tuted a great stimulus to business, and when the rolls of
those employed were reduced to 1,450,000 by the fall of 1937
a business recession followed. The quality of projects was
high and the diversity commendable. The efficiency of
workers was remarkable. The administrative organization
represented a desirable medium betv/een centralization and
decentralization.
The V\/PA hov/ever can be greatly criticized. Public
works theorists v/ould not endorse all its policies. The
projects did not at times provide enough indirect employment
Only those on relief could be hired. Earnings were not high
enough. Taking everything into consideration the whole
program could be termed only a glorified work relief program
It did not meet the requirements of a public works program
designed to stimulate recovery.
The Public Vjorks Administration
Although the PEHA, CWA, EVyR, and VtfPA did not meet
standards prescribed by public works theorists there V\ras
M, S. Stevmrt, This (Question of Relief, p. 9.
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one New Deal agency which in many respects met these standards,
This agency was the Public V\.'orks Administration, created by
authorization of Title II of the i^ational Industrial Recovery
Act. Its objective was the stimulation of business recovery
and not merely employm-ent creation. To substantiate such a
statement one can refer to the words of the author of the Nat-
ional Industrial Recovery Act, Senator Robert (.yagner, as he
testified before the Senate Committee on Finance:
"The imderlying principles of public works proposals
are, in my judgment, too clear for dispute;
"First, a vast number of men are without work. They
must be and are being maintained at public expense, I
submit that it is sounder business, better government,
and a more humane policy to pay these men for useful work
than to keep them in idleness,
"Second, we cannot emerge from the depression until
there is a sustained resumption of enterprise. That
cannot occur through private initiative alone mitil busi-
ness men see a prospect of profit. Government construc-
tion, however, is not undertaken for profit and can,
therefore, be initiated without waiting for an upturn of
business
,
"Third, public construction distributes purchasing
power without at the same time adding to the supply of
competitive goods in search of a customer. It is,
therefore, ideally suited as a means of priming the pump
of business •"^'5
Further substantiating evidence is presented by the words of
Harold L. Ickes, head of the PVkA, He wrote in 1934:
"The expenditures of the Government should therefore
not be thought of as scattered doles, but as a definite
part of a broad policy to revive industry. It is much like
priming an old-fashioned pump. In cold weather you can
work the handle up and down until you are tired and still
not a drop of water will come. But if you will pour
Cited by J. K, Vyilliams, Grants- In-Aid Under the
Public Viforks Administration, p,46.
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warm water down that pump then you can get all the
water you want. The Federal public works program, we
believe, will have this same effect. By pouring money
dovm the pump to prime it we will start the returning
flow which will mean better times and greater prosperity."
"We have seen hov;, once a depression gets under way,
one factor reacts on another to make it become cumulat-
ively worse, Vilhen such a situation develops the best
known way to prevent a drastic and long- continued decline
is for the G-ovemment to put money into circulation and
thus improve the purchasing power of the people who have
been stripped to the hide by the crushing economic col-
lapse ."
"Once money is put back into circulation, provided
the G-overnment is bold enough and plans its expenditures
intelligently, this depressive process is reversed and
things become cumulatively better instead of worse, "64
Many economists optimistically expected that the
objective of recovery v^rould be attained. As one pointed out,
the $3,300,000,000 appropriated under the National Industrial
Recovery Act was expected to increase the velocity of money.
This economist said that the normal speed of velocity of
money was 27 times a year but that it was only 15 or 16 in
June of 1937, In the circumstances, he reasoned conserva-
tively that the $3,300,000,000 would become ;?33,000,000,000
or perhaps $48,000,000,000 in a year. In his own words, "Such
is the gigantic ' pump-priming* being attempted today, and
no one doubts its ability to 'prime the pump' if the plan
can be put into action promptly. "^^
64
Harold L. Ickes, The New Democracy , New York, W. W,
Norton and Company, Inc,, 1934, pp. ±36-139.
65
J. George Frederick, A Primer of "New Deal" Econo-
mics , New York, The Business Bourse, 1935, p. 115.
66
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With the objective of the recovery of business, there-
fore, it was to be expected that the program of public works
would be different from that of the other agencies previously
discussed. The standards prescribed for the program were
governed by the desire to pump as much purchasing power into
the hands of the people as possible, and to stimulate the
heavy industries of the country. Among such standards there
could be no place for "made" work, short hours, low earnings,
and relief status for workers. The following details will
describe the standards extablished by the PWA.
The projects that were partly financed by the PVi/A were
the type that involved more expenditure for materials than
for direct employment at the site. The effects of the ex-
penditures would consequently be more widespread. The
following table indicates the number and types of non-Federal
projects as of i*^arch 1, 1939:

Table X
SUIvIMARY OP NUMBER OF NON-FEDERAL PROJECTS
(As of Mar. 1, 1939)
Number
Type of Projects of
Projects
Grand Total all Types 16,677
Streets and Highways 1,500
Roads and highways 606
Streets 782
Grade crossing elimiation 29
Miscellaneous 83
Sewers, waterworks, power, other facilities 4,642
Sewer systems 1,527
Sewage disposal plants 873
Sanitary sewers 463
Storm sewers 116
Combined sewers 75
Sewer and water 196
Water Systems 2,419
"i(Vater mains 252
Filtration plants 118
Reservoirs 182
Complete waterworks 1,867
Garbage and rubbish disposal 41
Gas plants 25
Electric power excluding water power 283
Electric distributing system 53
Power construction 230
Miscellaneous 151
Buildings 9,437
America Builds , Public Vrforks Administration, Wash-
ington, United States Government Printing Office, 1939,
pp. 288- 289.
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Table X (Cont.)
Number
Type of Projects of
Projects
Educational buildings 7,282
Secondary schools 6,450
Colleges and universities 662
Other educational buildings 65
Public libraries 105
Municipal auditoriums and armories 102
Courthouses and city halls 629
Hospitals and institutions 671
Penal institutions 178
Social, recreational buildings 131
Residential buildings 6
Office and administrative 130
Vtfarehouses, laboratories, shops, etc. 83
Housing (limited dividend)"^ 7
Miscellaneous 218
Flood control, water power and reclamation 131
Dams and canals 32
Channel rectification, levees, etc. 3
Storage reservoirs 8
Water Power development 16
Soil erosion 3
Flood control 25
Miscellaneous 44
Water navigation aids 45
Dams and canals 2
Channel rectification, levees, etc. 6
Other navigation aids 37
lingineering structures 473
Bridges and viaducts 379
Vi/harves, piers, and docks 53
Subways and tunnels 14
Other 27
Aviation 25
Recreational 136
Miscellaneous 256
Railroads 32
Figures as of Nov. 1, 1937, the date on which these
projects were transferred to the U.S.Housing Authority.

It is apparent that such projects woiild involve enormous
expenditures for materials. The follov/ing table lists the
value of material orders placed for projects financed by PV\IA
funds from July 1933 to March 1939:
Table XI
VALUE OF MATERIAL ORDERS PLACED FOR PROJECTS FINANCED
BY PVtfA FUNDS, JULY 1933 TO MARCH 1939 *58
All materials |2, 174,833,431
Textiles and their products 4,243,589
Forest Products 144,466,389
Chemicals and allied products 19,498,648
Stone, clay and glass products 619,007,376
Iron and steel and their products,
not including machinery 612,600,469
Nonferrous metals and their products 20,053,523
Machinery, not including transportation
equipment 356,264,837
Transportation equipment, air, land,
and water 91,031,392
Miscellaneous 307,667,208
Hoping that the employment from such types of projects
would be widespread, the PWA attempted to calculate the num-
ber of man-hours of direct and indirect employment created
and the wages paid. A study was undertaken by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. This study was based on detailed records
of hours of employment, wages, material orders, provided by
private contractors.
The figures obtained for direct employment on the site
68
Ibid., pp. 273-274.
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as of March 1, 1939 were 1,714,797,910 man-hours, and for
wages on the site $1,206,451,900.^^ These figures, however,
were only about one- fourth of the total employment generated
and one- third of the recovery wages. On the average, 35.8
cents of every dollar went for labor at the site and 64.2
cents went for materials. It is apparent that the indirect
effects from such a program would be great, hn example of
construction expenditures in Topeka, Kansas will illustrate
in what ways the PVyA dollars of direct and indirect wages
earned in building the East Side Junior xiigh School were
distributed. The actual building costs amounted to $310,000.
The workers, clerical, and supervisory personnel at the site
earned $86,735 in wages. The following figures compiled by
the Bureau representing ways in which the workers spent their
money:
$30,800 for food
11,275 for rent
11,540 for household operation
8,500 for clothing
7,025 for transportation
4,080 for medical care
2,775 for household equipment
1,990 for amusements
8,750 for other expenses, gifts, education, insur-
ance, taxes, and savings^O
In this way one-third of the PWA's expenditures were ac-
counted for.
Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid., p. 22.
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Materials for the school cost a little more than
l|170,000, which is about two-thirds of the total expendi-
tures for labor and materials. These expenditures for
materials resulted in indirect employment and purchasing
power for more persons.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics found that for the
nation as a whole |2, 174, 833, 431 worth of materials as of
71March 1, 1939 were required on PVi/A projects. The indirect
employment created by such material orders was 3,179,000,000
72
man-hours as of March 1, 1939.
In brief, for every 2 hours of work on the site, 5 hours
were worked in factories, plants, and mills making materials,
and on transportation facilities shipping the supplies.
Although such figures for the program as a whole were
valuable as criteria for the effects of public works, figures
on the man-hours of employment on specific projects are
important as they illustrate which projects are the most
valuable for recovery purposes. The following figures were
obtained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for certain pro-
jects on the basis of each million dollars of expenditures:
Ibid
., p. 26,
Ibid., p. 28.
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Table XII
MAN-HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT CREATED BY EACH MILLION DOLLARS
OP EXPENDITURES "7
3
Type of Project Direct Indirect
Streets and Roads 475,000 668,700
Water supply 262,000 875,900
Naval vessels 491,000 589,000
Reclamation 402,000 644,800
Residential building 410,000 615,000
Sewage disposal 358,000 666,500
Nonresidential building 344,000 657,000
Diesel power and light 161,000 641,000
Steam power and light 161,000 620,100
Total man-
Hours
1,143,700
1,137,900
1,080,000
1,046,800
1,025,000
1,024,500
1,001,000
802,000
.781,100
It is apparent that such projects as were executed
by the PVifA furnished a lot of indirect employment. Moreover,
they were of the type that would be of permanent value to
the country.
The financing of public works under the PVi/A differed
from that under the other public works programs, I'he Federal
projects were financed by appropriations under the National
Industrial Recovery Act and later under the ERA Acts of 1935
and 1936 and the PVVA Extension Act of 1937. The non-Federal
program was financed by Federal grants and loans.
In accordance with the National Industrial Recovery
Act, grants of 30 per cent of the cost of labor and materials
v;ere made to states, municipalities and other public
73
Ibid., p. 30 .

183
74bodies. The rest of the money needed was to be supplied
by the grantee. Such grants greatly aided the states and
localities as they were in dire financial straits. In 1935
the amount of the grant was increased to 45 per cent of the
total cost of the project.
Loans could be made, equal to the entire cost of the
project, minus the grant, if there was a grant. Interest
of 4 per cent was charged. Criteria for loans were the
validity of the obligations and a reasonable amount of repay-
7c;
ment ability in a period of not more than thirty years.
This method of financing projects met with favorable results.
It lowered interest rates in the country in general. Defaults
in repayment of loans were few.
The following table lists expenditures on non-Federal
projects by fiscal years:
Table XIII
EXPENDITURES ON NON-PEDERAL PROJECTS BY FISCAL YEAR'^^
Fiscal year Total Loans Grants
1934 1156,111,958 ii?154, 297,765 $1,814,193
1935 291,758,721 256,845,398 34,913,323
1936 376,860,255 168,115,234 208,745,021
1937 300,434,052 54,869,613 245,564,439
1938 (d mo, )103,488,625 13,421,901 90#066,724
74
Isakoff, The Public V^iorks Administration, p,88,
75
B, W, Thoron, "The Federal Emergency Administration
of Public Works," The Municipal Year Book , 1937, in Ecker-R,
Financing Relief and Recovery
,
p. 468,
"7 Ft
Isakoff, The Public y>iorks Administration, p. 80.
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Not only did the PWA aid public authorities by grants
and loans but it brought influence to bear on state and local
law so that debt limits were lifted, the procedure of bond
issuance simplified, revenue bond financing instituted in
some cases, and intra-state leasing instituted,''"^
Conditions of employment under the PVJA were favorable.
The policy of selecting workers was commendable. In general,
workers were selected without regard to relief status, al-
though this was less true of unskilled workers.'''^ Local
employment agencies designated by the United States Employ-
ment Service submitted lists of those seeking employment.
Most of the work was done under contract, although a few
projects were done by force account.
Wages paid to PVilA workers were to be, as stated in
the National Industrial Recovery Act, "sufficient to provide
for the hours of labor, as limited, a standard of living in
decency and comfort." Minima were set in three zones, as
under the CWA, with the proviso that higher wages were to be
paid if the latter were existing in the community on April
30, 1933. The zone system meant that PVilA workers could get
J. K. Williams, grants- In-Aid Under the Public V^orks
Administration
,
pp,231-23^r;
78
Ibid
., p. 174, The ERA Act of 1935 provided for the
giving of preferences to persons receiving relief if they
were qualified for the work. This provision was not applied
on the V\ik, Exemptions forced modifications because con-
tractors were reluctant to bid on projects where untrained
men were preponderant.
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higher wages than some private workers but this was condoned
partly on the ground that consumer purchasing power would be
spread more widely. Ickes himself said:
"... the Board had faced the issue deliberately
and put the rate on certain union jobs higher than the
rate then prevailing, on the theory that by paying the
workers a decent wage, they would have more money to
spend and get into circulation than if they were just
given enough for bare existence . "*79
After the ERA Act of 1935, however, the zone system
was abandoned and, in accordance with PWA Press Release No.
1646, it was ruled that wage rates on PVtfA projects for which
contracts were not let prior to October 9, 1935 were to be
determined in accordance with local wage conditions, by the
authority to which loans, grants, or allotments were made,
except as otherwise required by law, subject to approval of
the State Director of PWA.
Hours of work were set at 30 a week at first and later
40.
Vilith such high standards of labor conditions, efficient
work resulted and a large amount of purchasing power was
pumped into the economic system.
The administrative organization of the PVJA was greatly
centralized at first because there was a flood of applicants
for grants and loans and there were not enough experienced
employees to carry out the details insisted on by Ickes,
7Q
Minutes of the Special Board , April 17, 1935, cited
by J, K. Williams~G-rants-ln«Aid Under the Public vyorks Ad-
ministration, p,193.
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At first ten regional advisers were appointed as promoters
of the program. Their duty was chiefly to stimulate appli-
cations for non-Federal projects. V«ithin the ten regions
v/ere state federal-appointed officers. There was a state
advisory board to stimulate applications for grants and loans.
The executive officer of the board was a State Engineer, v/ho
received, recorded, and examined all project applications
and reported to the board on the manner in which projects
VIere meeting the requiremenos set by the PVvA,
Not very much authority was given to the regional and
state officers. They merely carried out the instructions
from V^ashington. As one student of the FViA said, "The strong
grip of the Washington office on the reins naturally made for
exasperating delay in some cases ."^-^
In June of 1935 greater decentralization of the
organization began, as the PVVA saw the need of speeding up
its application procedure. The Vi/PA had been set up, and in
order to obtain its share of the funds appropriated by the
ERA Act of 1935 the PWA- had to give employment as quickly
as the WPA, whose projects were smaller, less complicated,
technical, and provided more employment. Therefore, new
appointments were made in the field force so that more minor
and routine problems could be handled there. It was easier
J. K. V;illiams, Grants - In-Aid Under the Public
Works Administration , p.7T^
81
Ibid., p. 80.

to make such appointments in 1935 as there were available
more legal, engineering, and financial men who had been
trained in the Washington offices of the Vi/PA.
As a result of the decentralization, greater speed in
the program resulted. The number of allotments made during
a six months period of 1935 reached 2,965 whereas there were
only 1,374 following the 1933 Act in the same six months.®^
Among the administrative units of the PVi'A is one of
particular importance. This was the National Planning Board,
created by Ickes on July 30, 1933 and later replaced by the
National Resources Committee. This Board endeavored to
stimulate public and official interest in coordinated local,
state, regional, and Federal planning. It advised the PVi/A
and local and state planning bodies. It became very instru-
mental in promoting the long-range planning of public works.
It is in the experience of the PWA in meeting the
problem of organization that one can see the importance of
administrative details. The great centralization hindered
the program, although it did insure fulfillment of the PV^A
project requirements. The later decentralization brought
greater speed. The lesson that one can learn from this
experience is that a medium between centralization and de-
centralization is needed for the proper timing of public
works
•
Ibid., p. 97.

It is undoubtedly the PVilA that public works theorists
refer to and smile. In it was embodied the closest approxi-
mation to what they had been clamoring for that the country
had ever witnessed. The goal of the program was the recovery
of business through the stimulation of the capital goods
industries, not the mere creation of direct employment on the
construction site. The types of projects were not only use-
ful and permanent but they involved a lot of indirect employ-
ment - for every two men employed at the construction site
five were employed providing materials and transporting them.
The financial basis was commendable. The Federal Government
made available the strength of its credit sources by granting
loans, and in addition granted money to needy public authori-
ties. The v/hole financial system was a Pederal-state-local
cooperative venture, which had been recommended by theorists.
Conditions of employment were excellent. The Public employ-
ment exchanges that had been suggested by the International
Labour Office were utilized. Wages were standard, hours
v^rere slightly below those prevalent but were still what
normal working hours in industry should be. The efficiency
of workers was outstanding, and a relief status was not
necessary to obtain employment. The administrative organi-
zation was excellent in its later stages. At first too
centralized, it changed to a good balance betv/een extreme
centralization and extreme decentralization.

189
Vilith such high standards the PWA deserves a permanent
place in the economic life of the country. Its potentialities
have not been tapped to their greatest extent. I'he New Deal
wavered a bit from public works aimed at recovery to those
which would provide immediate and direct employment,
-^s a
result, the FUA never spent enough money and had enough
workers on its rolls but still gave a great impetus to recov-
ery, especially through the capital goods channels. It full
resources may be called upon at some later date.
Conclusion
The New Deal undoubtedly incorporated many aspects
of the theory of public works as a recovery measure in its
public works programs. The theory in its entirety was almost
embodied in the PVi/A program but in the PERA, EWR, CVi/A, and
PWA, some of the conditions that were considered essential
to the successful working of trie theory were absent. As
much as one may criticize the New Deal puDlic works program,
however, it should be said in all fairness tnat an effort
was made to provide work for the unemployed and a stimulus
to business in accordance with some of the conditions pre-
scribed by public works theorists. Probably the cause of
the failure of the effort was lack of funds - Federal, state,
and local; lack of long-range planning; the duration of the
Great Depression; and the hesitancy of business to cooperate
with the Federal (jovernment.
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This chapter has shown how the New Deal public work
programs improved gradually as experience showed weaknesses,
all of which, incidentally, had been pointed out for years by
public works theorists. The FERA marked the entrance of the
Federal Government into the arena to help states and locali-
ties expand public works on a soiond basis. Needed financial
aid was given to the states and localities. Construction
improved under Federal guidance, although it was mainly of
a light character. Earnings of workers v;ere inadequate. The
administrative organization, marked as it was by extreme
decentralization was a failure. The EVi/R improved the FERA
to a great extent, yet both programs can be considered mainly
as "relief" and aiming at alleviation of distress due to
unemployment
•
The GV^A was a better program than the FERA and EVtfR.
Projects were of a higher quality and more diversified.
Earnings at first were higher than the FERA. The centralized
administrative organization worked well. A great deal of
unemployment v/as absorbed by the program and business was
stimulated. In comparison with the FERA and EWR it was less
of a "relief" program, inasmuch as employees did not need to
have relief status, and it aimed decidedly at stimulating
business as well as relieving distress from unemployment.
The VifPA was in general a better program than the CWA.
It profited from the mistakes of the latter, the FERA, and
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< the EVi/R. The projects were marked oy better planning and
greater permanency. Earnings, however, were inadequate, a
fact which, along with the requirement of relief status,
placed the program in the "relief" class, although a glorified
"relief" class.
The PV\fA stood in marked contrast to the other New Deal
public works programs. It aimed at recovery alone and to
obtain this goal, made use of the teachings of the public
works theorists. If it had been expanded more to absorb
many of the workers on the FERA, EWR, GV^A, and WPA programs
the New Deal would have stimulated business to a greater
degree than it did and dealt more effectively with the
problem of unemployment.

Chapter IX
The Relation of Public Expenditures to the
Recovery and Recession of Business
1933-1937
In Chapter VIII the general characteristics of the
major New Deal public works programs were described. It
was pointed out in that chapter that only one of the five
major programs met the standards prescribed by the theory
of public works as a recovery measure and that this one
program did not go into action on a vast enough scale. The
Federal G-overnment and state and local governments, however,
pumped a lot of money into the economic system of the country,
and the question arises as to what effect such spending had
on business conditions from 1933 to 1937, It is knov/n that
business rose from the depressed condition in which it lay
in early 1933 and climbed steadily to a recovery status in
the ensuing four years. In the fall of 1937 a recession came.
If one can give "pump-priming" the credit for the recovery
of business and absolve it from the blame for the recession,
it may be said that the theory of public works as a recovery
measure has been tested and proved to be sound, even in the
absence of some of the conditions considered essential to its
effectiveness. It is very difficult to judge the effect of
government expenditures on the recovery and recession, but
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economists have made an effort to pass judgment. In this
chapter the findings of a few noted authorities will be
presented. Host of the findings have been based on total
governmental expenditures, not public works alone, but this
fact does not diminish the importance of the findings because
if other government expenditures can be useful in stimu-
lating recovery certainly public works can be at least as
useful and undoubtedly more so.
!Bhe Contribution of Government Spending to The National Income
The first step that may be taken in an effort to
appraise the influence of government expenditures on business
recovery during the years 1933-1937 is the measuring of
the contribution of such expenditures to community income.
Studies have been made of this contribution and the follow-
ing tables present figures on the subject. If it can be
proved that an increase in the national income can be attri-
buted to government spending the influence on recovery must
have been great. The follov/ing table lists the governmental
income expenditures, public works as well as other expendi-
tures, and the national income produced:
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The following table indicates the Federal net income- increas-
2mg expenditures and budget deficits 1930-1938:
Table XV
FEDERAL NET INC OIVIE- INCREASING EXPENDITURES
AND BUDGET DEFICITS, 1930-1938'^
(In millions of dollars)
Fiscal years
Net Federal
income- increas ing
expenditures
Budget deficit^
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
534
1,302
1,776
1,838
2,392
3,285
3,407
2,757
2,735
2,602
3,630
3,002
2,688°
2,707
462
695®250
Total, 1931-1937 incl. 16,757 17,826
Source: Col. (2), Table IV, below (Appendix); Col. (3),
Treasury Statements,
^Exclusive of debt retirement,
^Surplus. In this year 554 million dollars of public
Q debit was also retired.
Excludes provision for payment of bonus; including
^ this item, the figure is 4,362 million dollars.
^Preliminary estimate, made November, 1937.
President's budget statement, October, 1937,
Including bonus, 19,500 million dollars.
•2
Net income producing expenditures = all income de-
rived directly from government agencies and from persons and
institutions which are financing their expenditures by borrow-
ing from government agencies, minus all deductions from in-
come paid over to the government as taxes, fees etc. It
amounts to business stimulation expenditiires
,
3
Gayer, "Fiscal Policies,)* p,99.

The following table indicates the monthly increase in national
income and the net Federal contribution:
Table XVI
NET FEDERAL GOVERNIVIENT INC OIviE- INCREASING'
EXPENDITURES, 1929-37^
(In millions of dollars)
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
Jan. -49 101 88 164 384 264 291 237
Feb, -39 113 133 139 244 280 184 107
Mar
.
-16 128 155 187 253 232 244 50
Apr. -21 170 165 195 255 256 314t> 99
May -50 169 166 172 200 240 332 46
Jun, -24 171 173 215 272 383 543 101
Pis.Yr. -534 1,302 1,776 1,838 2,392 3,285 3,407 2,757
Jul. -67 75 154 126 97 283 272 469 114
Aug. -61 69 168 148 82 286 183 407 35
Sep. -70 69 185 90 134 217 268 296 36
Oct. -60 61 135 109 73 268 284 346 53
Nov, -49 88 132 131 140 286 229 300 0^
Dec -28 88 122 162 258 290 263 299
Cal.Yr. 251 1,748 1,856 1,856 3,238 3,154 4,025 900°
a
Figures through December, 1931, calculated by H. W,
Villard; from January, 1932, by L. Gurrie and Crost, unpub-
lished at this time.
b
Half the cash bonus payments made in 1936 are dis-
tributed over the month of payment, the tv/o months preceding,
and the three months follov/ing.
c , . .Preliminary,
It may be thought that expenditures of only about 6
per cent for 1934-1936 could hardly have affected business
Ibid,, p. 107.
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much. If one takes secondary expenditures, hov/ever, the
stimulus must have been great. The follovi/ing figures indicate
this more clearly by shov/ing hov/ net incom.e- increasing expend-
itures are related to annual changes in national income:^
1934 1935 1936 1937
National income produced: increase (Billions of dollars)
over preceding year 7.6 5.4 8.8 5.2
Next Federal contribution 3.2 3.2 4.0 0.9
It is pointed out, moreover, that no allowance was
made for the fact that a large portion of income tax pay-
ments v»/ould probably not have been spent if retained by
taxpayers. Taking this into consideration and the probabil-
ity that the secondary spending v/ould be large, and assuming
an income velocity for money of 2 per year, the rise in
national income in those years could be imputed almost en-
tirely to government spending.
Such a viev/ as Gayer presented is held by the econo-
mist Joseph Schumpeter, who wrote in 1939, "Prim.a facie
federal incom.e- generating expenditure actually v/as from about
December 1933 to about the middle of 1937 the dominant factor
in the increase of net national income (current dollars)."*^
Ibid.
,
p. 101.
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Bus ine s s Cycles , New ^ork,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939, II, p. 1001.
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The Increase in Bus ine s s Deposits
Further evidence on the question of whether or not
government spending was the cause of the recovery of 1933-
1937, has been presented by Dr. Lauchlin Gurrie in a paper
entitled, "The Stabilization of Piorchasing Pov/er Through the
Use of Public Credit" read before the American Economic
Association on December 30, 1936. In that paper he stated
that business deposits increased between 1933 and the close
7
of 1935. This increase could not have come from borrowing
because business was reducing indebtedness. It could not
have come from the sale of securities held in corporation
treasures. Nor could it have come from American business
capital held abroad. Moreover, business probably advanced
more capital to consumers than it collected in debts from
consumers. Therefore the income of business from the sale of
its products exceeded the outgo in the form of wages, dividends
and other payments to factors of production, and the source
must have been the net income- increasing expenditures of the
government. If business spending did not initiate an increase
in demand but was the result of the increase, government-
deficit spending must have been the main force in recovery.
In Currie?s own words, "If business had paid out more than
Lauchlin Gurrie, "The Stabilization of Purchasing
Power Through the Use of Public Credit," paper read before
the American Economic Association on December 30, 1936, cited
by Gayer, "Fiscal Policies," p. 101( footnote )
.
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it received in the sale of goods it v/ould have expended money
on additions to plant and equipment, making up the deficit
by drav/ing down its balances, by borrowing, or by new stock
issues."^
Views of the Seven Harvard and Tufts Economists
The seven Harvard and Tufts economists said that the
net expenditure of the Federal Government tending to expand
directly the national income was about ;^3, 000, 000, 000 a year
from the middle of 1936 v/hile it was only $1.3 billion in the
preceding three and one-half years. ^ By the latter part of 1936
the national income reached a level equivalent to 70 billion
while it was only 41 billion in 1932-1933. In addition, they
stated that 8 million more were employed and factory output
v/as greater. They asserted that business did not accomplish
all this because in the early phases of recovery, disburse-
ments of business in the form of income payments to individuals
rose in a smaller degree than income received by business from
the sale of goods and services to consumers, the rest going
to build up cash balances and repay debts.
The seven economists stressed another contribution made
by the government to recovery. They said that government
Ibid .
Q
Richard V. Gilbert, G-eorge H. Hildebrand, Jr, Arthur
Vtf. Stuart, Maxine Yaple Sv/eezy, Paul M. Sweezy, Lorie Tarshis,
and John D. Wilson, An Economic Program for American Democracy ,
Nev/ York, The Vanguard Press, 1938, p. 25.

spending stimulated expenditures by manufactiiring and mining
concerns
.
"''^ These expenditures had been only $3«1 billion
a year in the three big years before 1929, but dropped to
800 or 900 million by 1932-1933. With the rise in consumer
demand, however, these expenditures rose to ^1*4: billion in
1934, $1.7 billion in 1935, $2.3 billion in 1936 and |3.2
billion in 1937. In agriculture, these economists said that
capital outlays for farm improvements and machinery were as
large in 1937 as in 1928 or 1929. All this they believed
came from increased consumer demand, which necessitated more
and efficient capital.
The Recession of the Fall of 1937
If we may assume that the recovery of business from
late 1933 to late 1937 was caused by governmental expendi-
tures, it would seem that the theory of public works as a
recovery measure is sound. There remains the fact, however,
that the recovery initiated by the governmental expenditures
did not continue very long. In the fall of 1937 a severe
recession in business arrived. Critics of "pump-priming"
said that the recession proved that a recovery built upon
governmental expenditures alone is not permanent but temporary.
If such a criticism is valid, the theory of public works as
a recovery measure becomes tremendously weak. It becomes
necessary to analyze this recession and endeavor to discover
lo
Ibid., p. 29.
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what caused it.
The immediate factor explaining the recession is the
curtailment of government spending early in 1937. This
resulted in less purchasing power going into the economic
system of the country. As was indicated in chapter VII, one
i of the assumptions of the theory of public works as a recovery
j
measure was that once the government had stimulated business
I
I
by expenditures, private industry would automatically gather
momentum and roll along oy itself so that government spending
could be stopped. In 1937, the Federal Government thought
business was able to carry on alone, so it curtailed its
public works expenditures early in the year, inlhen the full
effects of this curtailment were felt, the condition of busi-
ness took a turn for the worse - production in general dropped
and unemployment followed. The question now arises - v/hy
did not private business alone maintain the recovery started
by the government?
The most widely held theory presented in explanation
of the recession is that business spending in 1937 did not
take place in a sufficient enough degree to offset the drop
in government spending. It is stated by one proponent of
this theory:
"Our recoveries from former depressions have not
come because American industry was engaged in replacing
the consumption goods that citizens were using up or
wearing out. They have come because energetic and
enterprising men have believed that they could see

profit possibilities in building and rebuilding AmericaV^^
According to this theory, past upswings of business have
been initiated and continued by new investment; consumption
was not geared to capital investment. Business men invested
because of the exploitation of new resources, changes in
industrial technique, and the development of nev/ products. -^^
In brief, the crucial factor in healthy business is spending
by business itself. The source of consumer income is busi-
ness. If business will not spend its income, consumers have
not the purchasing power with which to buy the products of
business. As pointed out by Leonard Ayres:
"It is hard to believe that at the lowest point of
most depressions large numbers of individuals simul-
taneously decide to increase their purchasing despite
the fact that their incomes, which mostly come from
business, have not been raised, "13
By triis, Ayres meant that consumers were dependent on business
spending.
In the recovery of 1933-1937, factors existed which
did not exist in previous recoveries as pointed out by pro-
ponents of the "business spending" tneory of recovery. No
private investment pulled the country out of the Great De-
pression, Investment was geared to consumption. As a result.
11
Leonard P, Ayres, Turning Points In Business Cycles ,
New York, ^he MacMillan Company, 1939, p,10^.
12
Alvin H. Hansen, Full hecovery Or Stagnation , New
York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 193b, p.Svy.
13
Ayres, Turning Points In Bus iness Cycles
,
p,102.

when the base of consiomption was withdrawn, business activity
fell off. This base of consumption was not private spending
but government spending,
if one may assume that business spending is necessary
for the maintenance of recovery after the government stimulus
is withdrawn, the question arises as to why private invest-
ment or business spending did not take place in the recovery
of 1933-1937, Critics of "pump-priming" say that excessive
public expenditures brought deterrents to private business
spending. The defenders of "pump-priming" say that this was
not the case, and that other causes prevented business
spending.
One school of critics of "pump-priming" assert that
the New Deal expenditures undermined business confidence and
made business men hesitate to make capital commitments. It
is argued by this school that tne regulation of securities,
the capital gains tax, the undistributed profits tax, drove
14funds to high liquidity securities. It is said that gov-
ernment investigations, competition with private industry,
and fear of inflation made capital issues small, •'-^ The
Brookings Institute, indeed, said that i n the early years of
the depression, fear for the future stability of the dollar
hurt long term credit operations and this fear was not
Hansen, Full Recovery Or Stagnation . p,284,
15
Lewis W, Douglas, "Can Government Spending Gure Un-
employment," The Atlantic, 156:408, October, 1935,
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dispelled to any degree until 1935 ."^^ The First Fortune
Round Table concluded, along similar lines, that the policy
of the Oovernment destroyed business confidence.
Although it is difficult to be certain as to whether
or not business confidence was undermined, it may be reason-
ably said that the ivew Deal did not encourage private invest-
ment. President Roosevelt's reform program did not at its
inception please capitalists.
The main school of defenders of "pump-priming" consider
the causes of low business confidence and hence little
business spending to be deeper than government policies.
According to this school, there is no longer the outlet for
private investment funds that there was at one time. Such
funds lie idle in the banks. The frontier has disappeared.
The rate of population is declining so that there is a
shrinking market for the products of industry. There are no
new industries ahead of us:"'-^ such as the railroad and the
electric pov/er industry. The former is declining due to
-I c
The Recovery Problem in the United States, V^ashington,
D. C, The Brookings Institution, 1936, pp. 458-459.
17
"The Effects of Government Spending Upon Private
Enterprise," Fortune, 19:60, March, 1939.
18
Gilbert, Hildebrand, Jr, Stuart, Maxine Sweezy,
Paul Sweezy, Tarshis, and Vililson, An Economic Program for
1
American Democracy, pp» 18-19.
19
Gill, Wasted Manpower, p. 97.

competition, inflated capitalization and banker control. The
latter reached the end of its rapid grov/th in the "20' s";
capital is adequate and equipment is new.^^ Foreign markets
have been curtailed. Further more, American business now
finances its own investment without drawing on the savings
22
of the people. The Hearings of the Temporary National
Economic Committee indicate this latter fact. At one of these
Hearings Dr. Lubin said, "in an organization such as ours
the net savings set aside from depreciation, depletion, and
profits are almost sufficient to keep it modernized and up
to date."^*^ Owen D, Young echoed this statement at one of the
Hearings, saying, "The Oeneral Electric has built its capital
24largely out of \mdistributed profits."
All these facts which point to a shrinking investment
market lead to the dilemma of money lying idle in the banks
when it should be invested and putting men to work. If the
20
Gilbert, Hildebrand Jr, Stuart, Maxine Sv/eezy, Paul
Sweezy, Tarshis, and Wilson, An Economic Program For American
Democracy
, p. 35,
21
Hansen, Full Recovery Or Stagnation
, p. 298,
22
Stuart Chase, Idle Money Idle Men , New York, Harcourt
Brace and Company, 194C, p. 101.
23
Testimony of Dr. Lubin at T.N. B.C. Hearings in Wash-
ington, D. C, cited by Chase, Idle Money Idle Men , pp. 112-113.
24
Testimony of Owen D. Young at T.N. B.C. Hearings, in
Vtfashington, D. C, cited by Chase, Idle Money Idle Men , p. 125,

idle money is not used, it means that the income ofbusiness
does not equal the outgo. This theory, which is actually
the "savine^s" theory of Foster and Gatchings was emphasized
by Dr. Lauchlin Currie and Dr. Ronald H. Davenport at the
T,N. E.G. Hearings.
If the foregoing theory of the main school defending
government spending explains the failure of private invest-
ment to take place on a large enough scale to take up the
slack in government spending, one wonders whether or not the
theory of public works as a recovery measure, which developed
when American business was making great capital outlays is
of any value. The latest adherents to the taeory say it is
now of greater value than before. There must be, hov/ever,
one big change in the theory, 'i'his change is that public
spending is here to stay until factors arise which will start
business spending again. The adherents to this view visual-
ize the modification of our capitalistic system so that the
Federal Government will play a large role in the economic
life of the American nation, '''hey see that the nation needs
housing, roads, school buildings, health promotion, recreation-
al facilities, cultural activities, land reclamation, flood
control, sewerage, scientific research, planned towns and
cities, and other things which private business cannot promote
because they are fundamentally public undertakings. In short,
all this means a more intensive cultivation of the needs of
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the nation; the era of extensive cultivation appears to he
at an end,
Conclus ion
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that govern-
ment spending underlay the rise in business activity from
late 1933 to the fall of 1937, and that the curtailment of
such spending early in 1937 was the immediate cause of the
recession in the fall of that year. The increased national
income, the increase in business expenditures in certain
fields were all caused mainly by increased purchasing power
pumped into the economic system of the country by govern-
mental expenditures, public works constituted a large portion
of these latter expenditures. In the circumstances, therefore,
j
it seems that the theory of puolic works as a recovery measure
I is sound. If the theory succeeded under the New Deal in the
i
absence of some of the conditions considered essential to its
success, one may expect greater accomplishments in a shorter
period of time when the theory is put into practice again
with all its conditions present.
It is unfortunate in a way that the recession came in
the fall of 1937 because it gave rise to the criticism that
government spending revived business only temporarily and
created conditions preventing permanent recovery - a criti-
cism, which though mainly unjustified gave the theory of
public works as a recovery measure bad publicity. On the

other hand, the recession revealed in our present economic
system, certain possible weaknesses which are fraught with
great meaning for the fut^ore of government spending. There
may be excess-savings in the country, 'fhere may be narrow-
ing outlets for private investment. There may be truth in
the statement that business spending is essential for normal
business activity under our present system. If these facts
are valid, our Federal, state, and local governments must
spend. Such spending will be on public works because the
need is great for such construction as housing, schools, roads
dams, and other construction which up to now private business
has failed to provide for the nation, -"-'he theory of public
works as a recovery measure thus undergoes a metamorphosis.
Spending on public ivorks become permanent until such time as
private spending makes public spending unnecessary.
It is possible that these so-called weaknesses in our
economic system are merely temporary. In this event, public
works will resume their role as a recovery agent. Our present
economic order has shown itself to be inherently unstable.
Private business has been unable to meet alone the problems
of the business cycle. It appears that under the present
economic regime government must play a role of coming to the
rescue of private business in times of distress. The life
line which can be thrown to business consists of purchasing
power placed in the hands of the people directly by public-

employment or indirectly through stimulating business spending
by stimulating the capital goods industries. In the words
of one believer in the greater role of government in our
economic life:
"Grovernment can assume responsibility and pov/er to
maintain full employment, production, and flow of pur-
chasing power. It can furnish the balancing factors
which private business by itself cannot apply. "25
Public works can be an excellent means by which govern-
ment may assume its nev/ role.
At the time of the writing of this thesis, the theory
of public works as a recovery measure lies dormant. Business
is booming under the Federal Government's defense orders.
The F\ik and Vi/PA still function but in a minor v/ay. The future
holds a lot for them, however, because after the war-boom,
business will again find itself in distress. Public works
will again come to its rescue. This fact is realized by the
present Administration and has available for immediate release
in time of need many public works projects. It is the fervent
hope of the public works theorists that all the conditions
essential to an effective public works program are present
when the hour of need does arrive.
John Bauer, National V^elfare and Business Stability ,
New York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1940, p. 51.

Chapter X
Findings, Conclusions,
And Recommendations
There are certain findings and conclusions that one
derives from a study of the theory of public works as a
recovery measure. Prom these findings and conclusions it is
possible to make recomiaendat ions relating to the theory. It
is the purpose of this chapter to present the findings and
conclusions derived from this thesis, and to present certain
of the writer's personal recommendations as to v;hat the
country should do about the theory.
Findings
The findin -s that have been produced by this thesis
may be divided into two classifications - one relating to the
history of the theory of public works as a recovery measure
and the other to the theoretical aspects of the theory.
In delving into the history of the theory several im-
portant findings appear.
The first concerns the origin of the theory, '-^'his
origin can be traced as far back as the use of public v/ork
by cities as a method of relieving the distress caused by
unemployment. It is possible to go farther back than the
depression of 1855 to find public work used to meet the prob-
lem of unemployment. It is even possible to trace the origin
of the theory back to the "v/orkhouse" of colonial
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society in this country. This thesis has not considered the
workhouse, hov/ever, as it provided work primarily for the
persons who were permanently unemployed. Those who were
temporarily imemployed by the fluctuations of the business
cycle were different. Public vi^ork for them was temporary
until such time as private business reemployed them. There
were business depressions before 1855 and public work was
performed during them by the unemployed. The year 1855,
however, seems to be the first year to which students of the
theory of public works as a recovery measure turn for
material. The main fact is that the origin of the theory is
old. The idea of stimulating business by public works may
not have been present in the early public work programs but
the seeds of the idea were there, 'i'he actual theory itself,
when it became well developed, v/as comparatively old as it
was suggested as far back as 1921 and used in 1922 to effect
the recovery of business. By realizing that the theory is
old, we know that the New Deal, or even Herbert Hoover, did
not originate it.
The second finding is related to the development
of the theory from its beginning in the providing of "relief"
work to the providing of "regular" public work aimed at
stimulating business. This development was fostered not by
one unit of government or one theorist but by all units of
government - the city, state, and Federal, and by several
theorists and writers. The cities promoted mainly relief work

but they contributed to the development by gradually improv-
ing their public works programs and by a fev/ outstanding
cities such as Duluth shovi^ing the wisdom of better programs.
Moreover, the weaknesses of the city public work programs
gave rise to the demand for reform, '-'ne states really gave
a great stimulus to the development of the theory because
they embodied many of its teachings in legislation. As early
as 1917 an act embodying some of these teachings was passed
in Pennsylvania, Other states v/ere to follow but not in
great numbers. It was really the Federal Government that
did the most to promote the developmert. President riarding's
Conference on Unemployment in 1921 did a lot to publicize
the theory, and in 1931 and 1932 important legislation was
enacted marking the highest advancement m.ade by the public
v;orks theorists. Then, with the Nev; Deal, the theory was
adopted in full in the P'dd'A, and partly in the FSRA, E^^R, the
CWA, and the WPA, V/ithout the aid and influence of the
Federal G-overnment the cities and states v/ould not have been
able to have improved their public v/orks programs.
Although the city, state, and Federal Governments
played an important role in the development of the theory
certain theorists and writers contributed a lot to this
development. Such men as Shillady, Hr.rd, ^lallery, J^'oster
and Catchings, Dickinson, Mund, and even hears t reasoned about
the theory, v/rote about it, and offered valuable suggestions.
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Where the cities, states, and the Federal 'Government carried
out the theory, these men thought about it.
It can be stated, then, that no one unit of government
or one person deserves the credit for the development of the
tneory of public works as a recovery measure. The city,
state, and Federal G-overnments and several theorists all
deserve credit.
The third finding produced by this thesis arises from
the experience of the units of government in providing public
work to combat the problem of employment and economic de-
pression. These units did not in general listen to the
teachings of the public works theorists. The result was that
the G-reat Depression found them ill-prepared to meet the
great unemployment and severe decline in business activity.
The Federal G-overnment with its greater financial strength
was able to expand construction although not so quickly nor
so effectively as it could have, but the cities and states
were unable to cope with the unemployment prevailing until
the Federal Government came to their aid. If the teachings
of the public v/orks theorists had been heeded, all units of
I
government undoubtedly v/ould have had greater success in
j
stemming the tide of unemployment and business depression,
A fourth finding is that "relief" work has failed to
li
absorb very much unemployment and stimulate recovery. The
cities' public v/ork programs v/ere primarily of this type and

the evils arising frora them vv'ere numerous. Even the New Deal
saw the evil effects of such work. It has been only regular
public v/ork executed in accordance ".vith some of the require-
ments of the theory of puolic works as a recovery measure,
that have been very effective in absorbing unemployment and
bringing recovery,
A fifth finding concerns the role of the Hoover
Administration in the development of the theory. One hears
a lot about the "laissez-faire" policy of Hoover and its
great contrast with the Roosevelt policy. It has been seen
in chapter VI, however, that although the hoover Administra-
tion hindered the full development of the theory it fostered
the development indirectly by Colonel ^u'oods' excellent pub-
licity and more directly by the enactment of the Federal
Employment Stabilization Act and the iimergency J^^elief
and Construction Act, It is undoubtedly true that the New
Deal public spending program had its ideological foundation
built by the Hoover Administration.
The last finding of the thesis in relation to the
history of the theory is th::i.t, in the estimation of several
prominent economists, government spending brought the recovery
of business 1933-1937, and the curtailment of such spending
v/as the immediate cause of tne recession of tne fall of 1937.
It is difficult to find the real causes for the failure of
business to continue along on its own momentum after
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government spending tapered off, but this thesis has pre-
sented the theories of one important school of thought v/hich
absolves the theory of public works as a recovery measure from
the blame
.
In the theoretical aspects of the theory of public
works as a recovery measure there are four important find-
ings ,
One finding is that the recovery of business is brought
mainly by public v/orks through the injecting of purchasing
power into the economic system directly through direct public
employment and indirectly by the indirect employment caused
by the stimulation of the capital goods industries,
A second finding is that many conditions are necessary
to the most effective v/orking of the theory and all of them
have never been incorporated in any public works program in
I
this country. Even the PvjA program was not perfect. There
j|
ji v/as no reserve fund built up by t:ie Federal Government. There
I
was not sufficient planning of projects. The program was not
on a vast enough scale. There was no international coopera-
tion, ''•'here was not enough coordination of city, state, and
federal programs. Until all the necessary conditions are
present, final judgment on the theory cannot be passed.
II A third finding is that there are reasons unrelated to
the recovery aspect of the theory wnich should induce public
authorities to contract public construction in timss of boom

1
and expand it in times of depression. The facts that there
are idle resources :i;oing to waste in depression, that costs
are lov/er at such a time, and that v/ork is better in general
than dole are good reasons for influencing public authorities
to execute most of their construction in depressions.
The last finding in the theoretical aspects of the
theory is that it has a nev/ role in the economic life of the
country. It has the opportunity, if certain widely-held as-
sximptions are true, of becoming a permanent force. Public
spending may be here to stay, and in that case, the theory
is not merely related to recovery but the permanent mainte-
I
nance of trie economic sound health of the nation, -Lhe theory
thus becomes even more important than it v/as when Shillady,
Mallery, and Mund wrote
.
These four findings in the theoretical aspects of the
theory are important. They are wrought witn significance
for tie future of public works as a factor in our economic
life.
Conclusions
There are seven conclusions that may be formed from
Ij
the facts presented in this thesis.
li In t-ie first place, it may be possiole to conclude
I that the theory of public works as a recovery measure has been
tested, and, even in the absence of certain conditions, proved
itself effective in bringing recovery. This conclusion

can be substantiated by the role of government spending in
the years 1933-1937 when business rose from depression to
a high peak of activity.
In the second place, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the long-range planning of public v/orks is
ji necessary for city, state, and Federal Governments. Ex-
I
perience has demonstrated the need for such planning in
! effectively m.eeting the problem of unemployment and depres-
sion. All units of government have suffered by ignoring this
need.
In the third place, it is possible to conclude that
in the absence of private business spending, government
spending is necessary, under our present economic system.
This fact v/as indicated by the recession of the fall of 1937.
It seems that the consumer is dependent on business for its
purchasing power. If business cannot or does not recognize
this dependency, depression results and government spending
must supply the needed purchasing power.
I In the fourth place, the conclusion may be formed that
the Federal Government must extend financial aid to cities
and states in their efforts to expand public works to bring
recovery from depression. The experience of the Great De-
pression illustrated this fact. In less severe depressions
cities and states may, if they listen to the teachings of the
public Vv'orks theorists, not need such aid.
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In the fifth place, it may be concluded that public
I
v;ork of the "relief" type is in general inadequate in absorb-
ing unemployment or stimulating business. It never has been
as useful as regular public work executed in accordance v/ith
I'
the theory set forth in chapter VII and should not be pro-
|l
vided. There is an infinite number of useful projects that
i
could be released for the unemployed, and there is no need
of terming v/ork on such projects "relief" v/ork and paying
workers accordingly.
In the sixth place, one may conclude that public
authorities v/ould be v;ise in contracting public construction
I
in times of boon and expanding it in times of depression even
if they do not believe in the theory of public works as a
recovery measiire. It is imv/ise to let men, money, plants,
and machinery remain idle v/hen they could be utilized for the
benefit of the country, moreover, savings in the cost of
public v/ork occur in times of depressions.
The last conclusion which may be formed from this thesis
is that many conditions are necessary for a perfect program
jj
of puDlic works aiming at the recovery of business from
depression. Certain projects, types of financing, conditions
of employment, and a certain administrative organization are
essential in such a program.
Recommendations
If it may be assiimed that the theory of public works

as a recovery measure is sound, one cannot escape the fact
that city, state, and Federal puolic v/orks programs in this
country are in need of reform, I'hese programs have undoubt-
edly improved under the guidance of such New Deal's public
v/orks theorists as Harold Ickes and Harry Hopkins, There is
need of further improvement, however, and it is the purpose
of this section to present some recommendations.
The recommendations that v;ill be presented are based
on the assumption that puolic works can be a pov;erful force
in bringing recovery from depressions. The v/riter of this
tnesis does not entertain any illusions as to the ability of
government spending to solve the problem of the business cycle.
The causes of this economic phenomenon are varied and many
of them unrelated to public works. It is naive to believe
that under the present economic system in this country, publi
c
works expansion and contraction can eliminate the fluctuations
of unemployment caused by the cycle. It is possible to say
Vi/ith assurance, hov/ever, tnat the theory of public works as
a recovery measure can be useful as one among several ways
of meeting the problem of booms and depressions under the
present economic system in this country. It is difficult to
see how the business cycle can be eliminated under the
capitalistic system that prevails today in the United States.
If capitalism continues, however, the country must make use
of safety devices such as public construction to apply when
the economic m.achinery runs wild. In short, the theory of
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public v/orks as a recovery measure can be used only as a
palliative. It does not treat the basic v/eaknesses of the
economic system that causes the business cycle. Like a
doctor treating an incurable disease, it ^i;ives medicine to
allay suffering but does not permanently cure the diseased
patient. It is the best medicine, however, that is available.
Assuming then, that the theory of puolic works as- a
recovery measure is sound as a palliative for our present
economic ills, the v/riter presents the following recommenda-
tions :
General
1. Adoption by the city, state, and Federal (Jov-
ernments of the theory in full as presented in
chapter VII.
Specific
1. Greater planning for public works contraction
and expansion. Public authorities should have
project plans made as far ahead as six years.
Projects should be ready for release at a moment's
notice
.
2. Diversified projects - not only construction
such as dams, roads, schoolhouses , v/hich should
constitute most of tne projects, but projects
such as the Federal Theatre, Federal writing
projects, and Federal music projects.
3. Less taxation of the mass of consumers v;ho do
not have enough income, and more loans or tax-
ation of other sources of income,
4. A well-developed system of public employment
exchanges so that all public workers virill be
hired through them.
5. Standard wages for those employed on public
v/orks, with total earnings curtailed slightly to
induce a return to private employment.
•

6. Elimination of the requirement of relief
status for employment on public works.
7. Broadening of the powers of the Katio^ al
Resources Board so that it v/ill develop a
national coordinated plan of city, state, and
Federal G-overnment puolic works.
8. International cooperation so that the effects
of one country's public works programs v/ill not
be nullified.
9. An elaborate system of government sponsored
indices of business activity.
10. Establishment of the PUA on a wider scale.
11. Changes in the VjPA so that it will be similar
to the PVii'A standards of projects, wages, and
hours, and free from tiie relief status require-
ment. The projects under the ivPA will be plan-
ned to meet t le diversified occupations of the
unemployed.

The Theory of Public Works
As a Recovery Measure
Abstract
The theory of public works as a recovery measure has
been an important factor in the economic life of the United
States since the advent of the Oreat Depression in the fall
of 1929, Knov/n in popular phraseology as "pump-priming" it
has created wide discussion and divided economic thought
mainly into tv/o schools - those who find merit in the theory
and those who do not, A knowledge of the American background
of the theory; the details of the theory; its application to
the New Deal's public works programs 1933-1937; and its
relation to the recovery and the recession of business 1933-
37 are essential to an understanding of "p\imp-priming" . If
such an understanding can be obtained, one is in a good
position to appraise one of the major proposed remedies for
the business cycle*
The development of the theory of public works as a
recovery measure in the United States has been promoted by
the city, state, and Federal Governments, and by certain
theorists and writers on the subject.
It is in the cities that the origins of the theory are
found. In their efforts to provide relief for the iinemployed
in periods of economic depression, cities as far back as the
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year 1855 provided public work for the jobless. The idea
motivating the early municipal authorities v/as relief of
distress, not the stimulation of business so tnat recovery
from depression would come.
As a result, the public work that was provided v/as
primarily of the "relief" type - the projects were of question-
able value, earnings were inadequate, and workers were
inefficient as they were demoralized by the stigma attached
to the receiving of relief. Such public work did not absorb
very many of the unemployed and business did not feel any
stimulus from the inadequate amount of purchasing pov;er put
into the hands of the unemployed. Wot all of the cities
executed such work, however, and as depression followed de-
pression, greater experience in meeting the problem of
unemployment was secured by public authorities so that by the
depression of 1920-1922 the type of v/ork provided for the job-
less was in general better than in preceding depressions and
the motive of stimulating business recovery was a factor
underlying the v/ork. The public works programs executed,
though, really never attained the standards recommended by
advocates of the theory of public v.orks as a recovery, and
when the Great Depression came with its great \inemployraent,
municipal authorities found themselves ill-prepared to provide
for the relief of unemployment or the stimulus of business
recovery.

The states entered into the development of the theory
by becoming conscious of the inadequacy of municipal public
works in meeting the problems created by depressions. At
first unv/illing to supplement the work of the cities, they
later realized the necessity of doing so and also improving
the nature of puDlic work for the jobless. Although the early
state legislation that was enacted did not embody all the
high standii.rds set by enlightened advocates of the theory, it
marked an improvement over the municipal work programs. The
Idaho law of 1917 with its recognition of the right to work
v/as a step in the right direction. The Pennsylvania Legis-
lation of 1917 v;ith its reserve fund, its emphasis on the
coordination of all public work in the state, and the require-
ment that the v/ork'be "useful, permanent, and economic" was
even better than the Idaho Lav/, In the following decade the
progress of the theory in the legislative halls of the state
capitols v/as rapid. The proponents of the theory were not
always successful in enacting legislation but beneficial
publicity was given to the theory by the struggle to pass such
legislation. Strangely enough the legislation that most
fully embodied the theory, such as the Massachusetts legis-
lative proposal of 1924-1925 and the Pennsylvania Proposal of
1931 was not passed. Legislation that v/as successful in being
enacted, such as the California and Louisiana laws of 1921,
hov/ever, were commendable, "Whether legislative proposals v/ere

adopted or not, the fact remained that public work of the
"relief" type as emphasized by most of tne cities became
primarily regular public work under state sponsorship. Where-
I
as the theory of public vs/orks as a recovery measure made slow
and halting progress in the city public v/ork programs, many
I
of its requirements such as tne reserve fund, long-range plan-
;
ning, coordination of public works agencies, useful projects,
j
tie efficiency of labor, adaptation of work to the training
' of those employed, the curtailment of public construction in
tim.es of increasing prosperity, and tne authorization of bond
I
j
issues in advance, were embodied in state legislation or
!
I
proposals for legislation. If the theory had gained greater
I
i headvi^ay among the state governments, the difficulties en-
!| countered by states in meeting the problem of unemployment
; created by the Great Depression might have been avoided,
IJ was with the advent of the Federal Government into
the public works arena that the theory of public v/orks as a
!
recovery measure made its greatest progress and finally became
almost fully em.bodied in the public v/orks programs executed
under New Deal guardianship 1933-1937. Like the state
governments, the Federal G-overnraent was at first hesitant to
execute puolic work for the unemployed, but gradually changed
I
its attitude as cities and states became unable to cope v/ith
the problem of imemployment created by severe modern economic
depressions. The change in attitude was slov/ in developing.

however, and it was really not until the Great Depression
that important legislation emDodyin^^ parts of the tneory was
enacted. Before the Great Depression, commendable efforts
were made to enact legislation. Senator Kenyon's bills of
January 21, 1919 and November 21, 1921, and Senator Jones'
bill of February, 1928 represented needed reform in Federal
public v/crks programs but were not passed. President Harding
Conference on Unemployment of 1921 stimulated wide interest
I
in public works reform in accordance with the theory. Valu-
able reports were compiled by committees of the Conference.
' As a result of the publicity given by this Conference public
' works became a factor in the recovery of business in the
i
depression of 1920-1922. The Federal Highway Act of 1921 v/as
' a clear affirmation of the conclusions of the Conference,
I
The letter sent to President Harding by Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover on karch 3, 1923 v/as important in the develop-
ment of the theory under Federal auspices. Embodying as it
did many of the ideas of public works theorists it had an
influence on private industry after Karch and helped avert
a dangerous boom of business. President Goolidge's speech
!
I before the Associated General Contractors of America on Janu-
i
II
jl ary 12, 1925 showed an enlightened attitude tov/ard the theory
i
No important legislation was passed by the Federal Government
before the Great Depression, however, and as a result the
economic distress after 1929 could not be met as effectively

as it might have been if the teachings of the public v/orks
theorists had been heeded.
The Hoover Administration plays a more important role
in the development of the theory than is commonly believed.
Although it proved a hindrance to the full adoption of the
theory by the Federal Government, it did aid in furthering
the development. It did so indirectly through the publicity
given to the theory by the Vi/oods Committee and to a lesser
extent by the Gifford Committee, and directly by enactment of
the Federal -t^mployment Stabilization Board Act and the Emer-
gency Relief and Construction Act, The foundation was thus
laid for the Nev/ Deal's public works policy.
Although the city, state, and Federal Governments were
important in the development of the theory of public works
as a recovery measure, there are certain economists and
writers on the subject who have been the greatest contributors
to the development, ''•'hey studied the theory generally with
an unprejudiced mind, incorporated their conclusions in
writing and influenced the city, state, and Federal Govern-
ments to plan their public works programs in accordance with
their recommendations, John R, Shillady, Secretary of the
Mayor's Committee on Unemployment of New York City, was an
early theorist who in 1916 called for the expansion of public
works to revive business in accordance with the teachings of
later theorists, William Hard created nation-wide attention
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by his advocacy of "pump-priming" in his article "Big Jobs
For Bad Times" published in 1916 in Everybody's. Otto B.
Mallery has exerted great influence through his "The Long-
Range Planning of Public ^yorks," Chapter IV. of Business Cycles
and Unemployment, published in 1923 and also through his
testimonies before Congressional committees studying public
works bills. Foster and Gatchings, by emphasizing the circuit
flow of money have enhanced the importance of the role of
public v/orks . Prank G. Dickinson with his mathematical com-
putation of how public v/orks would stabilize employment and
Vernon -ii-rthur liund with his scholarly study entitled "prosperi-
ty Reserves of Public Works" published in the Annals of the
American Academy of political and Social Science in kay 1930
have placed the theory in a clear and beneficent light. Last
among important v/r iters on the theory is William Randolph
Hearst whose popular version embodied in his editorials in-
fluenced the thought of many people concerning the role of
public works.
The essence of the theory of public v/orks as a recovery
measure is that government spending on public v/orks, as v/ell
as other public spending can stimulate the economic system
of a country so that private business v/ill recover from the
depths of economic depression and continue on its ovm momen-
tum after which puolic spending of great magnitude can cease.
This recovery of business is brought in four v/ays . The first
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is the stimulation of the capital goods industries by orders
for construction materials leading to business spending and
increased eraployment
.
By employing people directly, public
works put purchasing power into the hands of those v/no will
spend money and stimulate business. A third v/ay is oy re-
ducing the cost of living and making money buy more, a fourth
vi^ay is by offsetting the lack of purchasing power caused by
over- saving. The fifth way lies in the curtailment of public
construction in time of boom so that the height of the boom
will be lowered and the amount of adjustment needed in the
ensuing depression lessened.
Before public works can effectively bring recovery
certain conditions are necessary: Projects must consist of
regular public v;ork and not "made" or "relief" vfork. J^eavy
construction is generally recommended although some lighter
construction work and non- construction work is permitted.
Financing of the public works programs must be oy borrowing
or a reserve fund, and Federal aid to cities and states is
necessary; self- liquidating projects are to be avoided.
Conditions of employment must be favorable. Wages must be
standard; hours sufficient to enable workers to earn almost
as much as in normal private employment, vuorkers should be
hired through public employment exchanges, vnork should be
adapted to the aptitudes of previous training of tae seekers
of employment. Efficiency of the workers is necessary.
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The proper timing of the expansion or curtailment of puDlic
works is essential. The proper time to begin construction
seems to be just after a certain amount of liquidation has
occurred and before the cuiiiulative forces of depression have
grovm to such an extent that there is v^idespread unemployment.
Contraction of public construction should come when prices
have risen too high in comparison with other years, credit
conditions are stringent, overtime prevails in industry, and
costs are high. To be able to effect proper timing there must
be advance plannin^ of public v;orks programs, the coordination
of public construction agencies, a single public v;orks agency,
and international cooperation.
The main criticisms of the theory relate to the diver-
sion of money from private business, increased taxes, v;aste
in public work, and the question of occupational shifts. Such
criticisms have been ansv/ered oy public v/orks theorists.
Public works expansion in time of depression is desira-
ble for reasons not related to the recovery of business. Idle
men, machinery, plants, and money mean waste if not utilized.
Savings in construction costs arise from lov/er prices of
materials, lov\^er borrov/ing ciiarges, lower contractors' bids,
and tne greater efficiency of workers. Moreover, public work
is preferable to the dole.
The New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt gave the theory
of public works as a recovery measure a real chance to operate.
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In the Public Works Administration program the theory was
almost embodied in its entirety. In the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration, the Civil "-"orks iidrainistrat ion, the
Emergency Vi/ork: Relief program and the i/Vorks Progress Admini-
stration programs some of the conditions considered essential
to the successful working of the tneory were present but
several were absent. The PERA improved the public v/orks
programs of the cities and states and rendered financial
assistance. The program as a whole, however, aimed too much
at "relief". Projects were sometimes of questionable value.
Earnings of workers were inadequate, I'he decentralized ad-
ministrative organization was v/eak in many respects. The EWR
improved the nat\ire of t:ie early PERA. The Cv^A v/as a better
program than the PERA and EWR. Projects were of a more per-
manent and useful nature and were more diversified. Earnings
at first were higher, '•''he centralized administrative organi-
zation v/orked well, A great number of the unemployed v/ere
absorbed and business was stimulated to a noticeable degree.
The program v;as less of the "relief" type as employees did
not need to have relief status, and it aimed decidedly at
stimulating business as well as relieving distress from un-
employment .
The WPA was in general a better program than the CVi/A. •
It profited from the mistakes of the latter, the PERA, and
the EV/R, The projects were planned better and more permanent

as v/ell as greatly diversified. Earnings, however, v/ere
inadequate, and tnis fact, along with the requirement of
relief status for employees, placed the program in the
glorififcd "relief" class.
The FuA stood in marked contrast to the other Nev; Deal
public v/orks programs. In it v/as embodied the closest ap-
proximation to the ideal public works program advocated by
public works theorists that this country ever m'itnessed. The
goal of the progri^m. was the recovery of business through the
stimulation of the capital goods industries. '•'he projects
were of the heavy construction type which involved a lot of
indirect employment - for every tv/o men employed at the con-
struction site five v/ere em.ployed providing materials and
transporting them, i-ioreover, these projects vvere permanent
and useful, ''-he loans and grants met a great need of cities
and states. The conditions of employment were excellent.
Public employment exchanges were utilized, tuages v/ere stan-
dard. Hours v/ere alm.ost those prevailing in private industry.
VJorkers v/ere efficient and there v/as no relief status require-
ment. The administrative organization, at first too central-
ized, later represented a good balance betv/een extreme
centralization and extreme decentralization. If the PWA had
only been put into operation on a larger scale, the recovery
of business might have come sooner than it did.
It is difficult to state v/ith any great accuracy the
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relation of government spending to the recovery and recession
of business 1933-1937. Studies by the econoraist Arthur D.
Gayer have led to the conclusion that the rise in national
income 1934-1937 could be imputed almost entirely to govern-
ment spending. This conclusion has been reached oy the
economist Joseph Schumpeter and also by the seven Harvard and
Tufts economists. It does not seem illogical to connect the
increase in national income with the recovery of business.
The increase in business deposits has been taken by
Dr. Lauchlin Currie as indication of the importance of govern-
ment spending in the recovery of business. Dr. Currie sav/
that the income of business from the sale of its products
exceeded tho outgo in the form of wages, dividends, and other
payments to factors of production, and concluded that the
source must have been the net- income- increasing expenditures
of the government
.
The seven Harvard and Tufts economists stressed a
valuable contribution of government spending to recovery. They
said that such spending stimulated expenditures by manufac-
turing and mining concerns.
The recession of the fall of 1937 was caused immediately
by the curtailment of government spending early in 1937, The
basic cause, hov/ever, was the failure of business spending to
occur in a sufficient enough degree to offset the drop in
government spending. The causes for the failure of business
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to spend have been attributed by eminent economists to the
undermining of business confidence oy the Federal Government,
and the lack of outlet for investment funds. Pacts have
pointed to an excess of savings so that the income of business
does not equal the outgo.
This recession brought a change in the theory of public
works as a recovery measure. If it is a fact that private
business spending is necessary for the maintenance of the
economic good health of the United States and forces prevail
which deter such spending, the Federal G-overnment with the
aid of the city and state governments must spend. The role
of public works changes from an intermittent one to a per-
manent one. If, however, private busir^ess spending again
occurs so as to make unnecessary permanent government spending,
the role of public works can again be as it was v/hen Shillady,
Hard, Uallery and other public works theorists of the 20'
s
wrote - an instrument in stimulating recovery from depressions.
Our present economic system seems to be inherently unstable
and private business is subject to periodic depressions from
the morass of waich government spending must rescue it.
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